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Abstract 
 
 
In its etymology and in popular discourse, the term ‘avant-garde’ is commonly 
associated with a future temporality, while in art-historical discourse, it 
represents a tradition of modernist innovation, periodised as ‘historical avant-
garde’ and ‘neo-avant-garde’.  Since this historical periodisation was first 
established in the 1950s, the avant-garde’s futurity has been repeatedly 
disputed, bringing the very notion of an avant-garde into question.  This thesis 
takes as its starting point the predicament of ‘an avant-garde after the avant-
garde’ as a means to investigate the philosophico-political implications of a 
historical temporality marked by ‘afterness’.  Writing in critical dialogue with 
scholarship that has articulated the avant-garde as a notion of historical time, 
the thesis modifies the parameters of this scholarship by foregrounding the 
category of historicism, and by reformulating the avant-garde as a notion that 
both resists and inhabits historical periodisation.  As a study at the 
disciplinary intersection of comparative literature and critical theory, Ahead 
of its Time proceeds via close readings of selected theories of the avant-garde 
(German literary scholar Peter Bürger’s foundational Theory of the Avant-
Garde in the 1970s; British art theorist John Roberts’ formulation of a 
‘suspensive avant-garde’ in the twenty-first century; and the intellectual 
debates of the Italian circle Neoavanguardia in the 1960s), while also 
mobilising the critical resources available in the thought of Walter Benjamin. 
Through a non-linear, comparativist critical analysis that discusses these 
theories in, and as, a Benjaminian constellation, the thesis proposes the avant-
garde as a relational, indexical category that is constitutively split between 
historical continuity and historical rupture.  In this manner, Ahead of its Time 
revisits the broader question of mediation between universality and 
particularity, and by recasting it in temporal terms, it advocates a 
chronopolitics of singularity, whereby the avant-garde’s split between 
continuity and rupture also reveals the ethically-necessary relationship 
between self-determination and contingency.  
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Introduction: 
  
What’s Historical about the Historical Avant-
Garde? 
 
 
…the rupture of history is transformed little by little into a history of rupture. 
– Marcelin Pleynet, ‘Problems of the Avant-Garde’ (1966)1 
 
 
When French poet and essayist Marcelin Pleynet offered this negative 
diagnosis on the condition of the avant-garde in the pages of the influential 
literary journal Tel Quel in the mid-1960s, the avant-garde was beginning to 
show its first signs of exhaustion.  The apparent paradox that ‘the shock of the 
new’ was no longer shocking, and that the experiments and innovations of ‘the 
avant-garde of today’ had rendered the very name ‘avant-garde’ an 
anachronism, was a view that had become prevalent amongst art critics and 
intellectuals writing from various European and North American outposts.2 
Triggered by what was perceived as an irreversible process of 
institutionalisation and co-optation, a widespread anxiety over the avant-
garde’s afterlife gave rise to a discourse that repeatedly proclaimed, if not the 
                                                             
1 Marcelin Pleynet, ‘Problemes de l’avant-garde’, Tel Quel, 25. Printemps (1966), 77-
86 (p. 81).  
2 As an indication, see Hans Magnus Enzensberger, ‘The Aporias of the Avant-Garde’ 
(1962), trans. by John Simon, in The Consciousness Industry: On Literature, Politics and 
the Media, ed. by Michael Roloff (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), pp. 16-41; Harold 
Rosenberg, The Tradition of the New (New York: Da Capo Press, [1960] 1994), pp. 4-
10; Richard Chase, ‘The Fate of the Avant-Garde’, Partisan Review, 24.3 (1957), 363-
75.  The phrase ‘shock of the new’ is a nod to the popular book and BBC television 
series by Robert Hughes, which itself dates from the 1980s and does not form part of 
the intellectual discourses described here.  See Robert Hughes, The Shock of the New: 
Art and the Century of Change (London: Thames & Hudson, [1980] 1991).  
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avant-garde’s ultimate death, then certainly its perpetual crisis.3  Pleynet’s 
articulation of this anxiety over the avant-garde’s afterlife with reference to 
the categories of history and rupture stands out in its eloquence: not only does 
it foreground a relationship between the avant-garde and historical rupture 
(‘the rupture of history’ stands here for the avant-garde), it also poignantly 
refers to that relationship’s gradual reversal. In this seemingly simple 
formulation – ‘the rupture of history is transformed little by little into a history 
of rupture’ – the avant-garde becomes the exact opposite of what it once was.  
Pleynet’s formulation exemplifies the compelling effects of chiasmatic 
reversal: at once simple and intricate, it discloses on closer inspection a 
relationship more complex than a straightforward reversal.4  The category of 
history, that is, the role played by ‘history’ in the formulation’s constituent 
parts, is also transformed in this gradual process of transformation.  Whereas, 
in the first instance, history seems to denote the flow of historical events, in 
the second iteration, its meaning has shifted to those events’ representation, 
thus demoting history’s significance to one of mere historiography.  The 
avant-garde thus becomes entangled in this chiasmatic spider-web of history: 
it begins its journey as the thing that opposes and disrupts the continuity of 
historical flow, and ends up as nothing more than a story-telling of that flow’s 
disruption.  Yet, as this thesis seeks to propose, it is precisely in its 
entanglement in this complex web of relations concerning the different 
                                                             
3 On the prevalence of a ‘death discourse’ surrounding the avant-garde, see, for 
instance, Paul Mann, The Theory-Death of the Avant-garde (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993), especially p. 64; Jesper Olsson, ‘From Beyond the Grave: The 
Life and Death of the Avant-Garde. Book review of Mikkel Bolt, Avantgardens 
selvmord (Copenhagen: 28/6, 2009)’, The Nordic Journal of Aesthetics, 40-41 (2010-
2011), 153–63.      
4 On chiasmus and its continuing rhetorical significance since antiquity, see Anthony 
Paul and Boris Wiseman, eds., Chiasmus and Culture (New York: Berghahn Books, 
2014). 
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meanings of history and ‘the historical’ that the aporetic character of the 
avant-garde is most forcefully articulated. 
The intellectual questions underpinning Pleynet’s formulation speak 
directly to the central premise behind the propositions to be developed in this 
thesis: namely, that the status of the avant-garde’s relationship to historical 
time ought to considered as an articulation of ‘afterness’: that is, as a 
constitutive split between historical continuity and historical rupture.5  
Accepting that there was indeed a moment when the avant-garde’s alleged 
transformation from ‘a rupture of history’ into ‘a history of rupture’ took place 
(an idea that is further supported by scholarship that I discuss below), this 
thesis examines the philosophical implications of this changed relationship.  If 
the very meaning of the avant-garde hinges on its identification with the 
historical break, what happens when the avant-garde has itself become 
historical?  If the avant-garde’s radical politics centres on its ruptural 
relationship to history, what kind of politics or chronopolitics would a notion 
of the ‘historical avant-garde’ suggest?  Far from being research questions in 
the strict sense of the term, these broad exploratory interrogations provide 
the necessary intellectual framework through which to begin a critical re-
examination of the idea of the avant-garde after modernism.  Therefore, this 
thesis aims to articulate a new conceptualisation of the notion of the avant-
garde with reference to historical time, particularly as this conceptualisation 
is necessitated by the avant-garde’s changed status from a notion of futurity 
to one whose temporality is marked by a ‘future past’.6  
One important preliminary step must be taken before we embark on 
this undertaking.  Since it is the very notion of ‘the avant-garde’ that will come 
under scrutiny and reformulation, it is important that readers suspend any 
                                                             
 5 My usage of the term ‘afterness’ is indebted to the Germanist scholar Gerhard 
Richter.  My own proposition of ‘afterness’, as elaborated in Chapter 5, is conceptually 
distinct from Richter’s.  Cf. Gerhard Richter, Afterness: Figures of Following in Modern 
Thought and Aesthetics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).     
6 My allusion here is to Reinhart Koselleck, whose work I consider briefly below.   
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prior assumptions that they may have regarding this term.  Such prior 
assumptions may include certain conventions about who or what represents 
or exemplifies the avant-garde – be they specific artworks, texts and images; 
names of artists, writers and intellectuals; or lists of art movements. 
Assumptions may also pertain to specific geographical locations, historical 
periods, socio-economic conditions and political ideologies (including those 
that I have myself inescapably depended upon in my remarks in the preceding 
paragraphs). This strategy of suspension is not aimed at bypassing or erasing 
the issues that are raised through the consideration of specific artworks, 
geographical locations or historical periods. Quite the contrary: as will 
become apparent, this provisional ‘emptying out’ of signification is precisely 
what will enable the necessary interrogation of the status of specificity – in its 
deepest methodological and philosophical sense – when approaching the 
notion of the avant-garde critically.   
What follows is an introduction to the intellectual and methodological 
parameters of this investigation, structured in three parts. Part I introduces 
‘avant-garde’ as a term, clarifying the differences and convergences in the 
multiple discursive fields that the term occupies, before limiting its scope and 
proposing a preliminary, working notion of the avant-garde to be deployed in 
the thesis. Part II situates the present investigation within an existing body of 
scholarship that approaches the idea of the avant-garde as a philosophical 
problem, and suggests the ways in which this study builds on, and departs 
from, such scholarship. Part III introduces the corpus of texts through which 
this investigation will be undertaken, reviews key theories that were omitted 
from this study, and offers a brief summary overview while presenting the 
project’s broader methodological prism.   
 
I. ‘Which Avant-Garde?’ Specificity and its Discontents 
 
Conveying a sense of radicalism, novelty, and experimentation, ‘avant-garde’ 
is a word shrouded in mystique. An international term circulating in several 
fields of discourse, it retains today traces of its earlier military connotations 
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of a select group of soldiers marching ahead of the rest.7  For marketing and 
advertising executives ‘avant-garde’ usually means ‘cutting-edge’; for pop 
music journalists it may stand for ‘experimental’ or ‘difficult’; while for art 
lovers, it commonly represents a key moment in the development of 
nineteenth and twentieth century art.  Despite its ubiquity, the term ‘avant-
garde’ continues to bewilder. In its English usage it functions grammatically 
as both noun and adjective: someone or something may belong to ‘the avant-
garde’ (that select group of innovators or pioneers), or something may have 
certain ‘avant-garde’ attributes.  As art historian David Cottington has aptly 
remarked, this grammatical ambiguity has contributed to a broader 
conceptual ambiguity, and to a great deal of sloppy usage.8  Yet alongside the 
deceptively simple question of grammar, we must also note the term’s 
normative dimension: because of the implicit value-judgment entailed in 
saying who or what may qualify as ‘avant-garde’, the seemingly neutral 
question of definition quickly becomes embroiled in matters of legitimation 
and distinction.  For, the question ‘what is (the) avant-garde?’ immediately 
poses the question: ‘who decides what is (the) avant-garde?’  If the avant-
garde is no more than that which is said to be avant-garde – the noun merely 
exhibiting the characteristics of its own attribute – then we find ourselves 
caught in a definitional circularity. 
                                                             
7 See the etymological definition given by the OED, ‘Avant-garde, avant-guard’, Oxford 
English Dictionary Online, 2nd edn (1989), stable URL <http://www.oed.com> 
[accessed 18 February 2011].  The definitive scholarly histories of the term, tracing 
the link between the term ‘avant-garde’ and the utopian socialism of Saint-Simon, 
remain Donald Drew Egbert, ‘The Idea of “Avant-garde” in Art and Politics’, The 
American Historical Review, 73.2 (1967), 339-66; and Matei Calinescu, Five Faces of 
Modernity: Modernism, Avant-Garde, Decadence, Kitsch, Postmodernism (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1977; 2nd edn 1987), pp. 97-111.  
8 See David Cottington, The Avant-Garde: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), pp. 3-6.  
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Confronted with this knotty problem, scholars and teachers of this 
thing called avant-garde have long wrestled with the term’s contingent 
character, often resorting to identifying this contingency as the avant-garde’s 
defining characteristic. Introducing the term in a student textbook, art 
historian Paul Wood has announced the avant-garde as ‘a radically unstable 
concept’.9  Writing in a similar context, film historian Ian Christie has declared 
that: ‘the idea of an avant-garde cannot, by its nature, be static or agreed.  It is 
perhaps best understood as, in the philosophers’ term, an essentially 
contested concept, always open to dispute or redefinition’.10  Literary scholar 
Susan Rubin Suleiman has acknowledged the same intricacies when referring 
to the avant-garde as an example of deixis; namely, as a semantic element 
whose reference is always relative to a specific location and standpoint, and 
which consequently has no meaning outside that standpoint.11  Lastly, 
attempting to introduce a historical-materialist dimension to the issue, some 
scholars have turned to the thought of Raymond Williams and his category of 
the ‘basic concept’, suggesting that the avant-garde is best understood as a 
                                                             
9 Paul Wood, ‘Modernism and the Idea of the Avant-Garde’, in A Companion to Art 
Theory, ed. by Paul Smith and Carolyn Wilde (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 215-28 
(p. 215). 
10 Ian Christie, ‘The Avant-Gardes and European Cinema before 1930’, in The Oxford 
Guide to Film Studies, ed. by John Hill and Pamela Church Gibson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), pp. 449-54 (p. 453, emphasis added).  Christie is referring to 
W. B. Gallie’s paradigmatic social-science model whose application for the humanities 
is, however, questionable. Cf. W. B. Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56 (1956), 167-98.  
11 Susan R. Suleiman, ‘The Idea of the Avant-Garde’, in The Columbia History of 
Twentieth-Century French Thought, ed. by Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 162–65 (p. 163).  
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historically-constituted problem-category, alongside those of ‘culture’ and 
‘ideology’.12   
This articulation of the avant-garde as a contingent and contested 
notion – whether considered ‘essentially’, semantically, or historically – has 
itself fed back into the term’s etymological history.  Thus, a large number of 
accounts that deal exclusively with the idea of the avant-garde have placed 
less emphasis on defining the avant-garde, and more on offering an intellectual 
historiography of its terminological contestation.13  These accounts have 
variously incorporated genealogies of artists and art movements that are 
considered to be part of an ‘avant-garde tradition’ with discussions of 
landmark publications such as Clement Greenberg’s essay ‘Avant-Garde and 
Kitsch’ (1939), Renato Poggioli’s monograph Teoria dell’arte d’avanguardia 
(1962, translated as The Theory of the Avant-Garde in 1968), and the locus 
classicus for avant-garde studies, Peter Bürger’s Theorie der Avantgarde 
                                                             
12 See Jason M. Baskin, ‘Romanticism, Culture, Collaboration: Raymond Williams 
beyond the Avant-Garde’, Cultural Critique, 83. Winter (2013), 108–36 (pp. 108-9); 
Gail Day, 'Art, Love and Social Emancipation: The Concept "Avant-Garde" and the 
Interwar Avant-Gardes', in Art of the Avant-Gardes, ed. by Steve Edwards and Paul 
Wood (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), pp. 307-333 (p. 312).   
13 In addition to Paul Wood’s article cited above, see inter alia Edgar Lohner, ‚Die 
Problematik des Begriffes der Avantgarde‘, in Literarische Avantgarden, ed. by 
Manfred Hardt (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1988), pp. 113-27; 
Hannes Böhringer, ‘Avantgarde – Geschichten einer Metapher’, Archiv für 
Begriffsgeschichte, 22 (1978), 90–114; Jost Hermand, ‘Das Konzept ,Avantgardeʻ’, in 
Faschismus und Avantgarde, hg. Reinhold Grimm and Jost Hermand (Königstein: 
Athenäum Verlag, 1980), pp. 1-17; Ann Gibson, ‘Avant-Garde’, in Critical Terms for Art 
History, ed. by Robert S. Nelson and Richard Shiff (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996), pp. 202-16; Johanne Lamoureux, ‘Avant-Garde: A Historiography of a 
Critical Concept’, in A Companion to Contemporary Art since 1945, ed. by Amelia Jones 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 191-211.    
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(1974, translated as Theory of the Avant-Garde in 1984).14  Others, seizing 
upon the opportunity opened up by such contestation, have sought to 
contribute to the field by revisiting the perennial question and by defining the 
avant-garde anew.15  
Despite this broader acceptance of the avant-garde being a ‘problem-
category’, it is my contention – and one of the departure points for my enquiry 
– that the avant-garde, as notion, remains firmly fixed upon a small number of 
coordinates.  As I elaborate below, these coordinates relate to broader 
questions of history and representation, and have crystallised in the tension 
between the cognate concepts of ‘modernity’ and ‘modernism’.  Following 
from this, I propose that the apparent problem of the contingency (or of the 
definitional circularity) of the avant-garde in fact concerns the more 
fundamental issue of mediation between universality and particularity. Thus, 
to articulate the issue in the form of questions: the question ‘what is (the) 
avant-garde?’, instead of being approached directly, is commonly displaced by 
answering the different question ‘which avant-garde?’.  And this shift from 
generality to specificity (or from ontology to taxonomy, we might say) is also 
accompanied by a shift from idea to phenomenon: the avant-garde as general 
                                                             
14 See, respectively, Clement Greenberg, ‘Avant-Garde and Kitsch’, in Clement 
Greenberg: The Collected Essays and Criticism, Volume 1, ed. by John O’Brian (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 5-22; Renato Poggioli, The Theory of the Avant-
Garde, trans. by Gerald Fitzgerald (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, [1962] 1968); Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, trans. by 
Michael Shaw; with a foreword by Jochen Schulte-Sasse (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, [1974] 1984).   
15 For an early affirmation of the avant-garde as a notion that must remain a question, 
see Helmut Krapp and Karl Markus Michel, ‘Noten zum Avantgardismus’, Akzente, 2 
(1955), 399-407 (p. 399).  More recently, see ‘What Is an Avant-Garde?’, Special Issue, 
ed. by Jonathan P. Eburne and Rita Felski, New Literary History, 41.4 (2010) and Marc 
James Léger, ed., The Idea of the Avant-Garde – And What It Means Today (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press/Left Curve, 2014).   
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idea is made ‘unproblematic’ through resort to the avant-garde as specific 
phenomenon.  Before I elaborate on the problems that emerge from such a 
shift, and how this thesis seeks to respond to these problems, let me first 
outline the most prevalent conception of the avant-garde as phenomenon and 
the coordinates upon which this conception is fixed.   
Understood in its specificity, the avant-garde is generally articulated as 
a socio-cultural or artistic phenomenon of experimentation and innovation.  
As a socio-cultural phenomenon, the avant-garde comes to stand for a group 
of people (for instance, artists, intellectuals, or activists) who play a 
pioneering role within the wider social body.16  This group of people is often 
considered to be socially marginal and linked to ‘bohemian’ or ‘counter-
cultural’ tendencies; in order for their activities to be considered ‘avant-
garde’, they ought to be significant enough to take on the character of a 
‘formation’ – to come to stand for what is often called a ‘specific historical 
conjuncture’.17 In this conception, the avant-garde is best understood through 
sociological theories of art such as the paradigmatic analysis of Pierre 
Bourdieu, who insightfully articulates the avant-garde in relation to the 
‘bastard institution’ of the salon, and identifies the unique character of the 
avant-garde in its paradoxical relation to, and legitimation by, the bourgeois 
                                                             
16 See, for instance, ‘Avant-garde’, in M.H. Abrams, A Glossary of Literary Terms, 3rd 
edition (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971), p. 227.  
17 See Fred Orton and Griselda Pollock, ‘Avant-Gardes and Partisans Reviewed’, Art 
History, 4.3 (1981), 305-27; reprinted in Fred Orton and Griselda Pollock, Avant-
Gardes and Partisans Reviewed (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), pp. 
141-164 (pp. 141-142).  Cf. Cottington, The Avant-Garde, pp. 8-21; David Cottington, 
‘Like Mushrooms Overnight: A Conjunctural Analysis of the Emergence of the Avant-
Garde’, Unpublished Conference Paper, Historizing the Avant-Garde, Copenhagen 20-
22 November 2009; with thanks to the author for providing access to the 
unpublished manuscript.     
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market.18  Understood as an artistic phenomenon, on the other hand, the 
avant-garde emerges as a more narrowly specified category. Though the 
avant-garde as an artistic phenomenon is still considered through its 
antagonistic relationship towards mainstream cultural production or the 
market, its determination is often little more than a process of classification 
and taxonomy, where genealogies of artists, artworks, and art movements are 
presented as part of the avant-garde tradition.19  This history of the avant-
garde tradition is then further delineated according to two coordinates: most 
frequently, according to artistic medium (or discipline), and according to a 
national (or regional) origin. Whenever the decidedly undecided term ‘avant-
garde’ is introduced in a discussion, therefore, one can easily fall back upon 
the certainties of specificity: the avant-garde becomes the architectural avant-
garde, the musical avant-garde, the literary avant-garde, the digital avant-
garde, etc.; or it becomes the Turkish avant-garde, the Latin American avant-
garde, the Nordic avant-garde, the Australian avant-garde, and so on.20 While 
                                                             
18 See Pierre Bourdieu, The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field, 
trans. by Susan Emanuel (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, [1992] 1996), 
especially pp. 47-68, 121-28.     
19 See, for instance, the source books by Richard Kostelanetz, A Dictionary of the 
Avant-Gardes (New York: Schirmer Books, 2000); and Hubert van den Berg and 
Walter Fähnders, eds., Metzler Lexikon Avantgarde (Stuttgart: Metzler Verlag, 2008).  
20 Once again, this tendency is so prevalent in popular and scholarly discourse that 
space does not permit the inclusion of a comprehensive bibliography. Merely as an 
indication, see Aleksandar Flaker, ‘The Croatian Avant-Garde’, in Literarische 
Avantgarden, ed. by Manfred Hardt (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 
1988), pp. 375-91; Georgina Born, Rationalizing Culture: IRCAM, Boulez and the 
Institutionalization of the Musical Avant-Garde (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1995); Toshiko Ellis, ‘The Japanese Avant-Garde of the 1920s: The Poetic 
Struggle with the Dilemma of the Modern’, Poetics Today, 20. 4 (1999), 723-41; Hilde 
Heynen, ‘Avant-garde’, in Encyclopedia of Twentieth Century Architecture, ed. by R. 
Stephen Sennott (New York: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2004), pp. 97-99; Xiaobing Tang, 
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the latter specification of taxonomy through geography is welcome in that it 
often embraces inter-disciplinarity and goes beyond medium-specificity, it 
regrettably also reproduces a form of cultural essentialism, where each 
specific avant-garde phenomenon has to demonstrate its ‘avant-garde-ness’ – 
i.e. its legitimacy as avant-garde – to a general, arguably universalising, 
category of the avant-garde as notion.  (I will be returning to this contentious 
claim below).    
It is here that the centrality of the tension between ‘modernism’ and 
‘modernity’ and its relationship to the avant-garde becomes crucial.  Readers 
familiar with the problem of translating le moderne or die Moderne into 
English will be aware of the many misconceptions that arise as one tries to 
distinguish between ‘modernism’, ‘modernity’, and ‘the modern’.21  Yet the 
frequent lack of distinction between these terms is arguably also indicative of 
the more fundamental difficulty of systematically articulating an appropriate 
mediation between the socio-economic and cultural spheres. Modernism is 
still widely conceived in reflectionist terms – i.e. as the aesthetic response 
(whether as reflection of, or as reaction against) the socio-economic category 
of modernity.22 That said, this crude reflectionism has also been productively 
                                                             
Origins of the Chinese Avant-Garde: The Modern Woodcut Movement (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2007).     
21 See the seminal discussions by Jürgen Habermas and Hans Robert Jauss amongst 
others.  Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), especially pp. 1-22; ‘Modernity versus 
Postmodernity’, trans. by Seyla Ben-Habib, New German Critique, 22. Special issue on 
Modernism (1981), 3-14; reprinted as ‘Modernity – an Incomplete Project’, in The 
Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture, ed. by Hal Foster (Port Townsend, WA: 
Bay Press, 1983), pp. 3-15.  Hans Robert Jauss, ‘Modernity and Literary Tradition’, 
Critical Inquiry, 31.2 (2005), 329-64.      
22 See, for instance, Philip Tew and Alex Murray, ‘Introduction: Beginning with 
Modernism’, in The Modernism Handbook, ed. by Philip Tew and Alex Murray 
(London: Continuum, 2009), pp. 1-15 (pp. 12-13).    
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countered by analyses that centre on mediating categories such as subjectivity 
or experience.  Whether these draw on Reinhart Koselleck’s conception of 
modernity (Neuzeit) as the historical period that is uniquely self-conscious of 
its own historical time as ‘new’, or depart from Charles Baudelaire’s classic 
formulation that pronounces modernity as ‘the ephemeral, the fugitive, the 
contingent, the half of art whose other half is the eternal and the immutable’, 
such analyses allow for a more nuanced mediation between the cultural and 
the socio-economic dimensions of ‘the modern’.23   
Despite these nuanced mediations of the cultural and the socio-
economic spheres, the notion of the avant-garde – fluctuating between its 
socio-cultural meaning of bohemianism and its art-historical meaning of a 
tradition of formal experimentation – has inevitably been caught in the 
tension between (cultural) modernism and (socio-economic) modernity.  
Although the days of treating the avant-garde and modernism as synonymous 
are long gone, the avant-garde is still firmly attached to the notion of 
modernism.24  This attachment can again be understood through the tension 
                                                             
23 I have in mind analyses such as those by Marshall Berman, All That is Solid Melts 
into Air: The Experience of Modernity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982); and David 
Frisby, Fragments of Modernity: Theories of Modernity in the Work of Simmel, Kracauer 
and Benjamin (Cambridge: Polity, 1985).  For Koselleck’s paradigmatic conceptual 
history, see Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, 
trans. and with an introduction by Keith Tribe (New York: Columbia University Press, 
[1979] 2004), especially pp. 222-54.  For Baudelaire’s classic definition, see Charles 
Baudelaire, ‘The Painter of Modern Life’ [1859], in The Painter of Modern Life and 
Other Essays, trans. and ed. by Jonathan Mayne (London: Phaidon, [1964] 1995), pp. 
1-41 (p. 12).      
24 For a now-outdated example of treating the avant-garde and modernism 
interchangeably, see John Weightman, The Concept of the Avant-Garde: Explorations 
in Modernism (London: Alcove Press, 1973), passim.  For more recent expressions of 
this fundamental link between modernism and the avant-garde, see inter alia, 
Raymond Williams, ‘The Politics of the Avant-Garde’, in The Politics of Modernism: 
Against the New Conformists (London: Verso, 1989), pp. 49-63 (p. 51); Robert Holub, 
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between a trans-historically conceived question of artistic form or 
representation, on the one hand, and a historically specific question of 
periodisation, on the other.  With respect to representation, the avant-garde’s 
links to modernism are legitimated through their joint opposition to realism 
(where both modernism and realism are understood in terms of genre).  With 
respect to historical periodisation, the avant-garde is taken to occupy, or 
indeed to construct, the same historical period as modernism (with 
modernism being here construed in its double function as genre and period). 
Thus, modernism and by extension the avant-garde are historically situated 
in the years c. 1910-1930 or, in a more inclusive variation, in the years c. 1890-
1940.  Needless to say, these periodisations are much contested, and the 
chronological boundaries first laid out in Malcolm Bradbury and James 
MacFarlane’s canonical collection Modernism: A Guide to European Literature, 
1890-1930 have since been adjusted and modified.25  Particularly since the 
rise of ‘new modernist studies’, these chronological – and indeed geographical 
– boundaries have given way to a plethora of studies that question the 
legitimacy of modernism as a homogeneous phenomenon, and place emphasis 
on transnational exchange and global networks.26 In its most provocatively 
                                                             
‘Modernism, Modernity, Modernisation’, in The Cambridge History of Literary 
Criticism: Volume 9, Twentieth-Century Historical, Philosophical and Psychological 
Perspectives, ed. by Christa Knellwolf and Christopher Norris (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), pp. 275-88 (p. 280).      
25 See Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane, eds., Modernism: A Guide to European 
Literature, 1890-1930 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976). 
26 See the changes noted in the ‘Preface to the Second Edition’ in Peter Nicholls, 
Modernisms: A Literary Guide (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995; 2nd edn 2009), 
p. viii; and the seminal survey article by Douglas Mao and Rebecca L. Walkowitz, ‘The 
New Modernist Studies’, PMLA, 123.3 (2008), 737–48.  Of interest is also the 
regrettably mean-spirited exchange about the politics of new modernist studies 
between Max Brzezinski and Martin Puchner.  See Max Brzezinski, ‘The New 
Modernist Studies: What’s Left of Political Formalism?’, Minnesota Review, 76 (2011), 
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expansive articulation so far, Susan Stanford Friedman’s Planetary 
Modernisms, traces of modernism are found as far as the Tang Dynasty and the 
Mongol Empire of Genghis Khan.27   
Such expansions and modifications notwithstanding, the avant-garde’s 
historical location continues to be fixed to the periodising category of 
modernism.  Its historical location has been additionally fixed by the fact that 
the avant-garde functions as a periodising category itself or, rather, as a 
periodising category ‘cut in two’. Long before avant-garde studies had become 
a recognised sub-field of modernist studies, and as early as Pleynet’s diagnosis 
of the avant-garde’s historical crisis, the avant-garde had been split into two 
periods – ‘historical avant-garde’ and ‘neo-avant-garde’ – so as to mark the 
history of formal innovations in the first and second half of the twentieth 
century respectively and, in its initial formulation, to highlight precisely what 
was seen as the decline of the ‘original’ (i.e. ‘historical’) avant-garde.28 Since 
                                                             
109-25; Martin Puchner, ‘The New Modernist Studies: A Response’, Minnesota 
Review, 79 (2012), 91-96.     
27 See Susan Stanford Friedman, Planetary Modernisms: Provocations on Modernity 
across Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).  For the turn towards 
plural, global modernisms, see inter alia Peter Brooker et al, eds., The Oxford 
Handbook of Modernisms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Mark Wollaeger 
and Matt Eatough, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Global Modernisms (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012).  
28 The origin of the categories ‘historical avant-garde’ and ‘neo-avant-garde’ is often 
mistakenly attributed to Peter Bürger.  See, for instance, David Hopkins, 
‘Introduction’, in Neo-Avant-Garde, ed. by David Hopkins (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
2006), pp. 1-15 (p. 2). Hopkins is correct to foreground Bürger’s theory as 
popularising the neo-avant-garde as a ‘lesser’ avant-garde.  However, the derogatory 
connotations of ‘neo-avant-garde’, and prior to that of ‘neo-dada’, had already been 
established in the writing of several critics and, indeed, of some ‘ex-Dadaists’ 
themselves.  See Hubert van den Berg, ‘On the Historiographic Distinction between 
Historical and Neo-Avant-Garde’, in Avant-garde/Neo-avant-garde, ed. by Dietrich 
Scheunemann (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005), pp. 63-74 (pp. 67-70).      
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these lamentations of the neo-avant-garde’s lesser status as ‘avant-garde’ in 
the 1960s and 1970s, several attempts at rehabilitating the neo-avant-garde 
have taken place, most prominently those proposed by art critics Benjamin 
H.D. Buchloh and Hal Foster.29  Indeed, it is to Foster’s influential essay ‘What’s 
Neo about the Neo-Avant-Garde?’ (1994) that this introduction owes its title.  
Yet in asking ‘What’s Historical about the Historical Avant-Garde?’ my aim is 
not to shift the focus back to the hegemonic periodising category that Foster’s 
analysis successfully critiqued.  Whereas Foster articulated an alternative 
temporality for the neo-avant-garde (i.e. as the Freudian structure of 
Nachträglichkeit that, in its repetition of the traumatic event, activates and 
makes sense of the original occurrence), my focus in this thesis rests neither 
with the temporality of the historical-avant-garde nor with the temporality of 
the neo-avant-garde.  Rather, my concern lies in the paradoxical status of the 
avant-garde as a notion that both defies, and is bound by, the temporality of 
periodisation.   
Thus, if we consider the avant-garde as a contested and contingent 
notion, and furthermore, as a notion that can articulate a problematic of 
historical time, we can identify the new theoretical horizons that are opened 
up by considering the avant-garde as both inhabiting and resisting the 
temporality of historical periodisation.  In one of the few dictionary definitions 
that pays attention to the philosophical question of historicity in relation to 
the avant-garde, Ian Buchanan rightly problematises the avant-garde’s 
relationship to modernism, and goes on to assert that the avant-garde is 
inextricably linked to the ontological question of ‘the new’: ‘The notion of the 
                                                             
29 See Benjamin H. D. Buchloh, ‘Theorizing the Avant-Garde’, Art in America, 
November (1984), 19-21; ‘The Primary Colors for the Second Time: A Paradigm 
Repetition for the Neo-Avant-Garde’, October, 37. Summer (1986), 41-52; Neo-
Avantgarde and Culture Industry: Essays on European and American Art from 1955 to 
1975 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000).  Hal Foster, ‘What’s Neo about the Neo-
Avant-Garde?’, October, 70. Autumn (1994), 5-32; The Return of the Real: The Avant-
Garde at the End of the Century (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).   
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Avant-garde is therefore an ontological as well as artistic or historical 
problematic in that it contains the question of its own possibility: what does it 
take to be absolutely new?’30  The question that drives my enquiry makes the 
same demands of the avant-garde: it asks what it takes to be absolutely new 
and, moreover, it asks what it takes to be absolutely new while also being 
historically new.  In order to formulate an answer to this question, the thesis 
proceeds by drawing on recent scholarship that has examined the notion of 
avant-garde through a philosophical prism.  This body of scholarship, as I 
outline below, has raised key questions regarding the avant-garde’s 
historicity, and it is within the parameters provided by this philosophical turn 
that my own approach is formulated. 
   
II. Historicity, Time, and the Philosophical Turn in Avant-Garde Studies     
 
The working definition of the avant-garde to be deployed in this thesis, 
therefore, does not consider the avant-garde as a socio-cultural phenomenon, 
genre, a series of art movements or a periodising category, but rather as a 
philosophical notion of historical time.  This proposed notion has been 
formulated in response to a body of scholarship which, for want of a better 
term, might be referred to as a philosophical turn within (and, to some extent, 
against) avant-garde studies.  Far from constituting a clearly delineated field 
of study, this philosophical turn can be seen to have emerged from the work 
of scholars with a shared interest in the philosophical implications of the 
avant-garde’s temporal dimensions. Despite the absence of a pre-defined field 
of ‘the philosophical avant-garde’, however, the common ground established 
between these scholars, whether through direct contact and personal 
collaboration, or whether simply through common intellectual reference 
points, has resulted in an intellectual consistency and coherence that easily 
matches that of any long-established scholarly field.  
                                                             
30 Ian Buchanan, ‘Avant-garde’, in A Dictionary of Critical Theory, 1st edn (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 34.  
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The reference points that have established an intellectual common 
ground for these works have been the legacies of the thought of Martin 
Heidegger, Theodor W. Adorno and Walter Benjamin.  Accordingly, 
discussions of the avant-garde have tended to focus on the categories of 
historicity and experience within Heideggerian phenomenology and the 
Frankfurt School.  While some scholars have been more partial to one 
intellectual tradition over the other, and have carefully navigated the 
commonalities and differences between the two, they have all been guided by 
a strong impetus to defend a conception of qualitative over quantitative time: 
or, otherwise put, a conception of time as lived experience over that of time as 
measurement.31  Krzysztof Ziarek, for instance, in works such as The 
Historicity of Experience: Modernity, the Avant-Garde, and the Event (2001), has 
approached the idea of the avant-garde through his research on poetics and 
technology, and an intellectual prism indebted to Heidegger and Adorno.32  In 
his proposition of the ‘avant-garde-work’, not as artwork but as what he calls 
an ‘event-work’, Ziarek has re-articulated the avant-garde as a ‘momentum’ or 
‘force’ that can surpass the limitations posed by the periodising (and, by 
extension, quantifying) logic of modernism.33  Situated at the intersection of 
post-Heideggerian hermeneutics and the Frankfurt School, Andrew 
Benjamin’s widely discussed collection of essays Art, Mimesis and the Avant-
                                                             
31 These terms, and their epistemological foundations and implications, are clarified 
and discussed at length in Chapter 1.   
32 See Krzysztof Ziarek, The Historicity of Experience: Modernity, the Avant-Garde, and 
the Event (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001), pp. 3-21, 33-115, 294-
299; The Force of Art (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), passim.  See 
also Ziarek’s broader engagement with the ‘points of contact and conflict’ between 
Adorno and Heidegger in Iain Macdonald and Krzysztof Ziarek, eds., Adorno and 
Heidegger: Philosophical Questions (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 
passim (and in the quote here at p. 4). 
33 See Krzysztof Ziarek, ‘The Avant-Garde and the End of Art’, Filozofski Vestnik, 35.2 
(2014), 67–81 (pp. 75-76); The Force of Art, pp. 1-17.    
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Garde (1991) has similarly articulated a conception of ‘avant-garde 
experience’.34  Benjamin’s interest in the idea of the avant-garde can be seen 
as part of his broader intellectual project to re-formulate the philosophical 
category of ontology as ‘anoriginal difference’, and accordingly, his 
proposition of the avant-garde challenges the received notion of the avant-
garde as a negation of tradition.35  Instead, the avant-garde is proposed as a 
notion that affirms the very possibility of ‘inauguration’, of a most radical 
beginning that lies beyond the quantitatively new.  Developed partly through 
direct dialogue with Andrew Benjamin, Peter Osborne’s contribution has 
indisputably been the most influential in this philosophical turn.  Osborne’s 
monograph The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde (1995; 2011) 
mobilises the thought of Heidegger, Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and Paul 
Ricoeur (among many others) in an attempt to re-think the temporality 
implicit in the concept of modernity.36  Despite the book’s title, the avant-
garde remains marginal to Osborne’s analysis, as the term is used either to 
                                                             
34 See Andrew Benjamin, Art, Mimesis and the Avant-garde: Aspects of a Philosophy of 
Difference (London: Routledge, 1991), especially pp. 1-5, 36, 43-59, 64, 99-105, 131-
141. 
35 Andrew Benjamin’s philosophical proposition of ontology as anoriginal difference 
has since been systematically developed in publications such as The Plural Event: 
Descartes, Hegel, Heidegger (London: Routledge, 1993) and Towards a Relational 
Ontology: Philosophy’s Other Possibility (Albany: SUNY Press, 2015).     
36 See Peter Osborne, The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde (London: Verso, 
1995; 2nd ed. 2011), especially pp. ix-x, 1-5, 13-16, 23.  For the broader project that 
marks their collaboration, see for instance, Andrew Benjamin and Peter Osborne, 
eds., Walter Benjamin’s Philosophy: Destruction & Experience (London & New York: 
Routledge, 1994/2nd edn, Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000).  While Andrew 
Benjamin’s position regarding historicity has remained consistent since the ‘90s, 
Osborne’s more recent book-length publication arguably reverts to the kind of 
historicist conception of the avant-garde that The Politics of Time had inspired future 
scholars to go beyond.  See Peter Osborne, Anywhere or Not At All: Philosophy of 
Contemporary Art (London: Verso, 2013), pp. 18-22.   
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designate a temporal experience of rupture (which Osborne, in loose accord 
with Andrew Benjamin, calls ‘avant-garde experience’), or to stand for an 
expanded treatment of Surrealism, the latter being somewhat cursorily 
enlisted to provide the connecting thread between Walter Benjamin, Henri 
Lefebvre, and the crucial category for Osborne: ‘the everyday’.37 That said, 
Osborne’s main intellectual contribution – a phenomenological investigation 
into the concept of modernity, not as a neutral periodising category but as a 
form of historical consciousness – remains seminal for any consideration of 
historical temporality and the avant-garde.   
The implications for a philosophical treatment of the avant-garde, 
especially with respect to the question of historicity, have since been taken up 
by scholars writing at the intersection of literary modernism, cultural studies, 
and critical theory.  Building on Osborne’s formulation of modernity, literary 
and cultural theorist David Cunningham has shifted the focus from modernity 
to the avant-garde itself, interrogating the implicit temporalities of art-
historical and literary-historical discourses, and proposing the avant-garde as 
a concept of historical temporalisation.38 Supplementing Adornian and 
Benjaminian tendencies with the post-Heideggerian thought of Maurice 
Blanchot and Jacques Derrida, Cunningham has attended to the grammatical 
distinction between the avant-garde, understood as a periodising category, 
and an avant-garde, understood as a concept that ‘inscribes a particular mode 
of temporalizing history in its own right’ and, in a move that can be seen as 
                                                             
37 See Osborne, The Politics of Time, pp. 165, 180-196.  
38 See inter alia, David Cunningham, ‘Architecture, Utopia and the futures of the avant-
garde’, The Journal of Architecture, 6.2 (2001), 169-182 (pp. 169-170; 178, n. 5); ‘A 
Time for Dissonance and Noise: On Adorno, Music, and The Concept of Modernism’, 
Angelaki, 8.1 (2003), 61-74 (pp. 62-63); ‘The Futures of Surrealism: Hegelianism, 
Romanticism, and the Avant-Garde’, SubStance, 34.2 (2005), 47-65 (pp. 49, 60-61).  
The essays stem from the doctoral dissertation ‘A Time of Affirmation: On the 
Concept of an Avant-Garde’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Westminster, 
2001).     
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echoing Andrew Benjamin’s notion of inauguration, the avant-garde is  
proposed as that which names the very possibility of rupture.39  Also in 
dialogue with The Politics of Time, prominent Frankfurt School scholar and 
intellectual historian Susan Buck-Morss has adopted the conception of the 
avant-garde as experience of historical time, further delineating a distinction 
between ‘vanguard’ and ‘avant-garde’ time, and critiquing certain aspects of 
Osborne’s formulation on empirical grounds.40 Buck-Morss’s reservations 
rest on her insistence that Russian avant-garde artists followed a Leninist 
(that is, linear and progressivist) conception of historical time, which, 
according to Buck-Morss, ought to be distinguished from the Benjaminian 
critique of progressivist historicism, theorised by Osborne as ‘avant-garde’.  
As ‘vanguard’ and ‘avant-garde’ come to stand for two competing 
temporalities of modernity (‘Soviet’ and ‘Western’), Buck-Morss’s 
contribution reveals further complexities that are of geopolitical as well as 
chronopolitical significance.41 Lastly, through another contribution that is 
indebted to Osborne and that examines the relationship between modernities 
‘East’ and ‘West’, comparatist Tyrus Miller has discussed the paradoxical 
temporality of the term ‘retroavantgarde’ with reference to the Slovene art 
                                                             
39 Cunningham, ‘The Futures of Surrealism’, 49. 
40 See Susan Buck-Morss, ‘Revolutionary Time: The Vanguard and the Avant-Garde’, 
Benjamin Studien/Studies, 17: Perception and Experience in Modernity, ed. by Helga 
Geyer-Ryan (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002), pp. 209–25; Dreamworld and Catastrophe: 
The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 
60-63; 298, n. 28; 304, n. 87.   
41 Space does not permit me to discuss the contentious issues arising from such a 
distinction.  For a valuable critical reading of Buck-Morss’s problematic simplification 
of the temporality between ‘East’ and ‘West’, see Lisa Rofel, ‘Hetero-Temporalities of 
Post-Socialism’, in Given World and Time: Temporalities in Context, ed. by Tyrus Miller 
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 2008), pp. 243-60 (pp. 243-45).   
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group IRWIN, further problematising the implicit temporality of the avant-
garde as a periodising category.42 
My own enquiry shares these scholars’ principal intentions and 
intellectual prisms: it approaches the avant-garde philosophically, yet it does 
so outside the disciplinary boundaries of philosophy.  In accord with the work 
of Cunningham and Miller, it seeks to interrogate the avant-garde as 
commonly understood within art-historical discourse, and to investigate the 
temporalities at stake in periodising categories such as ‘historical avant-
garde’ and ‘neo-avant-garde’.  While in dialogue with these authors, my thesis 
departs from this body of scholarship in one key respect: its conception of 
historicity.  The majority of the above scholars (Buck-Morss being the sole 
exception) either share or follow Osborne’s phenomenological conception of 
historicity, a conception that is reliant, as we have seen, on the legacies of the 
thought of Heidegger, Benjamin and Adorno.  A characteristic example of 
Osborne’s fidelity to the thought of the latter is his espousal of the aphorism 
from Minima Moralia: ‘Modernity is a qualitative, not a chronological, 
category’.43  Viewed from such a perspective – a perspective which, as I discuss 
in Chapter 3, finds Adorno and Heidegger at certain points of convergence – 
historicity must stay clear of any form of time-measurement and, 
consequently, the avant-garde as a notion of historical temporalisation must 
be dissociated from historicism.  What such a conception of historicity leads 
                                                             
42 See Tyrus Miller, Late Modernism: Politics, Fiction, and the Arts between the World 
Wars (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 22-23; 
‘Retroavantgarde: Aesthetic Revival and the Con/Figurations of 20th-Century Time’, 
Filozofski Vestnik, 28.2 (2007), 253-65; Time-Images: Alternative Temporalities in 
Twentieth Century Theory, Literature, and Art (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2009).   
43 See Peter Osborne, ‘Modernity is a Qualitative, Not a Chronological, Category’, New 
Left Review, I/192 (1992), 65-84; The Politics of Time, p. 22.  Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, 
Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, trans. by E. F. N. Jephcott (London: 
Verso, [1974] 2005), p. 221.  
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to, however, is a problematic conflation of historicism with positivism and, 
even more spuriously, of historiography with chronology.44  It is precisely in 
this regard that my proposition of the avant-garde as a notion of historical 
time distances itself from Osborne’s and the above scholars’ contributions.  
Although I engage with the phenomenological conceptions of historicity as 
these are inflected in the thought of Benjamin and Adorno, I have sought to 
resist taking these thinkers’ conception of historical time at their own word, 
proposing instead that, when considering avant-garde temporality, one ought 
to investigate the constitutive role of historicism.  (Precisely how we are to 
understand ‘historicism’ here will become clear shortly.)   
Consequently, the manner in which ‘historicity’ is deployed throughout 
the thesis marks a notable departure from the above scholarship.  Although it 
is not my intention to offer a new theoretical formulation of historicity, I 
propose two working definitions that will enable the philosophical 
consideration of the idea of the avant-garde through a new lens.  The first 
definition is intentionally broadly construed, leading to a second, much 
narrower, determination.  Broadly construed, historicity is proposed as a 
category encompassing a variety of issues pertaining to the ‘historical’.  This 
conception aims to highlight the crucial issue that has already been intimated 
through Marcelin Pleynet’s chiasmatic formulation: that is, the issue of 
mediation between the two meanings of ‘history’ (between history as event 
and history as representation).  It thus seeks to attend to the multiple 
denotations of historicism (which Osborne’s fidelity to a phenomenological 
attack on historicism problematically bypasses).  Accordingly, it considers the 
constitutive role of historiography – not as naïve chronology, or a passive 
handing-down of facts and dates on a string (a caricature owing much to 
Walter Benjamin, as I discuss in Chapter 1), but as the active writing of history, 
and therefore as an indispensable form of critical practice. Stemming from 
these concerns, a second, narrower working definition of historicity is 
                                                             
44 See, in particular, Osborne, The Politics of Time, pp. 33, 152.  
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proposed: historicity as the articulation of antagonisms between qualitative 
and quantitative time. Historicity is thus intended not simply as another name 
for qualitative time but as a category which mediates the tensions between 
experience and measurement.  Therefore, one of the key intellectual premises 
upon which the ensuing arguments and propositions rest is that the avant-
garde is at once a qualitative and a chronological category.  It is through 
focussing upon the mediation and the unresolved tension between qualitative 
and quantitative time, I contend, that we are best able to consider the 
chronopolitical complexities of the meaning of the idea of the avant-garde 
‘after modernism’.   
This intellectual departure necessitates one more conceptual 
clarification, since it reveals underlying differences between differing 
epistemologies of time. Andrew Benjamin, in his reading of Walter Benjamin’s 
conception of history, foregrounds the equation of time with history: ‘History 
cannot be thought other than as a philosophy of time’.45 This equation is 
grounded in a Heideggerian conception of historicity [Geschichtlichkeit], a 
fundamental term in Heidegger’s philosophy because, for Heidegger, 
historicity names the possibility of attaining historical consciousness and 
therefore an ‘authentic’ life.46  It is beyond my scope to offer a summary of 
Heidegger’s philosophical conception of time.  Nevertheless, in a somewhat 
crude summary, and with reference to the contentious term of historicism that 
concerns us here, for Heidegger, Geschichtlichkeit offers the temporalisation 
of Historie (usually rendered in English as ‘historiography’ or ‘historical 
science’).47  Thus, while Historie stands for the scientific study of past events 
                                                             
45 Andrew Benjamin, Style and Time: Essays on the Politics of Appearance (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2006), p. 13. 
46 See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY 
Press, [1927] 1996), especially pp. 72-88. See also The Concept of Time: The First Draft 
of Being and Time, trans. by Ingo Farin (London: Continuum, 2011), passim.     
47 See Joan Stambaugh’s invaluable index in the 1996 English translation of Being and 
Time, pp. xiii-xvi. 
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and is considered ‘empty’ of experience (a trope we will revisit in our 
discussion of Walter Benjamin in Chapter 1), Geschichtlichkeit stands for the 
authenticity of lived experience, and provides the ground for the ontology of 
time – and of time as ontology.48  The primacy of an ontology of time in 
Heidegger and in the above scholarship results in what I regard as a 
problematic equivalence between time and history whereby history is 
experientially meaningful and ‘authentic’ only as historicity and thus as the 
temporalisation of itself. While I am in agreement with the above scholars’ 
insistence on history’s temporal dimension, my own epistemology seeks to 
retain a distinction between time and history.  Hence also my deliberate 
adoption of the term ‘chronopolitics’ over ‘politics of time’.49 By replacing the 
noun-phrase ‘politics of time’ (which syntactically denotes politics as 
something that can be attributed to time) with the compound ‘chronopolitics’, 
I thus intend to problematise the ontological primacy of time over politics, and 
                                                             
48 My understanding has been much aided by Charles Bambach’s analysis, which 
elaborates on Heidegger’s notion of historicity and its relationship to historicism 
while skilfully avoiding Heideggerian jargon. See Charles Bambach, Heidegger, 
Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 
passim.      
49 The term ‘politics of time’ is common in strands of philosophical scholarship that 
draw on phenomenological conceptions of time. In addition to Peter Osborne’s usage, 
see David C. Hoy, ‘The Politics of Temporality: Heidegger, Bourdieu, Benjamin, 
Derrida’, in Given World and Time: Temporalities in Context, ed. by Tyrus Miller 
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 2008), pp. 261-76.  In a sociological 
context, the term has a different currency and denotes the idea of political resistance 
to forms of temporal oppression: see Henry J. Rutz, ‘Introduction: The Idea of a 
Politics of Time’, in The Politics of Time, ed. by Henry J. Rutz (Washington, DC: 
American Anthropological Association, 1992), pp. 1–17 (p. 1). The seminal 
contribution in this latter strand remains Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How 
Anthropology Makes its Object, foreword by Matti Bunzl/with a new postscript by the 
author (New York: Columbia University Press [1983] 2014), whose ideas I draw upon 
in Chapter 4. 
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suggest instead a relationship of reciprocity: chronopolitics as ‘politics of time’ 
as well as ‘time of politics’.50  The notion of the political that is adopted here 
has affinities with Andrew Benjamin’s foregrounding of the temporality of 
decision-making in relation to indeterminacy and contingency.  Thus, in 
contrast to Peter Osborne, whose arguably under-determined category of the 
political in The Politics of Time often lapses into an impressionistic 
presentation of political ideologies (e.g. liberalism, fascism, or communism), 
in this study, I have consciously sought to resist the adoption of such political 
labels, as part of an attempt to unmoor the discussion of ‘politics and the 
avant-garde’ from fixed, often romanticised presuppositions about the avant-
garde’s relationship to ‘the Left’.51  In this respect, therefore, the thesis 
                                                             
50 The most widely-circulated usage of the term ‘chronopolitics’ occurs within 
political science and stems from Paul Virilio’s polemical theorisation of speed in the 
context of military communication technology.  See Paul Virilio, Speed and Politics: An 
Essay on Dromology, trans. by Mark Polizzotti (New York: Semiotext(e), [1977] 1986), 
p. 69; Paul Virilio, The Information Bomb, trans. by Chris Turner (London: Verso, 
1999), p. 109.  In more recent years, the term has gained wider prominence.  See 
Daniel Innerarity, The Future and its Enemies: In Defense of Political Hope, trans. by 
Sandra Kingery (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012); in critical 
geopolitics, see Kimberly Hutchings, Time and World Politics: Thinking the Present 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008) and Ian Klinke, ‘Chronopolitics: A 
Conceptual Matrix’, Progress in Human Geography 37.5 (2013), 673-90; and, lastly, 
see the intellectually promising coinage of a ‘chronobiopolitics’ in Dana Luciano, 
Arranging Grief: Sacred Time and the Body in Nineteenth-Century America (New York: 
New York University Press, 2007).  
51 See Osborne, The Politics of Time, pp. 116, 160-161, 200.  See also Osborne’s 
interpretation of Walter Benjamin’s notion of the political as a ‘temporal mode of 
experience’, arguably collapsing politics into time in a manner comparable to his 
identification of historicity with an ontology of time.  Cf. Peter Osborne, ‘Small-scale 
Victories, Large-scale Defeats: Walter Benjamin’s Politics of Time’, in Walter 
Benjamin’s Philosophy: Destruction & Experience, ed. by Andrew Benjamin and Peter 
Osborne, 2nd edn (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000), pp. 55-107 (pp. 65-66).   
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performs another interrogation of a fixed coordinate that unproductively pins 
the idea of the avant-garde to a given, unexamined specificity. 
This departure from a politics of time, and from time as ontology, is also 
reflected methodologically, since my analysis is informed by theories of time 
outside the philosophical discipline. A more nuanced approach to the 
relationship between historicity and historical writing is provided by turning 
to the field of historical theory (sometimes also referred to as ‘theoretical 
history’).  As a sub-field within the historical discipline, its consideration of 
time in/and history builds upon a disciplinary tradition that reflects on the 
narratological aspects of history writing (after the legacy of Hayden White) 
and considers the intersection between temporality and etymological 
development (after the legacy of Reinhart Koselleck).52  This approach 
informs my overall epistemology but is most evident in the narratological 
analysis of Peter Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-Garde developed in Chapter 2.  
In addition, in order to address the question of time’s exteriority to history, I 
have attempted to develop a methodology that, rather than collapsing time 
into history and vice versa, offers what might be described as a ‘parallax 
structure in/of time’.53  In this structure, while a distinction is retained 
                                                             
52 As an indication, see Olivia Harris, ‘Braudel: Historical Time and the Horror of 
Discontinuity’, History Workshop Journal, 57.1 (2004), 161-74; Lynn Hunt, Measuring 
Time, Making History (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2008); Chris 
Lorenz and Berber Bevernage, eds., Breaking Up Time: Negotiating the Borders 
between Present, Past and Future (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013); and 
the numerous lively discussions on time and historiography appearing in journals 
such as History & Theory and Storia della Storiografia.  For the seminal studies of 
Hayden White and Reinhart Koselleck, see, respectively, Hayden White, Metahistory: 
The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe,  40th edn (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, [1973] 2014), and the aforementioned Futures Past.      
53 This phrase is indebted partly to Japanese thinker Kojin Karatani’s notion of 
‘pronounced parallax’, and partly to British anthropologist Laura Bear, who is also 
concerned with the joint consideration of qualitative and quantitative time, 
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between the categories of time and history, the categories are still intricately 
connected in a relationship of ‘in/of’ – neither fully exterior to, nor fully 
constitutive of, one another.  Such a structure can arguably be observed in 
Moishe Postone’s analysis of Marx’s Capital, whereby his twofold conception 
of labour-time as both social relation and the measure of social relations, 
offers a nuanced articulation of the relationship between time and history.54 
Or, as I hope to demonstrate through my analysis of a ‘Benjaminian 
comparativism’ in Chapter 1, such a parallax structure in/of time can be found 
in the work of Walter Benjamin itself.  As I suggest in the next section, 
Benjamin’s thought can provide an intellectual framework through which to 
re-think the relationship between time and history and, ultimately, the 
chronopolitical status of the idea of the avant-garde after modernism.  In this 
endeavour, the structure and historicity of the thesis itself is also inevitably 
implicated.  Let us now turn to examining this precise structure and the 
‘constituent parts’ that make up this thesis, while also reflecting on its 
exclusions.                 
 
III. The Idea of the Avant-Garde in/as a Benjaminian Constellation   
 
Considering the intellectual intricacies that are involved in identifying the 
avant-garde’s meaning and location, attempting to theoretically survey the 
idea of the avant-garde after modernism might seem a gargantuan task. No 
                                                             
proposing in response a notion of ‘labour in/of time’. See, respectively, Kojin 
Karatani, Transcritique: On Kant and Marx, trans. by Sabu Kohso (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2003), pp. 44-53; and Laura Bear, ‘Doubt, Conflict, Mediation: The 
Anthropology of Modern Time’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 20.S1 
(2014), 3-30 (pp. 6-8, 20-21).  Karatani’s notion of pronounced parallax, which differs 
from the dictionary definition of parallax as a shift of position caused by a shift in 
perspective, is discussed further in Chapter 5.       
54 See Moishe Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of 
Marx’s Critical Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), especially pp. 
200-201. 
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doubt, it would seem to involve a multilingual, multidisciplinary, and 
historical and geographical scope so wide that it would be simply wiser to 
select one, particular avant-garde, rather than attempt to tackle the question 
of avant-garde qua avant-garde. Yet doing so would create yet another avant-
garde variant that would still necessitate the deeper questioning of the avant-
garde’s relation to universality and particularity.  By the same token, the texts 
that have been selected for analysis and discussion should not be seen as 
representative of the avant-garde, but rather as iterations of the broader 
problematic of a chronopolitics of ‘the new after the new’.  The guiding 
principle for articulating answers to this problematic has been given through 
an engagement with the thought of Walter Benjamin.  Although Benjamin’s 
thought is present in different ways throughout the thesis, the relationship 
between the selected theorists (writing chronologically ‘after Benjamin’) and 
Benjamin’s work should not be seen as one of ‘direct influence’ (although 
there are clear elements of influence), but rather as another manifestation of 
the question of afterness. Before I elaborate on the reasons for bringing these 
diverse texts together, let me first say a few words about some of the texts that 
have been excluded from my discussion. 
Due to the large volume of texts that have been written on (or, in the 
name of) the avant-garde, it was necessary to follow several principles of 
selection. The present selection was the culmination of surveying a wide range 
of texts that have concerned themselves with defining, defending, 
interrogating or critiquing the idea of the avant-garde: from artists’ texts and 
manifestoes to polemical essays and scholarly treatises, a number of well-
known and not-so-well-known writings on the avant-garde were 
considered.55  As I have suggested, one of the starting points of my enquiry has 
                                                             
55 These were necessarily also determined by my own linguistic abilities: I considered 
texts in English, German, French, Italian and Greek, or texts translated into English.  
Apart from the works mentioned so far, the following are worth noting: Thomas B. 
Hess & John Ashbery, eds., Avant-garde Art (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1968); 
Achille Bonito Oliva, ed., The International Trans-avantgarde/La transavanguardia 
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been an engagement with the work of Benjamin, and with the Benjaminian 
‘application’ of historical time within the avant-garde’s philosophical turn.  As 
such, in my selection I was guided less by the texts’ perceived canonicity or 
marginality (although readers familiar with genealogies of theorising the 
avant-garde will no doubt easily ‘spot’ the canonical). Rather, what was 
decisive in my selection was the theorists’ relationship to the Frankfurt School 
legacy, and their own articulation of indebtedness to that legacy through a 
theorisation of the avant-garde. Therefore, although important debates on the 
avant-garde have been played out in a French context, most prominently in 
the artistic and intellectual formations of Tel Quel and the Situationist 
International (these formations are themselves treated historiographically as 
avant-garde), their contributions were not included because of the divergent 
parameters of their intellectual projects.  In other words, the temporality of 
‘afterness’ at work in this project has also been guided by the internal 
affinities, points of convergence, and acknowledged instances of intellectual 
inheritance, albeit kept in tension with a more linear conception of ‘influence’.          
Among the large number of writers and thinkers who have been 
omitted from this study, there are four in particular whose omission warrants 
a brief discussion: the Italian comparatist Renato Poggioli, the US art critic 
Clement Greenberg, and the French philosophers Jean-François Lyotard and 
Jacques Rancière. All four thinkers have contributed to the intellectual history 
of theorising the avant-garde, yet each of them has been excluded for unique 
reasons.  The Theory of the Avant-Garde by Renato Poggioli was the first 
monograph dedicated to the difficult task of theorising the avant-garde as 
concept and phenomenon.  As has already been noted, Poggioli’s book (like 
the book that bears the near-identical English title, Peter Bürger’s Theory of 
the Avant-garde) is routinely mentioned in historiographical accounts of the 
                                                             
internazionale (Milano: Giancarlo Politi Editore, 1982). For recent polemical defences 
of the avant-garde, see Zanny Begg and Dmitry Vilensky, eds., Special Issue ‘Debates 
on the Avant-Garde’, Chto Delat?/What is to be Done?, Issue 17, August (2007); Gene 
Ray, ‘Avant-Gardes as Anti-Capitalist Vector’, Third Text, 21.3 (2007), 241-55. 
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avant-garde.  Unlike Bürger’s theory, however, which continues to be 
fervently debated and translated into new languages to this day, Teoria 
dell’arte d’avanguardia has aged rather ungracefully, and its theoretical 
contribution appears today more as a peculiarity typical of the intellectual 
climate of its time, and less as a blueprint with continuing critical purchase.56  
Compared to Bürger’s theory, Poggioli’s monograph has failed to offer a set of 
conceptual categories that are directly applicable to the analysis of diverse art 
movements and practices.  Even when considered on its own account, 
Poggioli’s socio-psychological methodology that maps a typology of avant-
garde ‘mentalities’ (such as ‘agonism’ and ‘nihilism’) onto the artist’s 
experience of social alienation is arguably marred by metaphysical strains 
that posit a de-historicised and de-materialised conception of an ‘avant-garde 
spirit’.57  Ultimately, Poggioli’s theory was excluded because it was deemed 
neither intellectually tenable nor of continuing critical relevance.     
In sharp contrast to Poggioli’s theory, Clement Greenberg’s 
contribution to the history of theorising the avant-garde has been 
foundational. The commonly-used term ‘Greenbergian modernism’ testifies to 
the critic’s towering influence, not only over debates concerning the avant-
garde, but also to his role in establishing the very vocabulary through which 
the development of modern art has been construed.58  Renowned art critic 
                                                             
56 See the intriguing analysis of the influence of Vilfredo Pareto on Poggioli’s theory 
in Sascha Bru, ‘A History of Aristocracies: Old and New Avant-Gardisms in Poggioli 
and Marinetti’, L'Esprit Créateur, 53. 3 (2013), 64-78.  This article aside, there is 
currently little interest in Poggioli’s theorisation of the avant-garde.  
57 See Poggioli, passim (and especially, pp. 25-40, 61-77, 103-128, 224-226).  It is 
worth noting that some of the limitations of Poggioli’s theory were acknowledged by 
his contemporaries.  See Peter Jones, ‘The Theory of the Avant-Garde: Renato Poggioli 
(Book Review)’, British Journal of Aesthetics, 9.1 (1969), 84-89 (pp. 86-88).     
58 For a biographical study that attempts to situate Clement Greenberg’s writing 
within a broader socio-cultural history of rationalisation and ocularcentrism in the 
mid-century United States, see Caroline Jones, Eyesight Alone: Clement Greenberg’s 
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Rosalind Krauss’s own account of how ‘practically everything’ in her book, as 
she exclaims, goes against Greenberg’s position is telling, and the critical 
reception of Greenbergian modernism has itself been foundational for the 
establishment of French post-structuralist discourses in US art criticism.59  
There are, however, two interrelated reasons why this study does not deal 
with Greenberg’s writings. First, a focus on Greenberg would necessitate 
discussions of visuality, medium-specificity, materiality, and the category of 
‘the painterly’ and its relationship to photographic representation.  Second, 
with respect to Greenberg’s essay ‘Avant-garde and Kitsch’, it would 
necessitate a discussion on elitism and populism and a broader engagement 
with the question of a politics of artistic form.  While I briefly discuss these 
concerns with respect to the frequent comparison between Greenbergian and 
Adornian modernism in Chapter 3, a discussion of the question of the avant-
garde’s politics of form would have overshadowed my more immediate 
concern with chronopolitics and historical time.  (It is likely that analyses that 
offer a bridge between Greenbergian politics of form and a theory of 
chronopolitics could be put to work, but such an endeavour is not taken up 
here.)    
With respect to the contributions of Jean-François Lyotard and Jacques 
Rancière, the reasons for their exclusion are again distinct.  For his part, 
Lyotard began considering the avant-garde philosophically while formulating 
his answer to the hotly-debated question of the postmodern in the early 
1980s.60  Lyotard’s liberal rendition of the Kantian sublime, enabled by 
                                                             
Modernism and the Bureaucratisation of the Senses (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005). 
59 See Rosalind Krauss, The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), pp. 1-2.  
60 See Jean-François Lyotard, ‘Presenting the Unpresentable: The Sublime’, trans. by 
Lisa Liebmann, Artforum, 20.8 (April 1982), 64-69; reprinted in modified form as 
‘The Sublime and the Avant-Garde’, in The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, trans. by 
Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), pp.  89-107; and 
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interpretations of artworks by Barnett Newman and Kazimir Malevich, was 
quickly taken to task by Kant scholars, and his conception of the avant-garde 
as painterly abstraction (despite being overly reductive) meant that his 
propositions were discussed alongside Greenberg’s canonical essays.61 
Jacques Rancière’s writings, by contrast, came into contact with the notion of 
the avant-garde through broader debates on the relationship between 
aesthetics and radical politics during the current century.62  Although 
Rancière has not been explicitly concerned with theorising the avant-garde, 
his engagement with the categories of autonomy and heteronomy, as well as 
his tripartite schema of art’s movement through different historical stages, 
has prompted some commentators to compare his theory of the ‘regimes of 
art’ with that of Bürger.63  Lyotard and Rancière have distinct theories of 
aesthetics and, accordingly, distinct conceptions of the avant-garde.  Whereas 
Lyotard shares with Greenberg an inclination towards aesthetic form, 
Rancière’s preferred term of ‘sense’ or ‘the sensible’ arguably problematises 
the distinction between aesthetic form and political praxis.  And precisely 
through his notion of a ‘distribution of the sensible’, Rancière’s theory of 
                                                             
‘Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?’, trans. by Régis Durand, in Jean-
François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. by Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi, foreword by Fredric Jameson (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, [1979] 1984), pp. 71-82 (pp. 76-79).   
61 See Paul Crowther, ‘The Kantian Sublime, the Avant-Garde, and the Postmodern: A 
Critique of Lyotard’, New Formations, 7.1 (1989), 67-75. 
62 See Jacques Rancière, ‘The Aesthetic Revolution and its Outcomes’, New Left Review, 
14. March-April (2002), 133-151, reprinted in Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, 
ed. and trans. by Steven Corcoran (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), pp. 115-133; ‘Artistic 
Regimes and the Shortcomings of the Notion of Modernity’, in The Politics of 
Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible, trans. by Gabriel Rockhill (London: 
Continuum, 2004), pp. 20-30. Jacques Rancière, ‘Rethinking Modernity’, Diacritics, 
42.3 (2014), 6-20 (pp. 18-19).   
63 See Gail Day, ‘The Fear of Heteronomy’, Third Text, 23.4 (2009), 393-406 (pp. 399-
402).  
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aesthetic praxis has been recently been put to work for a new interpretation 
of avant-garde movements alongside Bürger’s conception of heteronomy.64  
Yet Rancière’s own analysis of the avant-garde is minimal, himself declaring 
that he finds the notion of little contemporary relevance.65   
We encounter no such problem in Lyotard’s case, where the notion of 
the avant-garde is given due prominence in his discussion of the sublime and 
‘the unpresentable’.  We encounter a problem of a different order, however.  
Since Lyotard’s avant-garde is one of painterly abstraction where the non-
figurative character of avant-garde painting becomes a marker of the 
ineffable, the question of representation is handled almost literally: the avant-
garde as abstract image points to the unpresentable. From an ethico-political 
perspective, such a move suggests a quasi-theological proposition on the ban 
on images, responding to the singularity of Auschwitz as a historical event that 
ought to remain unspoken.  It is here that Lyotard’s treatment of the avant-
garde is at odds with my own approach: firstly, my notion of the avant-garde 
is not restricted to one particular medium or artistic form; secondly, assigning 
to the avant-garde the kind of ethical task that Lyotard proposes cannot allow 
for an opening-up of the avant-garde’s relationship to the political, since the 
unpresentable cannot but preserve the fixed ethico-political location held by 
the name ‘Auschwitz’.  Rethinking the chronopolitics of the avant-garde after 
modernism can, of course, be legitimately considered through the question of 
an afterness of Auschwitz.  (In addition to Adorno’s famous statement on the 
possibility of writing poetry after Auschwitz, recent scholarship has 
approached this question of an avant-garde afterness through the question of 
fascism.)66 Yet in my concern to re-establish the notion of the avant-garde 
through the question of universality and particularity, I seek to set a different 
                                                             
64 See Aleš Erjavec, ed., Aesthetic Revolutions and Twentieth Century Avant-garde 
Movements (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015). 
65 See Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, pp. 21, 29-30.  
66 See Richard Langston, Visions of Violence: German Avant-Gardes after Fascism 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2008), especially Chapter 1, pp. 23-55. 
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ethico-political task.  As I propose in the thesis’ culminating chapter (Chapter 
5: ‘Afterness and Singularity’), this task requires not the fixed singularity of an 
unprecedented historical event, but a relational singularity of a historicity 
guided by comparativism. Far better suited to this task, I argue, are Walter 
Benjamin’s theoretical formulations on historical time and representation, 
which allow for precisely such a comparative opening.  
Benjamin’s own life makes this choice perhaps predictable.  His 
friendship with Bertolt Brecht and personal acquaintance with several 
Dadaists, Constructivists and Surrealists, coupled with the influence that 
automatic writing and photomontage had on the development of his thought 
in the turning-point years of 1923-1924, leave little doubt that Benjamin had 
something to say about the avant-garde.67 Yet my choice is not guided by 
biographical concerns (which would after all re-affirm the locus of the avant-
garde in a ‘Parisian 1930s’ geochronopolitical coordinate).68  Rather, taking 
                                                             
67 Let us recall here the oft-cited lines from a letter to Adorno, in which Benjamin, 10 
years on, narrates his physical response to reading Louis Aragon’s Le paysan de Paris 
for the first time: ‘Evenings, lying in bed, I could never read more than two to three 
pages by him because my heart started to pound so hard that I had to put the book 
down.  What a warning!  What an indication of the years and years that had to be put 
between me and that kind of reading.  And yet the first preliminary sketches for the 
Arcades originated at that time.’ Letter 260, To Theodor Adorno, Paris, 31 May 1935, 
in The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin, 1910-1940, ed. by Gershom Scholem and 
Theodor W. Adorno (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 488-91 (p. 488), 
hereafter CWB.   
68 Detailed accounts of Benjamin’s links to the ‘historical avant-gardes’ can be found 
in a number of biographies.  See, for instance, Berndt Witte, Walter Benjamin: An 
Intellectual Biography, trans. by James Rolleston (Detroit: Wayne State University 
Press, [1985] 1991), p. 108; Esther Leslie, Walter Benjamin (London: Reaktion, 
2007), pp. 42, 57-58, 66-67, 74, 82-85, 171-172, 193-194; Howard Eiland and Michael 
W. Jennings, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2014), pp. 6, 105-106, 170-72, 236, 296, 310-12, 386, 394, 
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my cue from scholars such as Peter Osborne and Susan Buck-Morss, I develop 
their proposition that the temporality of the avant-garde can be articulated 
through Benjamin’s notion of Jetztzeit.  Moreover, through my analysis in the 
two chapters that open and close this thesis (Chapters 1 and 5), I seek to 
investigate whether Benjamin’s work on mimesis – and particularly his 
categories of non-sensuous similarity and temporal indexicality – can be 
productively put to work so as to critique the aforementioned tendency 
towards avant-garde specificity.   
In approaching Benjamin, my emphasis has been on what unites, 
rather than separates, the distinct phases of his thought.  I have focussed on 
the categories that remain constant or, at least, whose core articulation 
remains unchanged by the transition towards the later explicitly Marxist 
concerns.  The notion of constellation as it appears in the ‘Epistemo-critical 
Prologue’ of the Trauerspiel study, and the non-communicative aspects of 
language elaborated in the early essays on language are thus considered 
alongside their later reformulations through the autobiographical sketches of 
Berlin Childhood circa 1900, the fragments on the mimetic faculty, the essays 
on Marcel Proust and Surrealism, the materialist studies of Baudelaire and the 
Arcades Project, and the cryptic yet highly influential theses on the concept of 
history.69  My enquiry in Part I (Chapter 1: ‘The World in a State of Similarity’) 
opens with a discussion of Benjamin’s chronopolitics and revisits recent 
debates on the role of kairós (i.e. the decisive or opportune moment) in 
Benjamin’s formulations on historical time.  Examining ‘On the Concept of 
History’ alongside other later works that foreground quotidian, as opposed to 
exceptional, modes of historicity, I suggest that Benjamin’s chronopolitics 
ought to be considered not through the prism of the moment of kairós, but 
rather as a delicate negotiation between decisionism and undecidability. In 
                                                             
490, 518-20.  See also Margaret Cohen, Profane Illumination: Walter Benjamin and the 
Paris of Surrealist Revolution (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993).  
69 Full bibliographical details of the Benjamin editions and texts studied are given in 
the introduction of Chapter 1.     
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addition to modifying the parameters of discussing Benjaminian 
chronopolitics, Chapter 1 mobilises Benjamin’s early and late essays on 
translation and the mimetic faculty so as to propose a new comparative 
method, which is then brought to bear upon the theorists that are discussed 
at length in the second part of the thesis (Chapters 2, 3 and 4): German literary 
scholar Peter Bürger, British art theorist John Roberts, and selected figures of 
the intellectual and poetic circle of the Italian Neoavanguardia.   
Since the analytical approach pursued here is of a speculative and 
critical nature, the theorisations discussed in Part II should not be seen as 
empirical ‘case studies’, which are separated from the ‘meta-theoretical’ 
position of Benjamin.  The thesis may begin and end with Benjamin, but the 
theorists that find themselves at the thesis’ narrative core are best thought of 
as forming a constellation, structured by modalities of afterness.  The avant-
garde’s many facets of afterness are thus explored through the figures of 
prolepsis, infidelity, and belatedness in the chapters on Bürger; Adorno and 
Roberts; and the Neoavanguardia respectively.  In Chapter 2 (‘Proleptic Avant-
Garde’), Peter Bürger’s canonical monograph is revisited in the broader 
context of his methodological formulations on the institution of art in the late 
1970s, and read as a text whose narrative logic produces a temporality of 
prolepsis. Against common accusations of progressivism, my narratological 
re-reading of Theory of the Avant-Garde reveals new layers of historicity in 
Bürger’s text that suggest an anticipatory temporality not unlike Benjamin’s 
messianism.  Chapter 3 (‘Repeating Rupture’) turns to Adorno’s Aesthetic 
Theory and analyses the notion of the new in relation to John Roberts’ recent 
polemics in a number of essays and the monograph Revolutionary Time and 
the Avant-Garde (2015).  Exposing Roberts’ appropriation of Adorno’s 
thought, my analysis suggests that the historiographical anachronisms and 
textual infidelities characterising Roberts’ theory exemplify, not a 
revolutionary time, but the avant-garde’s aporetic condition of a rupture in 
repetition. Chapter 4 (‘Strangers to our Times’) examines the theoretical 
essays of members of the Neoavanguardia with reference to the contentious 
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issue of Italy’s belated modernisation. Countering the prevalent discourses of 
modernisation theory with respect to the history of Italian avant-garde 
movements, my analysis draws on Johannes Fabian’s concept of 
‘allochronism’ and proposes that the avant-garde temporality articulated in 
Neoavanguardia, as well as in its Italian and Anglo-American literary 
historiographies, implicitly imposes an avant-garde centre to which 
Neoavanguardia’s own temporality cannot but remain ‘other’.   
In light of these analyses, Part III (Chapter 5, ‘Afterness and 
Singularity’) returns to the thesis’ main problematic regarding the mediation 
of universality and particularity, and broaches the question of articulating the 
avant-garde as a singularity. Chapter 5 begins by critically assessing the 
impact that ongoing debates on the status of ‘multiple modernities’ have had 
on the field of avant-garde studies and, siding with the critics of multiple 
modernities, it refuses the false choice of discussing the avant-garde ‘in the 
plural’.  This critique is then further articulated through a return to Benjamin, 
and a discussion of Benjaminian singularity as a parallax structure in/of time, 
gleaned from texts that foreground the figures of the vessel (with reference to 
language, representation and historical time); of the threshold (spatial as well 
as temporal); and of the fold (in ways reminiscent of, yet distinct from, Gilles 
Deleuze’s own philosophy of singularity).  As the thesis’ culminating chapter, 
Chapter 5 concludes by articulating the chronopolitics of the idea of the avant-
garde after modernism, and proposes the avant-garde as a relational notion 
in/of historical time. Such relationality rests not only on a rapprochement 
between qualitative and quantitative time, and an acknowledgment of the 
partly constitutive role of historicism, which my analyses of Peter Bürger, John 
Roberts, and Neoavanguardia make manifest but, just as importantly, on a 
Benjaminian conception of singularity that productively undermines the 
taxonomic, representational, and periodising impulses of avant-garde 
specificity.  
It is often remarked that Benjamin’s thought resists method.  So why 
should we look to Benjamin for a method? Or as Max Pensky has probingly 
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asked: ‘Why should we prefer a “constellation” to a solid work of critical 
historiography?’70 A constellation might suggest an arbitrary selection of 
objects assembled without regard for historical specificity.  If we are no longer 
bound to historicism, anything and anyone can be brought together to form a 
constellation.  There is a grain of truth in these criticisms.  However, 
Benjaminian constellation as I consider it here does not mean an assemblage 
of relations that exist outside historical time.  While I aim to situate the 
selected texts and debates historically, such situating remains critical of a 
certain empirical reflectionism that would re-establish a conception of 
historical time as time’s arrow.  No linear movement from the ‘60s to the 
present is followed here; no expansive mechanism from the avant-garde’s 
canonical geopolitical centre to the avant-garde’s periphery, as is frequently 
proposed in new modernist studies, is espoused either. A critical 
historiography, no matter how ‘solid’, still posits the primacy of linear 
historical periodisation. A Benjaminian constellation, by contrast, 
interrogates the temporal logic of taxonomy, and disrupts the neat separation 
of historicity’s exteriority and interiority.  In other words – and to return to 
Pleynet’s image of rupture of history/history of rupture – a Benjaminian 
constellation allows for the chiasmatic web of history’s event and 
representation to unfold, while producing a historicity that remains in tension 
with historicism. It is through a Benjaminian constellation, therefore, that this 
thesis proposes the idea of the avant-garde as a parallax in/of time.  Ahead of 
its time, the avant-garde emerges as a notion that is ‘ahead’ of its own 
historical temporality – in a mode of afterness which resists linear 
progressivism and which produces the very conditions of (its) historical 
difference.  Neither ‘living’ nor ‘dead’, neither ‘historical’ nor ‘neo’, the avant-
garde as a parallax in/of time re-opens the question of what it takes to be 
absolutely new, and in its temporal re-configuration as a Benjaminian 
                                                             
70 Max Pensky, ‘Method and Time: Benjamin’s Dialectical Images’, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Walter Benjamin, ed. by David S. Ferris (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), pp. 177-198 (p. 177).   
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constellation presents us with a chronopolitics that in turn asks us to radically 
re-configure our own fixed spatiotemporal and ideological conception of what 
constitutes modernity.     
I. Towards a Benjaminian Comparativism    
 
 
  
When our theatres perform plays of other periods they like to annihilate 
distance, fill in the gap, gloss over the differences.  But what comes then of our 
delight in comparisons, in distance, in dissimilarity – which is at the same time 
a delight in what is close and proper to ourselves?  
 
Bertolt Brecht, ‘Appendices to the “Short Organum”’1      
 
 
 
She paused for a long moment and then began to speak; something about a 
home, but whether she meant a household or the literal structure, I couldn’t 
tell; I heard the names of streets and months; a list of things I thought were 
books or songs; hard times or hard weather, epoch, uncle, change, an analogy 
involving summer, something about buying and/or crashing a red car. I 
formed several possible stories out of her speech, formed them at once, so it 
was less like I failed to understand than that I understood in chords, in a 
plurality of worlds. 
 
Ben Lerner, Leaving the Atocha Station2 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 Bertolt Brecht, ‘Appendices to the “Short Organum”’, in Brecht on Theatre: The 
Development of an Aesthetic, ed. and trans. by John Willett (London: Methuen, 2001), 
p. 276.  
2 Ben Lerner, Leaving the Atocha Station (London: Granta Books, 2011), p. 14. 
Chapter 1 
 
‘The World in a State of Similarity’: Walter Benjamin, 
Chronopolitics, Historical Difference 
 
 
 
Walter Benjamin never joined the German Communist Party. Although he 
seriously entertained the thought, he never took that decision. Often asked to 
justify himself for not doing so, Benjamin was highly aware of the temporal 
character of such a decision – an awareness most vividly captured in a letter 
to his close friend Gershom Scholem dating from 29 May 1926:  
 
[T]he task is plainly not to decide once and for all, but rather at every moment. 
But what is essential is to decide […]. If I were to join the Communist Party 
someday […], my own conviction would be to proceed radically and never 
consistently in the most important matters. The possibility of my remaining a 
member is therefore to be determined experimentally; of interest and in 
question is not so much the yes and no, as the how-long? [weniger das Ja und 
Nein als das Wielange?]1      
 
Benjamin presents his reasons for not joining the Party as a justification for 
the reasons that he was hesitant to take any decision – or rather, as a 
justification for his reasons for timing the decision, for ensuring not only that 
the decision is made at the right moment but that the decision is itself 
temporalised.  Benjamin’s refusal can be read as a rejection of the a-temporal 
ultimatum of a question that requires a ‘yes or no’ answer.  Shifting the 
parameters, Benjamin rejects the premise’s punctual, irreversible character 
and introduces the problem of duration: the question ‘should I become a 
member?’ becomes ‘for how long should I be one’?  While doing so, Benjamin 
also problematises the idea that there is a ‘right’ or ‘opportune’ moment for 
                                                             
1 Benjamin, Letter to Gerhard Scholem, Paris 29 May 1926, Gesammelte Briefe, Bd. III, 
hg. Christoph Gödde und Henri Lonitz (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1997), pp. 158-159; Cf. 
‘Letter 156: To Gerhard Scholem’, in CWB, p. 300 (translation modified; emphasis 
original).   
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taking a decision: deciding ‘once and for all’ is replaced by deciding ‘at every 
moment’: each and every moment in time becomes potentially decisive. 
Taking Benjamin’s attempt to re-define decision-making on his own 
terms as my starting point, in this opening chapter I set out to explore the 
political implications of the temporality of decision-making, while also 
focusing on the question of decision in Benjamin’s writings. More specifically, 
I examine the political implications of this particular kind of temporalisation, 
an act that introduces the role of duration and distributes the moment of 
decision across time.  These implications should thus be understood, not in 
the narrow party-political sense at stake in this particular exchange, but 
rather in a broader chronopolitical sense.  Although the question of decision-
making may at first sight appear as only pertaining to Benjamin’s explicitly 
politico-theological writings, my analysis seeks to highlight Benjaminian 
chronopolitics as inextricable from his theory of mimesis and, to some extent, 
also from Benjamin’s own philological practice.  In this respect, therefore, I 
concur with Peter Osborne’s call for ‘a Benjaminian practice of constructing 
juxtapositional differences or encounters within the speculative unity of a 
singular history’,2 and suggest that such a practice can be thought as a new 
practice of comparativism.   
Since the turn of the millennium, the question of ‘comparativism’ has 
re-emerged within a body of literature at the intersection of comparative 
literature, translation studies, and postcolonial theory.3  Benjamin’s thought 
                                                             
2 Peter Osborne, ‘On Comparability: Kant and the Possibility of Comparative Studies’, 
boundary 2, Special Issue: Problems of Comparability/Possibilities for Comparative 
Studies, 32.2 (2005), 3-22 (p. 21).   
3 As an indication, see David Damrosch, What is World Literature? (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2003); Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Death of a Discipline 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Haun Saussy, ed., Comparative 
Literature in an Age of Globalisation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2006); Emily Apter, The Translation Zone: A New Comparative Literature (Princeton: 
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has been an indirect influence on this tendency, primarily through the 
reception of his foundational essay ‘The Task of the Translator’ (1923) in the 
field of translation studies.4  Similarly, and as I discuss below, there have been 
isolated attempts to bring Benjamin’s work into contact with postcolonial 
concerns.  The approach of a ‘Benjaminian comparativism’ that I adopt here 
aims to bring together the problematic of what can be compared and under 
what conditions (and whether there can ever be an external unit of 
measurement that decides the very terms and conditions of comparison) with 
a problematic that addresses the relationship between the particular and the 
universal, and periphery and the centre, as well as attending to the conditions 
that legitimise the centre as universal.   
For the purposes of this endeavour, my reading of Benjamin’s work is 
necessarily selective.5 I draw extensively from ‘On the Concept of History’ 
                                                             
Princeton University Press, 2006); Thomas Docherty, ‘Without and Beyond 
Compare’, Comparative Critical Studies, 3.1-2 (2006), 25-35.  
4 ‘The Task of the Translator’ is customarily anthologised in translation studies 
volumes. See The Translation Studies Reader, ed. by Lawrence Venuti (London: 
Routledge, 2004). See also Janet Sanders, ‘Divine Words, Cramped Actions: Walter 
Benjamin ― an Unlikely Icon in Translation Studies’, TTR: traduction, terminologie, 
rédaction, 16.1 (2003), 161-83. 
5 The following editions have been consulted: Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften 
Bd. I-VII, hrsg. Rolf Tiedemann & Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 
1972-1989), hereafter cited GS and by volume number; Selected Writings: Volumes 1-
4, series ed. by Michael W. Jennings et. al. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1996-2003), hereafter cited SW and by volume number; The Arcades Project, ed. by 
Rolf Tiedemann; trans. by Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), hereafter cited AP and by 
convolute number; The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. by John Osborne 
(London: Verso, [1963] 1998), hereafter cited Origin; Understanding Brecht, trans. by 
Anna Bostock (London: New Left Books, [1966] 1973), hereafter cited UB; 
Illuminations, ed. by Hannah Arendt (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968). As 
is customary in Benjamin scholarship, published essays and texts are dated according 
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(1940), complementing this reading with allusions from passages in texts 
conceived and written from the late 1920s onwards – especially, the Arcades 
Project (1927-1940), One-Way Street (1928), and ‘On the Image of Proust’ 
(1929). In doing so, I seek to foreground the constitutive relationship between 
the exceptional character of Jetztzeit and the quotidian temporality 
articulated elsewhere in Benjamin’s writings, especially as these take on a 
daily, autobiographical dimension.  While my focus remains on the theses on 
history, I also consider the earlier essays ‘On the Language as Such and on the 
Language of Man’ (1916) and ‘The Task of Translator’ (1923), whose 
articulation of language returns in a materialist-messianic guise in the later 
fragments ‘Doctrine of the Similar’ (1933) and ‘On the Mimetic Faculty’ (1933) 
in an attempt to explicate Benjamin’s chronopolitics in relation to the figure 
of analogy.  In analysing Benjamin’s theory of mimesis and the figures of 
thought that provide the material for this theory, I myself deploy analogical 
methods, not in order to self-consciously mirror the material I discuss, but 
rather because Benjamin’s work invites such a mode of reading. 
Comparativism thus also becomes a way of grappling with the difficulty that 
arises when one considers Benjamin’s work as a whole, while acknowledging 
the tensions and contradictions that lie within and across his writings. 
The question of chronopolitics is treated in this study through the 
category of ‘historical time’. Whether ‘historical’ time can be neatly separated 
from ‘cosmological’, ‘geological’ or ‘biological’ kinds of time is, of course, a 
matter of continuing debate, whose reach extends across disciplinary fields.6 
                                                             
to their year of publication, while those texts unpublished in his lifetime are dated 
according to the years in which they were written and conceived. When translations 
have been modified, they are noted as such.        
6 To mention one of the most recent and most significant contributions to such 
questions, the ‘Anthropocene’ thesis challenges long-held assumptions on the 
relationship between geological and human epochs.  For an important discussion of 
this thesis’ impact on historical theory and practice, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘The 
Climate of History: Four Theses’, Critical Inquiry, 35.2 (2009), 197-222. 
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With reference to Benjamin’s work in particular, this debate is highly 
pertinent because of the centrality of theological motifs in his thought, which 
themselves throw doubt on the assumption that historical time equals 
humanity’s ‘development’ over time.7 What is more, the question of historical 
time has often been treated in Benjamin scholarship as two separate 
questions: of ‘history’ and of ‘time’. This separation has meant that those who 
study Benjamin’s critique of historicism in the ‘theses’ or his attempts at a 
materialist historical practice in the Passagenarbeit only tangentially touch 
upon the underlying temporalities at work, while those focussing on the role 
of time side-line the question of historicity, sometimes even circumventing it 
altogether.8  Historical time’s historicity is, too, a contentious issue in 
Benjamin’s work, with one of the focal points of discussion being the question 
whether the time of Jetztzeit (now-time) is inside or outside history.9 My 
                                                             
7 For an analysis that attends to the ‘beyond-human’ elements in Benjamin’s 
conception of history, see Beatrice Hanssen, Benjamin's Other History: Of Stones, 
Animals, Human Beings, and Angels (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).  
8 On the former group, see the opposing views of Irving Wohlfahrt and H.D. 
Kittsteiner on whether Benjamin’s historical practice is a form of historicism. Cf. 
Irving Wohlfahrt, ‘Smashing the Kaleidoscope: Walter Benjamin’s Critique of Cultural 
History’, in Walter Benjamin and the Demands of History, ed. by Michael Steinberg 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: 1996), pp. 190-205; H.D. Kittsteiner, ‘Walter 
Benjamin’s Historicism’, Second Special Issue on Walter Benjamin, New German 
Critique, 39 (1986), 179-215. On the latter, see Peter Fenves, The Messianic Reduction: 
Walter Benjamin and the Shape of Time (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2011), a well-crafted monograph which delineates its scope in the relationship 
between time and language in Benjamin’s pre-materialist years, and thus tactfully 
avoids any mention of the role of history.    
9 Peter Osborne, for instance, argues that now-time is ‘neither wholly inside nor 
wholly outside of history, but faces both ways at once’. See Osborne, Politics of Time, 
p. 144.  For Giorgio Agamben, on the contrary, ‘now-time’, and even the messianic, is 
interior to historical time.  See Giorgio Agamben, The Time that Remains: A 
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reading of Benjamin’s conception of historical time considers this particular 
question while looking beyond the antagonistic relationship between 
historicism and Jetztzeit that is set up by Benjamin in ‘On the Concept of 
History’.  Considering other less ‘evental’ temporalities, as these are 
manifested in writing that concerns the realm of the quotidian, I suggest that 
the opposition between historicism and Jetztzeit (often reduced to an 
opposition between chronos [time as-measurement] and kairós [time-as-
rupture]) has been problematically overemphasised.  As I argue below, the 
reduction of Benjamin’s conception of historical time to the figure of kairós 
has led not only to a false equation of kairós with decisionism, but also to a 
false sense of Jetztzeit‘s exteriority to chronos.  In order to redress this 
temporal imbalance, I propose that Benjamin’s chronopolitics be understood 
through the figure of timing, entailing both decisionism and undecidability, 
and acknowledging that measurement and measurability are interior to 
Benjamin’s historical time. This interiority is articulated with reference to the 
monadological principle that guides Benjamin’s thought, a principle Benjamin 
also calls the principle of ‘montage’ or ‘interruption’.  According to this 
principle, the montage ‘fragment’ is not part of a whole, but rather the part 
contains the whole, whereby Jetztzeit is neither reducible nor exterior to 
historical time, but rather contains historical time in miniature.  
 The monadological principle of Jetztzeit containing historical time in 
miniature is then taken up with respect to the question of comparativism. 
More specifically, the question of the change of scale that occurs when 
something is contained in miniature – or as an ‘abridgment’, as Benjamin 
writes – is discussed with reference to Benjamin’s fragments on the mimetic 
faculty. Although they do not deal with the question of historical time per se, 
Benjamin’s short pieces on mimesis shed light on the question of scale and the 
transposition from the miniscule to the enormous that marks Benjamin’s 
                                                             
Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. by Patricia Dailey (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2005), pp. 69-71; 138-145. 
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notion of Ähnlichkeit. Rendered as similarity or analogy, Ähnlichkeit, I argue, 
is a key category for Benjamin’s non-representational relationship between 
universality and particularity, which can be productively deployed to 
articulate historical difference.  The self-differentiating, self-determining 
conception of historical difference established in this chapter will therefore 
function as a compass for our enquiry into the chronopolitics of the avant-
garde, and will be revisited and further developed in Chapter 5, when we 
return to Benjamin in light of the analyses of ‘afterness’ in the theorisations of 
the avant-garde after modernism.   
 
1.1 Time Experienced/Time Measured: Historical Time in ‘On the 
Concept of History’  
 
 
Die Geschichte ist Gegenstand einer Konstruktion, deren Ort nicht die homogene 
und leere Zeit sondern die von Jetztzeit erfüllte bildet. 
 
History is the subject of a construction whose site is not homogeneous and 
empty time, but time filled full by now-time.10  
 
 
Like so many of Benjamin’s writings, this famous extract from ‘On the Concept 
of History’ continues to puzzle newcomers and seasoned Benjaminians alike.  
In its mysterious concision, this brief sentence perfectly captures a 
confrontation between two different conceptions of historical time.  On the 
one hand, we are presented with ‘a homogeneous and empty time’; on the 
other, a ‘time filled full by now-time’.  How are we to understand this 
‘emptiness’ or ‘fullness’ of time precisely? And what is the politics of such a 
confrontation? Although the notion of ‘now-time’ [Jetztzeit] is particular to the 
materialist-messianic constellation of Benjamin’s late thought, the distinction 
between an empty and full time articulated here is founded on a set of 
                                                             
10 Thesis XIV, ‘On the Concept of History’, SW4, pp. 389-400 (p. 395); ‘Über den Begriff 
der Geschichte’, in GS I.2, pp. 693-704 (p. 701), hereafter cited by thesis number 
followed by page number of SW and GS editions. 
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presuppositions that is as old as philosophical enquiry into the nature of time 
itself.11  It is beyond the scope of my present analysis to recount the genealogy 
of such presuppositions.  Nevertheless, it is worth pausing briefly to sketch 
their outline, before I move on to examine their import for Benjamin’s thought, 
particularly with reference to his critique of progress.   
There are two presuppositions that require attention. The first 
concerns the question over whether time is a vessel.  The archetypal image 
used to describe and cognise time – the river of time – hints at precisely this 
question:  Does time flow (like the water in a riverbed)?  Or is time the 
riverbed through which events flow?  Otherwise put, this is a question over 
whether time is something that one can be ‘inside’ (and which carries events 
inside it) or whether time simply is these events.  It is also a question 
concerning time’s movement.  If time itself flows then it is in movement; if time 
is a vessel, then it is the events inside it that move, not time.12  The second 
presupposition concerns time’s relationship to movement and, additionally, 
to measurement.  The Aristotelian and Newtonian conceptions of time, which 
have been foundational for both physics and philosophy, posit a direct 
relationship between time and measurement. In Aristotle’s proposition, time 
is indeed ‘in movement’, and it is this being-in-movement that allows it to 
function as a device of measurement: ‘Not only do we measure the movement 
by the time, but also the time by the movement, because they define each 
                                                             
11 For a concise introduction to the parameters of philosophical discussion on time 
and temporality across the ages, see Russell West-Pavlov, Temporalities (London: 
Routledge, 2013), pp. 42-55. 
12 Debates over such questions have marked significant methodological differences 
between analytic and phenomenological approaches to the philosophy of time, 
although recently there has been more dialogue across the camps. See Roger McLure, 
The Philosophy of Time: Time before Times (London: Routledge, 2005); Yuval Dolev, 
Time and Realism: Metaphysical and Antimetaphysical Perspectives (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2007); Jack Reynolds, Chronopathologies: Time and Politics in Derrida, 
Deleuze, Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2012).  
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other’.13  In other words, time is defined through the fact that it measures 
movement, yet it measures movement only on account of its own movement.  
According to the Aristotelian definition, being in time means being measured 
by time: ‘if a thing is in time it will be measured by time’.14  Newtonian time or 
‘absolute time’, by contrast, refers to time as self-constitutive: time is ‘in and 
of itself, and of its own nature, without reference to anything external’.15 Thus, 
whereas Aristotelian time is constituted by its relationship to the objects 
whose movement it measures, absolute time exists prior to and irrespective 
of what it measures. 
Returning to Benjamin with these ideas in mind, we can discern that 
the distinction between a ‘homogeneous and empty time’ and a ‘time filled full 
by now-time’ presupposes that time is a vessel, which can be empty or full of 
historical events. The distinction also presupposes that there can be a ‘time 
within a time’, or rather a type of time (i.e. ‘now-time’) which provides the 
content to time as an a priori, exterior vessel.  With regard to the second 
question of time’s measurement (and even though the idea of measurement 
may not appear as explicitly as that of the vessel in the selected passage), 
Benjamin puts forth a strong polemic against the conception of time-as-
measurement. This polemic shows Benjamin to be firmly embedded in the 
intellectual context of his time, a context marked by the legacy of Henri 
Bergson’s Matter and Memory (1896) and of a phenomenological analysis of 
time initiated by Edmund Husserl’s On the Phenomenology of the 
                                                             
13 The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, Volume 1, ed. by 
Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 354-390 (pp. 
373). 
14 The Complete Works of Aristotle, p. 375. 
15 Isaac Newton, The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural History, trans. by I. 
Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman, assisted by Julia Budenz (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1999), p. 408. 
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Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917).16 Despite their differences, what 
these seminal philosophical contributions have in common is their critique of 
a positivist conception of time.  In other words, they propose a conception of 
time whereby time is to be understood first and foremost as experience (be it 
called ‘durée’ or ‘consciousness’), and the reduction of time to measurement is 
considered a ‘vulgarity’ to be opposed at all costs.17 This crucial opposition 
between qualitative and quantitative time can serve to explicate Benjamin’s 
concept of historical time.  Although I wish to problematize such a clear-cut 
opposition between experience and measurement, this distinction is 
necessary so as to understand Benjamin’s critique of quantitative time, which 
can be found in two particular manifestations: his critique of historicism and 
his attack on an undialectical notion of progress.  
Let us first review Benjamin’s critique of historicism. Benjamin’s usage 
of the term ‘historicism’ is far from neutral, as historicism is itself a notion 
with a contested history.  Indeed, German idealist philosophy and 
historiography is one of the loci where such a contestation has been played 
out, with variations in meaning so wide that the term can denote precisely 
opposite historiographical theories and practices.18  The kind of historicism 
                                                             
16 On the broader historical, cultural and scientific context of changing perceptions of 
time in the fin-de-siècle and early twentieth-century Europe, see Stephen Kern, The 
Culture of Time and Space, 1880-1918 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
[1983] 2003). 
17 See West-Pavlov, Temporalities, pp. 42-55; David Couzens Hoy, The Time of Our 
Lives: A Critical History of Temporality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009), pp. 45-68. 
18 One key issue has been the question whether historicism should place emphasis on 
the particular context’s uniqueness or whether it should emphasise the narrative of 
epochal continuity and/or change. For the context of this distinction in German 
historiography, see Georg G. Iggers, The German Conception of History: The National 
Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1983); Georg G. Iggers, ‘Historicism: The History and Meaning of the 
Term’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 56.1 (1995), 129-52 (pp. 131-132). 
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that Benjamin is referring to here is the German nineteenth-century school of 
historiography associated with the work of Leopold von Ranke and Gustav 
Droysen, also known as the German Historical School.  It could be said that 
Benjamin’s critique of this kind of historicism, also known as ‘Rankean 
historicism’, is exaggerated and caricatures these historians’ actual tenets.  
Nevertheless, Ranke’s dictum that history should portray events ‘as they 
really were’ [wie es eigentlich gewesen] is used by Benjamin to suggest a 
historical time devoid of time-as-experience.  When Benjamin describes the 
first kind of time as ‘homogeneous’, therefore, what he has in mind is a 
historicist time which, through the practice of chronology, treats historical 
moments as if they were equidistant from one another, separated by 
equivalent intervals.19  For Benjamin, historicism follows an ‘additive’ logic, 
trying to fill historical time with data.20  Thus, like the logic of measurement 
that operates under clock-time, the chronological time of historicism is for 
Benjamin objectionable because it posits a false objectivity on the historian’s 
part and takes no account of the role of experience.21  
Let us now turn to Benjamin’s critique of progress. Benjamin’s 
conception of the linearity and false objectivity of historicism becomes 
implicated in his critique of the orthodox Marxist belief that humanity is 
                                                             
19 As Andrew McGettigan has noted, Benjamin’s ‘homogene’ must be rendered and 
understood as ‘homogeneous’, that is, in the mathematical sense of having 
‘uniformity of degree’ (and not ‘homogenous’, as being of the same genos, i.e. 
descent).  See Andrew McGettigan, ‘As flowers turn towards the sun: Walter 
Benjamin’s Bergsonian image of the past’, Radical Philosophy 158. 
November/December (2009), 25-35 (p. 34, n. 37).  
20 ‘Its procedure is additive: it musters a mass of data [die Masse der Fakten] to fill the 
homogeneous, empty time’. Thesis XVII, SW4, p. 396; GS I.2, p. 702.   
21 Benjamin does not oppose all forms of measured time: only those that disregard 
memory.  In Thesis XV, Benjamin draws a distinction between clock-time and 
calendrical time, calling days of remembrance (such as holidays) ‘monuments of 
historical consciousness’.  Thesis XV, SW4, p. 395; GS I.2, p. 702.      
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marching towards a better world.  In his letter to Adorno of 9 December 1938, 
Benjamin concurs with Adorno’s reservation about the idea of progress, 
suggesting that he intends to critique the idea and ‘get at its roots and 
origins’.22  Perhaps one of the ways in which Benjamin ‘got’ at these origins 
was through his association of the notion of progress with the empty and 
homogeneous time of historicism.  As Thesis XVII declares: ‘The conception of 
humankind’s progress in history cannot be sundered from the conception of 
its progression [durchlaufenden Fortgangs] through a homogeneous and 
empty time. A critique of the conception of such a progression must be the 
basis of the critique of the conception of progress [an der Vorstellung des 
Fortschritts] itself’.23  Benjamin outlines here a direct connection between the 
marching-forward [durchlaufend] movement in the movement of progress 
[Fortgang] and the movement that takes place in the empty-of-temporality 
time of historicism.  What is asserted here is the conviction that a critique of 
the idea of humankind’s historical progress requires a critique of its 
temporality. This critique is launched not only against Rankean historicism 
but also against the determinist notion of progress advocated by the orthodox 
Marxist ideology of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) which, according to 
Benjamin, gave the proletariat the false impression that they were part of a 
historical movement towards progress: ‘Nothing has so corrupted the German 
working classes as the belief that it was they who were moving with the 
current’.24  
In opposition to the false objectivity of historicism and the 
determinism of orthodox Marxism, Benjamin articulates a form of historical 
time detached from the doxa of inevitable development: ‘The historical […] 
                                                             
22 See ‘Letter 307: To Theodor W. Adorno’, in CWB, pp. 585-92 (p. 591). 
23 Thesis XIII, translation mine; Cf. SW4, pp. 394-395; GS I.2, p. 701.  
24 Thesis XI, translation mine, emphasis original. Cf. SW4, p. 393; GS I.2, p. 698. See 
also Thesis XIII, SW4 p. 394-395; GS I.2, pp. 700-701.  
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can no longer be sought in the riverbed of progress.’25 Benjamin’s task is to 
move in a different historical direction: ‘to swim in time against the direction 
of the swirling stream’.26  This new form of historical time is proposed in the 
name of historical materialism, with the figure of the historical materialist 
deployed in stark contrast to that of the positivist historicist.  Whereas the 
latter places events in chronological order, the historical materialist is called 
upon to ‘blast a specific era out of the homogeneous course of history’.27  
Benjamin questions the explanation of causality in history through the notion 
of a ‘chain of events’, as he calls for an end to the practice of going through 
events with one’s fingers as though they were rosary beads [‘sich die Abfolge 
von Begebenheiten durch die Finger laufen zu lassen wie einen Rosenkranz’].28  
The past (or better put, the ‘what-has-been’, das Gewesene) is for Benjamin not 
something that one has at one’s disposal, but rather something that is difficult 
to grasp because it ‘flits past’ [huscht vorbei] and threatens to disappear at 
every present moment.29  This is Benjamin’s famous ‘dialectical image’ which 
appears before the historical materialist, almost as if it were an apparition.30  
The historical materialist’s task is, then, at that very precise and critical 
moment – an opportune moment which is also inescapably ‘a moment of 
                                                             
25 ‚Das Historische […] kann nicht mehr im Flußbett eines Verwicklungsverlaufes 
gesucht werden‘.  ‘Tagebuch vom 7.8. 1931 bis zum Todestag’, GS VI, p. 443. 
26 AP <Go, 20 >, p. 843.  On the connection posited by Benjamin between historical 
practice and temporal direction, see also AP <Oo, 56>, p. 862. 
27 Thesis XVII, SW4, p. 396; GS I.2, p. 703. 
28 Thesis A. Here I summarise with a modified translation, as the image of the 
historian’s hands running through the rosary beads has been lost in the English 
translations; an image that perhaps can be itself likened to the movement of the 
abacus beads that measure while-being-moved by the human hand, albeit without 
the rosary beads’ theological inflections.  Cf. SW4, p. 397; Illuminations, p. 255; GS I.2, 
p. 704. 
29 See Thesis V, SW4, pp. 390-391; GS I.2, p. 695.  
30 See Thesis VI, SW4, p. 391; GS I.2, p. 695. 
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danger’ – to seize hold of that fleeting image, through which knowledge of the 
historical past becomes accessible.  Jetztzeit becomes therefore the key 
conceptual category that Benjamin proposes in opposition to quantitative 
time and the ‘empty and homogeneous’ time of historicism and progress.  It is 
through Jetztzeit that Benjamin articulates a historiographical practice that 
goes by the name of historical materialism, critiquing the orthodox Marxist 
conceptions of historical time’s forward march.  But how does Jetztzeit relate 
to historical time precisely?  To what extent can it be said to be exterior to 
historical time?  Let us now examine these two questions in more detail. 
 
1.2  Revisiting Benjaminian Chronopolitics: kairós and ‘timing’   
 
Benjamin’s enigmatic proposition of a historical materialist practice is 
distinctive in its combination of anarchist, Marxist and theological tendencies: 
the voluntarist momentum that explodes ‘the continuum of history’ coexists 
with calls for a proletarian revolution, which themselves coexist with images 
of a Messiah that ‘comes as the victor over the Antichrist’.31  A conceptual 
trope that can be deployed to bring these disparate tendencies together is the 
temporal figure of kairós, namely, the opportune or decisive moment for 
taking action – the moment when, as it were, one must ‘seize the moment’.  In 
contrast to the figure of chronos – a ‘normal’ or ‘unexceptional’ time – the time 
of kairós is ‘exceptional’.32 The chronopolitics of kairós is captured in one 
passage that is commonly referred to by scholars and commentators, the 
appropriately-titled fragment ‘Fire Alarm’ in One-Way Street: ‘And if the 
abolition of the bourgeoisie is not completed by an almost calculable moment 
in economic and technical development (a moment signaled by inflation and 
poison-gas warfare), all is lost. Before the spark reaches the dynamite, the 
                                                             
31 Thesis VI, SW4, p. 391; GS I.2, p. 695.  
32 On the difference between chronos and kairós, see Hutchings, Time and World 
Politics, p. 5.  For a more detailed analysis, see J.E. Smith, ‘Time, Times and the “Right 
Time”: chronos and kairós’, The Monist, 53.1 (1969), 1-13. 
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lighted fuse must be cut.’33  This emphasis on seizing the moment and acting 
before it is too late – a chronopolitics of ‘the time is now’, we might say – has 
been taken up by a number of commentators who have seen Benjaminian 
kairós as a useful tool for political mobilisation.34  The politics of kairós has 
also been foregrounded by current interpretations that trace an affinity 
between Benjamin’s conception of historical time and recent materialist-
theological philosophy by figures such as Antonio Negri and Alain Badiou.35  
Lastly, and perhaps most controversially, Benjaminian kairós has been 
discussed with reference to the thought of the conservative Catholic and later 
Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt and his notion of the ‘state of exception’, which 
Benjamin references in the theses.36   
                                                             
33 ‘Fire alarm’, One-Way Street, SW1, p. 470; ‘Feuermelder’, Einbahnstrasse, GS IV, p. 
122. 
34 The most influential analysis in this vein has been Michael Löwy, Fire Alarm: 
Reading Walter Benjamin’s ‘On the Concept of History’, trans. by Chris Turner (London: 
Verso, [2001] 2005); see especially, p. 87.  Cf. Daniel Bensaïd, Marx for our Times: 
Adventures and Misadventures of a Critique, trans. by Gregory Elliott (London: Verso, 
2002), pp. 81-90.  For an earlier, comparable position, see also Terry Eagleton, Walter 
Benjamin: Or Towards a Revolutionary Criticism (London: Verso, 1981), pp. 173-79. 
35 See Roland Boer, ‘The Immeasurably Creative Politics of Job: Antonio Negri and the 
Bible’, SubStance, 41.3 (2012), 93-108 (p. 95).     
36 Carl Schmitt famously declared that sovereignty is founded on the state of 
exception, namely, on the exceptional moment that grants the power to suspend legal 
order.  See Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of 
Sovereignty, trans. by George Schwab (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, [1922] 1985), pp. 
1-15.  Giorgio Agamben has influentially read Benjamin’s reference to a ‘real state of 
exception’ as an appropriation, not confirmation, of Schmitt’s ideas.  See Giorgio 
Agamben, The State of Exception, trans. by Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 57-59. There is a wealth of scholarship discussing the 
difficult relationship between Benjamin and Schmitt, and Agamben’s reading.  See 
Samuel Weber, ‘Taking Exception to Decision: Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt’ 
Diacritics, 22.3/4 (1992), 5-18; Horst Bredekamp, ‘From Walter Benjamin to Carl 
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Despite the undeniable presence of the decisive moment in Benjamin’s 
chronopolitics, my wager is that the temporality of decisionism underlying 
kairós has been overstated, leading to a false identification of Benjamin’s 
conception of historical time with kairós.  By focussing on the temporality of 
kairós, whether in its messianic or its secular-decisionist guise, and by 
equating Benjamin’s concept of historical time with Jetztzeit, one runs the risk 
of disregarding the import of less ‘exceptional’ temporalities that have an 
equally historical function within Benjamin’s thought.37  As I wish to show, this 
overemphasis on kairós has been to the detriment of another temporal figure, 
one which was intimated in Benjamin’s letter at the beginning of this chapter, 
and which can be given the name ‘timing’.  Timing denotes ‘telling the time’: 
that is, knowing the time, and knowing through measuring.  This 
measurement, however, is not based on exterior devices, such as clocks or 
calendars, but is a form of discernment based on a human experiential scale 
that, when considered alongside Benjamin’s theory of mimesis, reveals timing 
as a form of embodied cognition.  Thus, ‘timing’ and Benjamin’s chronopolitics 
by extension, involves timeliness and untimeliness; it involves kairós as well 
as the moment of indecision.   
Timing crops up in unexpected places in Benjamin’s writing.  
Measuring time by following one’s embodied cognition may encompass the 
newspaper reader’s daily impatience for the news, the gambler’s weighing-up 
of the exact moment when the bet must be placed, or the crowd’s measured 
                                                             
Schmitt, via Thomas Hobbes’, Critical Inquiry, 25.2 (1999), 247-66; Brian Britt, ‘The 
Schmittian Messiah in Agamben’s The Time That Remains’, Critical Inquiry, 36.2 
(2010), 262-87.  
37 I am here in agreement with the view that historical time in Benjamin is also 
present in the unexceptional, quotidian temporality of the Passagenarbeit. See Peter 
Buse, Ken Hirschkop, Scott McCracken and Bertrand Taithe, Benjamin’s Arcades: An 
Unguided Tour (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), p. 37.  
 
[66] 
movement in front of the arcades.38  Moments of indecision may appear in 
fragments and thought-images involving the act of waiting, or the figure of 
awakening, a spatio-temporal threshold between action and idleness.39  Such 
instances of waiting-time and undecidability have been read as moments of 
deferral by Anglo-American scholars who have taken deconstructive paths to 
interpreting Benjamin’s texts.40 However, although these in-between 
moments are no doubt present in Benjamin, focussing on the undecidability 
of Benjamin’s chronopolitics without considering his decisionism, would be as 
misleading and as partial a move as the one made by those who can only hear 
the ‘fire alarm’.  The figure of timing, I suggest, opens a different path to 
understanding the relationship between undecidability and kairós.  As we saw 
in Benjamin’s letter in this chapter’s introduction: ‘the task is plainly not to 
decide once and for all, but rather at every moment.’41  This temporal 
                                                             
38 See ‘Author as Producer’, SW2.2, pp. 771; GS II.2, p. 688.  AP [O12a, 2], pp. 512-513.  
AP <Oo, 51>, p. 862. 
39 See, for instance, ‘Breakfast Room’, One-Way Street, SW1, pp. 444-445; ‘On the 
Image of Proust’, SW2.1, pp. 238-239; Origin, pp. 70-72. Further examples can be 
given in relation to the role that ‘habit’ plays in Benjamin’s thought. See, for instance, 
AP [N2a, 1], p. 461. Cf. Tim Beasley-Murray, Mikhail Bakhtin and Walter Benjamin: 
Experience and Form (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 22-24.  
40 Derrida’s own interpretations of Benjamin aside, two prominent examples include 
Paul de Man, ‘Conclusions: Walter Benjamin’s “The Task of the Translator”’, in The 
Resistance to Theory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), pp. 73-93; 
and Samuel Weber, Benjamin’s –abilities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2008), especially pp. 122-28.  For Derrida’s foundational essay, see Jacques Derrida, 
‘Des Tours de Babel’, trans. by Joseph F. Graham, in Difference in Translation, edited 
with an introduction by Joseph F. Graham (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1985), pp. 165-207. The original French is published as an appendix in the same 
collection. Cf. Jacques Derrida, ‘Appendix: Des Tours de Babel’, in Difference in 
Translation, pp. 209-48.       
41 See n. 1 in this chapter; emphasis added.  Moreover, see the closing sentence of the 
‘Surrealism’ essay and the image of an alarm clock ringing ceaselessly, replacing the 
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relationship between the rupture of Jetztzeit and the continuity of ‘deciding at 
every moment’ can be elucidated through Benjamin’s famous method of 
constellation.  In order to explicate the broader chronopolitical import of 
timing, therefore, let us now turn our attention to Benjamin’s method of 
constellation and his deployment of the Leibnizian monad.    
Benjamin makes explicit reference to Leibniz’s notion of the monad as 
early as the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ in his failed Habilitation on the 
Trauerspiel and returns to this notion in the theses.42  In Leibniz’s own texts, 
the ontology of the monad is explained through a metaphor of plants and fish: 
‘Each portion of matter can be conceived as a garden full of plants, and as a 
pond full of fish. But each branch of a plant, each limb of an animal, each drop 
of its humors, is still another such garden or pond’.43  The Leibnizian monad is 
an indivisible entity: it has no composite parts, and does not form part of a 
bigger entity.  It is ‘window-less’: it does not refer to anything outside itself.44  
Following the theological idea of analogia entis, according to which God’s 
creations are not ‘part of’ God but are ‘analogous to’ God, the monad is not part 
                                                             
function of ticking with that of a constant waking bell.  SW2.1, p. 218; GS II.1, p. 310.  
See also the experience of constant tiny alarms by the reader of Proust: ‘The true 
reader of Proust is shaken continuously [immerwährend] by little frights.’  ‘On the 
Image of Proust’, SW2.1, p. 242; translation modified.  Cf. GS II.1, p. 318.   
42 ‘Thinking involves not only the movement of thoughts but, equally, their arrest 
[Stillstellung]. Where thinking suddenly stops in a configuration pregnant with 
tensions, it gives that configuration a shock, through which it is crystallised as 
monad.’  Thesis XVII; translation modified.  Cf. SW4, p. 396; GS I.2, pp. 702-703. 
43 G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical Texts, trans. by Richard Francks and R. S. Woolhouse, 
introduction by R. S. Woolhouse (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 277. 
44 On the indivisibility of the monad in Leibniz, see Daniel Garber, Leibniz: Body, 
Substance, Monad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 353.  For a detailed 
analysis of Leibniz’s influence on Benjamin, see Paula L. Schwebel, ‘Intensive Infinity: 
Walter Benjamin’s Reception of Leibniz and its Sources’, MLN, 127.3 (2012), 589-610. 
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of the universe but is, in its internal structure, analogous to the universe.45  
Benjamin’s metaphor also involves a planetary, and arguably also theological, 
analogy: ‘ideas are related [verhalten sich] to things as constellations 
[Sternbilder] are to stars’.46 Literally ‘star-images’, constellations are not a 
priori to the stars, nor do they function as first principles.  Like the mosaic, the 
other image that Benjamin characteristically deploys, the constellation is 
formed of multiple singularities: ‘Every idea is a sun and is related to other 
ideas just as suns are related to each other.’47  Rather than being a particle of 
the world, the monad is a world within a world. Or, as Eli Friedlander reminds 
us: ‘the dialectical image is not an image of anything’.48  Thus, Benjamin’s 
much-discussed figure of the fragment is monadological in this precise sense: 
it does not refer to anything outside itself but is complete in itself.49   
Benjamin’s monadological principle does not restrict itself to texts 
where the monad is mentioned explicitly.  In the Arcades Project, the collector 
and collecting as a way of relating to objects become another expression of 
singularity: ‘For the collector, the world is present, and indeed ordered, in 
each of his objects’.50  As a monad, each object is not part of the collection but 
                                                             
45 See Lucian Hölscher, ‘Time Gardens: Historical Concepts in Modern 
Historiography’, History and Theory, Forum: Multiple Temporalities, 53 (2014), 577-
91 (p. 583). 
46 Origin, p. 34; translation modified.  Cf. GS I.1, p. 214.   
47 See Origin, pp. 28, 37. 
48 Eli Friedlander, ‘The Measure of the Contingent: Walter Benjamin’s Dialectical 
Image, boundary 2, 35.3 (2008), 1-26 (p. 4; emphasis original). 
49 See, for instance, ‘Eduard Fuchs, Collector and Historian’: ‘The researcher […] must 
abandon the calm, contemplative attitude towards his object in order to become 
conscious of the critical constellation in which precisely this fragment of the past 
finds itself with precisely this present.’ SW3, p. 262; GS II.2, pp. 467-68. 
50 AP [H2, 7; H2a, 1], p. 207.  Cf. ‘And for the true collector, every single thing in this 
system becomes an encyclopaedia of all knowledge of the epoch […]’.  AP [H1a, 2], p. 
205.  
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contains the entire collection within it.  Benjamin’s theories of allegory, 
gesture and indexicality also follow the same principle. ‘Each gesture is an 
event […] in itself’, writes Benjamin with reference to the gestural aspects that 
he recognises in Kafka.51  In his analysis of epic theatre, too, Benjamin salutes 
the non-empathetic, non-representational quality of Brecht’s plays, 
recognising a method that he advocated and practised: literary montage and 
the principle of interruption.52  Brecht himself described epic theatre in terms 
that were in accord with Benjamin’s appropriation of the Leibnizian monad: 
‘One can as it were take a pair of scissors and cut [the epic play] into individual 
pieces, which remain fully capable of life’.53  These individual pieces are fully 
capable of life because they do not need to form part of a larger whole in order 
to retain their import.  As Benjamin famously summarised his principle of 
montage: ‘I needn’t say anything. Merely show. I shall […] appropriate no 
ingenious formulations. But the rags, the refuse – these I will not inventory 
but allow, in the only way possible, to come into their own: by making use of 
them’.54  
The montage principle was also intended by Benjamin as a method of 
historical practice. Historical materialism would provide the space ‘to carry 
over the principle of montage into history […], to assemble large-scale 
constructions out of the smallest and most precisely cut components […] to 
discover in the analysis of the small individual moment the crystal of the total 
event’.55  Thus, each historical moment can be fully ‘capable of life’, and not 
reduced to a rosary bead in the string of the narrative of progress.  In 
Benjamin’s own declarative terms: ‘If the object of history is to be blasted out 
                                                             
51 ‘Franz Kafka, On the Tenth Anniversary of his Death’, SW2.2, p. 802; GS II.2, p. 419.  
See also Benjamin’s remarks on Chaplin’s movement in ‘The Formula in Which the 
Dialectical Structure of Film Finds Expression’, SW3, p. 94.   
52 See UB, pp. 4, 12, 81, 99.  
53 Brecht on Theatre, p. 70. 
54 AP [N1a, 8], p. 460; emphasis original. 
55 AP [N2, 6], p. 461.  
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of the continuum of historical succession, that is because its monadological 
structure demands it.’56  It is important to underline here that the principle of 
interruption does not lead to a rupture where time ‘escapes’ measurement, as 
some commentators have suggested.57  Rather, the montage principle 
produces a new relationship between the moment of kairós and the 
unexceptional moment, with the idea of singularity being here crucial.  In 
Convolute N and the theses, Benjamin presents now-time as a crystallisation 
or condensation of the whole course of history into one particular moment, 
and this condensation appears in the aporetic temporal movement of Jetztzeit 
as ‘dialectics at a standstill’.58  Jetztzeit is certainly in opposition to the time of 
historicism, as we have already seen.  However, in its monadological 
relationship to history (namely, containing the whole course of history in 
miniature), Jetztzeit is not exterior to chronos.59  Although Jetztzeit cannot be 
equated with chronos – it is, after all, a rupture in the historical time of 
                                                             
56 AP [N10, 3], p. 475. 
57 As an indication see the phenomenological analysis proposed by Kia Lindroos, 
which, in my view, emphasises the centrality of qualitative time to such an extent 
where the dialectical relationship to a time-measured is effaced.  See Kia Lindroos, 
Now-Time/Image-Space: Temporalization of Politics in Walter Benjamin's Philosophy 
of History and Art (Jyväskylä: SoPhi/Jyväskylä University Press, 1998), p. 20. 
58 ‘It’s not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present its 
light on what is past; rather, image is that wherein what has been comes together in 
a flash with the now to form a constellation. In other words: image is dialectics at 
standstill’.  AP [N2a, 3], p. 462. Cf. Thesis XVII, SW4, p. 396; GS I.2, p. 703.  See also AP 
[N11, 4], p. 476. 
59 Giorgio Agamben arrives at the same conclusion, even though via a different 
hermeneutic route.  See Agamben, The Time that Remains, pp. 68-72. Following 
Agamben, Sami Khatib makes the comparable point that Jetztzeit is not exterior to 
‘capital-time’.  See Sami Khatib, ‘The Time of Capital and the Messianicity of Time. 
Marx with Benjamin’, Studies in Social & Political Thought, 20 (2012), 46-59 (pp. 59-
62).   
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historicism – equally, it cannot be reduced to, or subsumed by, the messianic.  
In all its exceptionality, Jetztzeit finds itself related to time-as-measurement.   
This relationship can be understood as a condensation, as I have 
mentioned above.  Or, rather more appropriately, considering the central 
status of philology in Benjamin’s thought, it can be understood as an 
abridgement or abbreviation. Benjamin uses the term abridgement 
[Abbreviatur] to describe both the ‘idea’ in Origin, and Jetztzeit in the theses.60  
The idea’s relationship to the world of ideas is one of abbreviation, and so is 
Jetztzeit’s:  
  
Die Jetztzeit, die als Modell der messianischen in einer ungeheueren 
Abbreviatur die Geschichte der ganzen Menschheit zusammenfaßt, fällt 
haarscharf mit der Figur zusammen, die die Geschichte der Menschheit im 
Universum macht.61  
 
Now-time, which, as a model of the messianic, comprises the history of all 
humankind in a tremendous abbreviation, coincides precisely with the figure 
that the history of humankind draws in the universe.62  
 
The temporality of abridgement is here key, as abridgement is both a spatio-
temporal condensation and a textual act of cutting short.  Abridgement is the 
antidote to the additive, accumulative temporality of historicism: instead of 
the accumulation of new historical data to a line of events, Benjamin proposes 
the abbreviation of humankind’s entire history, an abbreviation that is itself 
‘enormous’ [ungeheuer].  The question of time’s direction becomes thus three-
dimensional, as the abbreviation suggests a change in scale and proportion.63  
What is more, Jetztzeit is a ‘model’, that is, it is in a proportional relationship 
to the messianic.  Therefore, through the philological device of abridgement, 
                                                             
60 See Origin, p. 48.  
61 Thesis XVIII, GS I.2, p. 703; emphasis original.   
62 Thesis XVIII, SW4, p. 396; emphasis original and translation modified. 
63 See for instance: ‘[…] the historical object […] into which all the forces and interests 
of history enter on a reduced scale’.  AP [N10, 3], p. 475.  
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Benjamin proposes a mediation between the miniscule and the enormous, and 
between the historical instant and the entire course of human history.   
Let us recap our argument so far.  Although Benjamin’s concept of 
historical time cannot be explicated without the decisive moment of kairós, 
the monadological structure of Jetztzeit problematises any clear-cut 
opposition between kairós and chronos and, consequently, questions the 
notion that the moment of rupture can escape measurement.  We have seen 
that Jetztzeit does not have a ‘metonymic’ relationship to history (that is, a 
relationship of ‘part’ to ‘whole’).64  Instead, as a singularity, Jetztzeit comprises 
the whole course of history in an abridgement. Whereas kairós disregards the 
importance of ‘in-between’ tropes such as awakening and waiting, the 
proposed temporal figure of ‘timing’ better captures the ambivalence between 
decisiveness and undecidability that characterises Benjamin’s writing, and 
highlights a form of measuring time that is inextricable to human experience.  
With these conclusions in mind, we are now in a position to probe further into 
the monadological constitution of the relationship between the particular and 
the universal, while suggesting an epistemological continuity between 
Benjamin’s concept of historical time, his reflections on mimesis, and his own 
propensity ‘for seeing similarity’.  
 
 
                                                             
64 Osborne rightly points out that Jetztzeit, being an abridgement of historical time, is 
temporally ‘both durational extension and point-like source’. (See Osborne, Politics 
of Time, p. 145).  He also suggests, however, that the dialectical image has a 
‘metonymic’ relationship to history as a whole, a suggestion which seems to 
contradict its monadological character, underlined by Osborne himself.  Cf. Politics of 
Time, pp. 147, 151. ‘Metonymic’ is used by Osborne rather loosely and does not refer 
to Jakobson’s classic distinction between metonymy and metaphor: see Roman 
Jakobson, ‘Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances’, in On 
Language, ed. by Linda R. Waugh and Monique Monville-Burston (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 115-33.      
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1.3  Seeing Similarity: Benjaminian Analogy as Historical 
Difference  
 
Considering that Benjamin’s concept of historical time is founded on the 
critique of progress, it is unsurprising that ‘On the Concept of History’ has 
found allies among critics of modernisation theory from the field of 
postcolonial studies. In his foundational monograph Provincializing Europe, 
historian and historical theorist Dipesh Chakrabarty alludes to Benjamin’s 
notion of the ‘empty and homogeneous’ time of historicism before launching 
into a critique of the temporal logic that structures the relationship between 
‘the West’ and ‘non-West’.65 Historicism’s logic of the ‘not-yet’, argues 
Chakrabarty, places the ‘non-West’ in ‘the waiting room of history’, where the 
‘not-yet-modern’ has to wait for its turn, so that it can too ‘modernise’.66 The 
movement of transition between different stages in history – most 
importantly, the transition ‘towards modernity’ – becomes also a movement 
where the relationship between centre and periphery is temporally figured.  
In keeping with Chakrabarty’s overall project of ‘temporalising’ discourses on 
geopolitical centre/periphery relations, in this chapter’s final part I wish to 
bring my analysis of Benjamin’s chronopolitics of timing to bear on the 
question of representation. As has been recently suggested by Zahid R. 
Chaudhary, historical difference manifests itself in Benjamin’s writings on 
mimesis and can be instructive for postcolonial studies.67 Although my own 
methodological emphasis is not on Benjamin’s potential contribution to 
                                                             
65 See Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and 
Historical Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 6-11. 
66 Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, p. 8. It must be noted here that Chakrabarty 
understands historicism with reference to development: ‘the idea of development 
and the assumption that a certain amount of time elapses in the very process of 
development are critical to this understanding’. Chakrabarty, p. 23.  
67 See Zahid R. Chaudhary, ‘Subjects in Difference: Walter Benjamin, Frantz Fanon, 
and Postcolonial Theory’, differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, 23.1 
(2012), 151-83 (pp. 160-66).  
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postcolonial thought, Chaudhary’s call to relate Benjamin to the postcolonial 
via mimesis is nonetheless timely, because it offers a productive avenue for 
investigating the relationship between universality and particularity.68 In my 
analysis, therefore, I turn to Benjamin’s theory of mimesis in an attempt to 
take the first steps towards a Benjaminian comparativism. Such 
comparativism does not rely on tracing axes of influence from the centre to 
the periphery and back again, but rather, in the model of Jetztzeit, it functions 
as a lens whose shifting focus from the miniscule to the enormous conditions 
the world ‘in a state of similarity’.  Before spending too long anticipating my 
conclusions, however, let me begin by examining Benjamin’s fragments on 
mimesis. 
 There are two short fragments where Benjamin’s theory of mimesis is 
explicitly articulated: ‘Doctrine of the Similar’ and ‘On the Mimetic Faculty’, 
both dating from 1933, the latter being a shortened version of the former.69  
At the core of these texts is the notion of ‘nonsensuous similarity’ [unsinnliche 
Ähnlichkeit].  ‘Nonsensuous’ needs to be understood here as transcending the 
five senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. Accordingly, what 
                                                             
68 It is beyond my present enquiry to discuss the possibilities, as well as limitations, 
in proposing a ‘postcolonial Benjamin’.  Scholarship on this issue remains, by 
Benjamin studies standards, limited. As an indication, see Willi Bolle, ‘Paris on the 
Amazon? Postcolonial Interrogations of Benjamin’s European Modernism’, in A 
Companion to the Works of Walter Benjamin, ed. by Rolf J. Goebel (Columbia, SC: 
Camden House, 2009), pp. 216-45; ‘Walter Benjamin in Latin America’ Special Issue, 
Discourse, 32.1 (2010); John Kraniauskas, ‘Beware Mexican Ruins! One-way Street 
and the Colonial Unconscious’, in Walter Benjamin’s Philosophy: Destruction and 
Experience, ed. by Peter Osborne & Andrew Benjamin (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 
139-54.   
69 ‘Doctrine of the Similar’ [1933], SW2.2, pp. 694-98; ‘Lehre vom Ähnlichen’, GS II.1, 
pp. 204-10.  Cf. ‘Doctrine of the Similar’, trans. by Knut Tarnowski, New German 
Critique, 17. Walter Benjamin Special Issue (1979), 65-69. ‘On the Mimetic Faculty’ 
[1933], SW2.2, pp. 720-22; ‘Über das Mimetische Vermögen’, GS II.1, pp. 210-13.  
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Benjamin calls ‘the mimetic faculty’ – namely, the faculty that enables the 
perception of similarities – transcends all other faculties.  Benjamin defines 
the ‘gift for seeing similarity’, a gift exclusive to humans, as the remainder of 
an earlier mimetic faculty which compelled humans ‘to become and to behave 
alike’ [ähnlich zu werden und sich zu verhalten].70  This earlier, ‘truer’ form of 
mimesis has disappeared in modern times, writes Benjamin, but residues are 
still discernible in astrology, children’s play and – above all – language.71  
There are inescapable mystical overtones in this presentation of a faculty of a 
higher order, whose origin is traced in a questionable narrative of historical 
movement from the ‘primitives’ to the ‘moderns’.72  Yet, for all its dubious 
mysticism and reductive historicism, Benjamin’s articulation of the 
importance of ‘seeing similarity’ is instructive for its comparativist potential.  
This perception of similarity must not be confused with a movement towards 
assimilation or homogeneity.  Seeing similarity does not mean looking for 
what is ‘the same’ but rather for what is ‘alike’ [das Ähnliche], and thus entails 
difference as much as it entails sameness.  Perceiving the alike is, for Benjamin, 
akin to discerning a physiognomic resemblance.73  It also informs the practices 
of philology and translation, both of which rely on the ability to compare, or a 
                                                             
70 ‘Doctrine of the Similar’, SW2.2, p. 698; translation modified.  Cf. GS II.1, p. 210. 
71 See ‘On the Mimetic Faculty’, SW2.2, p. 721; GS II.1, pp. 211-12. 
72 See ‘Doctrine of the Similar’, SW2.2, pp. 695-696; GS II.1, pp. 205-6.  See also the 
unpublished fragment dated around 1936 ‘The Knowledge that the First Material on 
which the Mimetic Faculty Tested itself […]’, SW3, p. 253; GS VI, p. 127. 
73 Benjamin also describes historiography with reference to physiognomy: ‘To write 
history means giving dates their physiognomy’.  AP [N11, 2], p. 476.  See also ‘On the 
Image of Proust’, SW2.1, pp. 237, 246. On the relationship between physiognomy and 
non-sensuous similarity, see Frederic Schwartz, Blind Spots: Critical Theory and the 
History of Art in Twentieth-Century Germany (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2005), pp. 194-201.  
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‘comparability’ as we might say adding a new term to the list of Benjamin’s ‘–
abilities’.74   
A philological expression of the mimetic faculty was suggested by 
Benjamin a few years prior, in the 1929 essay ‘On the Image of Proust’.  
Proust’s life and writing become for Benjamin exemplary of the perception of 
the alike, particularly with respect to the singularity of an in-between state of 
experience that interrupts the distinction between night and day, sleeping and 
wakefulness. What Benjamin describes as Proust’s ‘impassioned cult of 
similarity’ lies precisely in this threshold between an awake and sleeping 
state:   
 
The similarity of the One to the Other [des Einen mit dem Andern], which we 
reckon with, which preoccupies us when awake, merely laps around in the 
deeper dream world, where what occurs is never identical, but alike: to itself 
emerging unfathomably alike [was vorgeht, nie identisch, sondern ähnlich: sich 
selber undurchschaubar ähnlich, auftaucht].75   
  
 
This passage is particularly cryptic and so its translation necessitates a form 
of textual interpretation to take place prior to the linguistic translation itself.  
At stake in this ambivalence is the question over whether the relationship of 
analogy is simply between the One and the Other, or whether the One is itself 
divisible (and thus in that case non-monadological) and in an analogical 
relationship to itself. In my own present task as philologist and translator, I 
                                                             
74 I am here indebted to Samuel Weber’s definition of ‘–ability’ in Benjamin’s work 
(see Weber, Benjamin’s –abilities) and to Harry Harootunian’s articulation of a 
broader intellectual project of ‘comparability’.  See Harry Harootunian, ‘‘Modernity’ 
and the claims of untimeliness’, Postcolonial Studies, 13.4 (2010), 367-82 (p. 369). See 
also ‘Problems of Comparability/Possibilities for Comparative Studies’, Special Issue, 
boundary 2, 32.2 (2005). 
75 ‘On the Image of Proust’, SW2.1, p. 239; translation modified.  Cf. ‘Zum Bilde 
Prousts’, GS II.1, pp. 313-14.  
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have decided not to decide and leave the translation ambivalent.76 Yet, even if 
we were to take one position and read the One as non-monadological, the 
figural tropes that Benjamin deploys to describe the temporality of analogy 
both in the essay on Proust and in the fragments on mimesis bring us back to 
his reflections on the concept of historical time, and the monadology of the 
dialectical image.  
In the ‘Proust’ essay, Benjamin offers a visual metaphor to explain the 
perception of the alike in Proust’s writing: ‘Proust’s most accurate, most 
conclusive insights fasten on their objects the way insects fasten on leaves 
[…].’77 At first, writes Benjamin, the insect is not discernible from the leaf, until 
suddenly there is a miniscule ‘leap’ which makes the perception of similarity, 
and thus the difference between the two entities come to light.  The 
relationship between insect and leaf, insight and object, continues Benjamin, 
is the same relationship that a child recognises when playing with a sock: the 
sock becomes both content and container (both an object and a vessel for 
other objects), and the interplay in-between.78  We can discern here an 
ambivalence that brings us back to Benjamin’s concept of historical time, 
                                                             
76 The translation in Selected Writings suggests that ‘identisch’ and ‘ähnlich’ are 
adjectives that describe ‘what occurs’, thus adding the verb ‘to be’.  However, another 
interpretation is possible, whereby identisch and ähnlich function as adverbs 
describing the manner in which the One relates to the Other, and to itself (as Other). 
This is what the translation in Illuminations seems to suggest (even though it does 
not render the immanent analogy of the One to itself).  See Illuminations, p. 200.  My 
usage of ‘emerging’ (not designating but potentially implying a subject) and ‘alike’ 
(potentially either an adjective or an adverb) hopefully retains the ambivalence 
characterising the German.   
77 ‘On the Image of Proust’, SW2.1, p. 242; GS II. 1, pp. 317-18.  
78 See ‘On the Image of Proust’, SW2.1, p. 240.  See also ‘The Sock’, Berlin Childhood 
around 1900, SW3, p. 374; ‘Berliner Kindheit um Neunzehnhundert’, GS IV, p. 284.  On 
animal mimicry in Berlin Childhood around 1900, see Joyce Cheng, ‘Mask, Mimicry, 
Metamorphosis: Roger Caillois, Walter Benjamin and Surrealism in the 1930s’, 
Modernism/Modernity, 16.1 (2009), 61-86 (pp. 77-80).  
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which can itself be described as an interplay between time’s potential to be 
both vessel and content.   
Equally reminiscent of his formulations on historical time is the 
temporality that Benjamin describes explicitly in the ‘Proust’ essay.  Benjamin 
considers time in Proust as ‘entangled, not boundless time’ [verschränkte, 
nicht grenzenlose Zeit].79  This ‘entangled’, non-linear time can only be 
revealed when it is crystallised in quotidian, daily time: ‘Proust has brought 
off the monstrous feat letting the whole world age by a lifetime in an instant. 
[…] À la Recherche du temps perdu is the constant attempt to charge an entire 
lifetime with the utmost mental awareness. Proust’s method is actualization 
[Vergegenwärtigung], not reflection’.80 Similarly, the temporality described in 
the fragments in mimesis brings to mind the instantaneous and condensed 
time of Jetztzeit.  Both rely on a particular velocity and the moment of kairós: 
   
The perception of similarity is in every case bound to an instantaneous flash 
[Aufblitzen].  It slips past […] but really cannot be held fast […]. It offers itself 
to the eye as fleetingly and as transitorily as a constellation of stars. The 
perception of similarities thus seems to be bound to a time-moment 
[Zeitmoment].81   
 
This deciphering, whether it is secular or sacred, whether it is the pupil 
reading an ABC book or the fortune-teller reading the stars, ‘is subject to a 
necessary tempo, or rather a critical moment, which the reader must not forget 
at any cost lest he go away empty-handed’.82  The perception of the alike is 
thus characterised by a chronopolitics of kairós but, like in the dialectical 
image, this temporality is condensed and abbreviated.  
                                                             
79 ‘On the Image of Proust’, SW2.1, p. 244; translation modified.  Cf. GS II.1, p. 320. 
80 ‘On the Image of Proust’, SW2.1, p. 244.  Cf. GS II.1, p. 320.  
81 ‘Doctrine of the Similar’, New German Critique, 66.  Cf. SW2.2, pp. 695-96.  GS II. 1, 
pp. 206-7. 
82 ‘Doctrine of the Similar’, SW2.2, p. 698; emphasis added.  GS II. 1, pp. 209-10. 
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We have so far discussed Benjamin’s remarks on analogy in his 
fragments on the mimetic faculty and ‘On the Image of Proust’.  Yet analogy is 
more than a fleeting subject matter to be detected in a narrow selection of 
Benjamin’s texts.  An analogic imperative is at the heart of Benjamin’s work, 
operating conspicuously in his own mode of thinking and writing.  As Sigrid 
Weigel has acutely observed, Benjamin’s mode of working is ‘a way of thinking 
and writing that favours simultaneity and constellation over continuity, 
similitude over representation or sign, and the detail or fractionary 
(Bruchstück) over the whole’.83  Benjamin’s way of ‘thinking-in-images’ as 
Weigel calls it, or his unparalleled ‘gift for seeing similarity’, as we might say 
here appropriating Benjamin’s own words, is crucial for articulating a 
comparativist practice of historical difference.  Such an analogic mode of 
thinking is expressed in Benjamin’s parallel syntactical structures, which, as 
Peter Demetz has noted, demonstrate a particular form of reasoning:  
‘Benjamin speaks about correspondences where many other Marxists would 
refer to economic basis and cultural superstructure; and he often suggests 
these correspondences by parallel sentence structures, neatly arranging the 
semantic elements in the required relationships (‘as…as’; ‘as little…as’).’84  
Although it is not the relationship between economic basis and cultural 
superstructure that is at stake in my present enquiry (and there are arguably 
instances where Benjamin does rest on a Marxist basis/superstructure model 
for his understanding of culture), Demetz’s point is nonetheless illuminating, 
because it captures the philological centrality of analogy in Benjamin’s work 
                                                             
83 Sigrid Weigel, ‘The Flash of Knowledge and the Temporality of Images: Walter 
Benjamin’s Image-based Epistemology and its Preconditions in Visual Arts and Media 
History’, Critical Inquiry, 41.2 (2015), 344-66 (p. 345).  
84 Peter Demetz, ‘Introduction’, in Walter Benjamin, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, 
Autobiographical Writings, ed. by Peter Demetz (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich: 1978), p. xxxix. On the centrality of similarity in Benjamin’s writing, see 
Sigrid Weigel, Entstellte Ähnlichkeit: Walter Benjamins theoretische Schreibweise 
(Frankfurt: Fischer, 1997).  
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while also suggesting its broader intellectual import.  As a result, therefore, 
conceptual relationships of determination, reflection and representation are 
replaced by those of analogy, abridgement, and actualisation but in a manner 
that implicates the author’s own praxis.  
This intimate relationship between subject matter and method is most 
vivid when Benjamin deploys analogic methods while theorising analogy.  
Thus, different levels of analogy become implicated in Benjamin’s thinking 
and writing, pointing to a theory of mimesis that also constitutes a form of 
analogic praxis.  In a much-cited passage, Benjamin formulates an analogy first 
between ‘the child’ and ‘humanity’, then between ‘a ball’ and ‘the moon’, and 
finally, between two kinds of goals: ‘Just as a child who has learned to grasp 
stretches out its hand for the moon as it would for a ball, so humanity […] sets 
its sights as much on currently utopian goals as on goals within reach’.85  We 
see here an intricate web of analogies between syntactical subjects 
(child/humanity), and objects (moon/ball), as well as the degree with which 
humanity as a universal historical subject stretches towards the reachable and 
the unreachable.  In her insightful analysis of this passage, the late Germanist 
Miriam Hansen has analysed the centrality of play as creative mimicry, 
suggesting that Benjamin’s mimicry is a ‘miscognition’ which is then 
transformed into radical art and politics.86 Even if Benjamin himself valorises 
miscognition, however, I would suggest that what is taking place in the 
passage itself is a self-aware analogy rather than miscognition.  The child does 
not take the moon for a ball.  The child acts as if it were a ball.  And through 
this self-aware play-acting, the child – together with Benjamin who is himself 
playfully seeing and creating similarity – produces a utopian model for 
humanity.   
                                                             
85 ‘The Work of Art in the Age of its Reproducibility (Second Version)’, SW3, p. 124, n. 
10; GS VII, p. 360; emphases added.  See also the related fragment ‘A Different Utopian 
Will’, SW3, pp. 134-35.   
86 See Miriam Bratu Hansen, ‘Room-for-Play: Benjamin’s Gamble with Cinema’, 
October, 109 (2004), 3-45 (pp. 19-20). 
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We saw in the previous section that Benjamin refers to Jetztzeit as a 
‘model of the messianic’. This change of magnitude between the model and its 
object, the model being a microcosm of the larger and future entity, is what is 
articulated in the relationship between the child and humanity. Change of 
magnitude is required for the monadological principle to function: ‘[r]eal time 
enters the dialectical image not in natural magnitude […] but in its smallest 
gestalt’, writes Benjamin.87  In the Arcades, we see yet another analogy 
connecting two different magnitudes: ‘Just as Proust begins the story of his life 
with an awakening, so must every presentation of history begin with 
awakening […]’.88  The narrative time of a single human life is here likened to 
the narrative time of history, with the daily awakening of an individual 
corresponding to the awakening of the entire humankind: Proust’s life and 
work become a model for ‘the world in a state of similarity’.89  Benjamin’s 
attention to the miniscule is thus mediated by the possibility of its expansion 
into the cosmos, a possibility that makes itself most apparent in texts such as 
‘To the Planetarium’, where Benjamin alludes to a colossal shift from an 
immediate, seemingly-trivial experience of intoxication to the planetary 
organisation of a technological utopian commons.90   
The theses found in ‘Paralipomena to “On the Concept of History”’ also 
offer an insight into the role of universality in Benjamin’s thought.  Although 
the theses were explicitly aimed at critiquing the idea of universal history, 
there persists a pull towards the universal that is expressed in a parallel 
formulation regarding universal history and universal language: 
                                                             
87 AP <Qo, 21>, p. 867.     
88 AP [N4, 3], p. 464. 
89 ‘On the Image of Proust’, SW2.1, p. 244. GS II.1, p. 320. 
90 See ‘To the Planetarium’, One-Way Street, SW1, pp. 486-487; ‘Zum Planetarium’, 
Einbahnstrasse, GS IV, pp. 83-148 (pp. 146-48). Emily Apter has discussed the 
possibility of a planetary comparativism that would draw on Benjamin amongst 
others, but she surprisingly omits discussing this text. See Apter, The Translation 
Zone, pp. 92-93.   
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The multiplicity [Vielheit] of “histories” is closely related, if not identical, to 
the multiplicity of languages.  Universal history in the present-day sense is 
never more than a kind of Esperanto.  (It expresses the hope of the human race 
no more effectively than the name of that universal language.)91   
 
Benjamin is not opposed to universality as such, but simply to the current 
forms of universality found in universal history and universal language.  The 
kind of higher, truly universal language that Benjamin has in mind needs to 
transcend the particularism of Esperanto which, like historicism, has an 
additive quality, being constituted by many already-existing particular 
languages.  For Benjamin, universal history has revolutionary potential so 
long as it follows a monadological principle because this principle ‘allows 
[universal history] to be represented in partial histories’.92   
Esperanto may be an indication of false universality for Benjamin, yet 
the possibility of true universality via language is not altogether abandoned.  
In the early essays ‘On Language as Such and on the Language of Man’ and ‘The 
Task of Translator’, Benjamin formulates a theory of language founded on the 
ontological primacy of a ‘pure language’ [reine Sprache], a language exterior to 
and prior to ‘languages’ in their particularity.93  When he writes that ‘a 
translation […] must lovingly and in detail incorporate the original’s way of 
meaning, thus making both the original and the translation recognizable as 
fragments of a greater language, just as fragments are part of a vessel’, 
Benjamin retains this idea of language as an incomplete entity awaiting to be 
made whole.94  Thus, in an idealism of almost Platonist dimensions, Benjamin 
                                                             
91 New Theses K, ‘Paralipomena to “On the Concept of History”’, SW4, p. 404; GS I.3, p. 
1235. 
92 New Theses H, ‘Paralipomena to “On the Concept of History”’, SW4, p. 404; GS I.3, 
p. 1234. 
93 See ‘On the Language as Such and on the Language of Man’, SW1, pp. 62-65; GS II.1, 
pp. 140-44. 
94 ‘The Task of the Translator’, SW1, p. 260; GS IV, p. 18.  
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advocates the impurity of the particular, and the purity of the universal.  In the 
later fragments on mimesis that we have already discussed, traces of this 
earlier idea of universality problematically persist, whereby Holy Scripture 
and astrology provide the possibility of humans’ connecting to that ‘purity’. 
However, there are indications of an important shift towards a different kind 
of universality, or indeed of a shift towards a singularity, and it is this shift 
towards singularity that I will now, by way of conclusion, turn to.   
Benjamin was fascinated by hieroglyphics and the interpretation of 
handwriting, and his articulation of a singularity of language, as well as 
history, can be found in his formulation of language as script.95  As we have 
seen, language is one of the central loci for perceiving the alike, and for 
Benjamin it is within language as written word that the mimetic faculty finds 
expression:  ‘Graphology has taught us to recognize in handwriting images 
that the unconscious of the writer conceals in it. […] Script has thus become, 
alongside language, an archive of nonsensuous similarities, of nonsensuous 
correspondences.’96  In the entry ‘Attested Auditor of Books’ from One-way 
Street, Benjamin offers a utopian commons that brings to mind the planetary 
comparativism of the entry ‘To the Planetarium’. Whereas ‘To the 
Planetarium’ projects a technological utopia centred on the human body, this 
entry suggests a mode of universality founded on language as script.  
Benjamin opens the passage by sketching the development of script from the 
invention of printing to the moment where script is liberated from the 
confines of the book, finding itself in the modern cityscape amongst posters, 
                                                             
95 On Benjamin’s interest in the scientific interpretation of handwriting, see 
‘Graphology Old and New’ (1930), SW2.1, pp. 398-399.  On the important links 
between graphology and fortune-telling in Benjamin’s thought, see Eric Downing, 
‘Divining Benjamin: Reading Fate, Graphology, Gambling’, MLN, 126.3 (2011), 561-
80.    
96 ‘On the Mimetic Faculty’, SW2.2, p. 722; translation modified.  GS II.1, pp. 212-13. 
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advertising and ‘the brutal heteronomies of economic chaos’.97  Benjamin 
relates the script’s newfound ‘three-dimensional quality’ to the archival logic 
of a library card-file system [Kartothek] before changing his tone from the 
diagnostic to the prognostic.98  It is in the final prognostic part that a new 
conception of language is articulated: a language both visual and textual, 
proclaimed to emerge in the not-so-distant future: ‘[…] the moment is coming 
when quantity suddenly changes into quality, and script, advancing its new 
eccentric image-ness [Bildlichkeit] ever more deeply into the graphic sector, 
takes on all at once its suited subject matter.’99  Poets, technicians and scribes 
of all kinds partake in the production of an international hieroglyphics that 
Benjamin describes with a word of his own coinage – Wandelschrift.100  
Benjamin’s vision of poets and writers taking on tasks of technical and 
statistical nature is reminiscent of the ideas presented in ‘The Author as 
Producer’.101  Yet what is unique in this passage is the fact that Benjamin’s 
vision of doing away with the intellectual and technical division of labour 
operates on a global scale: ‘With the establishment of an international 
exchange-script [Wandelschrift] they will renew their authority in the life of 
peoples and find a role for themselves, in comparison to which, all aspirations 
to a renewal of rhetoric will turn out to be outdated daydreams.’102  
Benjamin’s ‘exchange-script’ is not an international language like Esperanto, 
which falsely combines together the plurality of particularities. Wandelschrift 
is a script whose universality stems from its convertibility, with language 
                                                             
97 ‘Attested Auditor of Books’, One-Way Street, SW1, p. 456; ‘Vereidigter 
Bücherrevisor’, Einbahnstrasse, GS IV, pp. 102-103; hereafter cited ‘AUB’. 
98 AUB, SW1, p. 456; GS IV, p. 103. 
99 AUB, SW1, pp. 456-57; translation modified. GS IV, p. 104. 
100 AUB, SW1, p. 457; GS IV, p. 104.   
101 See ‘Author as Producer’, SW 2.2, pp. 770-77; GS II.2, pp. 686-96.  
102 AUB, SW1, p. 457; translation modified. GS IV, p. 104. 
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being exchanged and converted, almost like a form of currency.103 This notion 
of language as ‘exchange-script’ marks a departure from Benjamin’s earlier 
conception of language.  Whereas in the notion of reine Sprache, each language 
is the particular of a fragmented vessel waiting to be stuck together, in the 
notion of Wandelschrift each language is a singularity in a relation of 
constellations.  Benjamin’s notion of language as an international exchange-
script thus complements the monadological principle of Jetztzeit and 
nonsensuous similarity, offering a notion of universality that rests on 
convertibility and exchange. This notion of universality, as I further elaborate 
in Part III (Chapter 5), is in fact a form of individuation and singularity that 
disrupts the neat separation of universality from particularity. In its 
epistemological dimensions, therefore, and in thinking of the possibility of a 
Benjaminian comparativism, a singularity gleaned from Benjamin’s writings 
on historical time and mimesis would point to a system of exchange whereby 
the terms and units of comparison are decided not with a ‘yes or no’ but with 
a ‘how-long’; and the temporality of this ‘how-long’ would itself be 
determined, not externally from its objects, but in the monadological 
abbreviation of historical time itself.      
It is with these ideas in mind – a form of decision-making through the 
chronopolitics of timing, and a relational category mediating between ‘one’ 
and ‘other’ in an analogy, shifting in magnitude and circulating as exchange-
script – that we can now shift our focus back to the notion of the avant-garde 
and the ways it has been theorised by selected thinkers.  Although in the 
following chapters Benjamin’s work will recede into the background as 
complementary analytical tools are mobilised to address the specificities of 
                                                             
103 Translating the term as ‘moving script’ (see SW1, p. 457) does not quite render the 
element of exchange in that movement. J. A. Underwood’s translation as 
‘internationally convertible kind of script’, although it detaches the idea of 
convertibility from ‘script’, is still closer to the meaning of a ‘exchange-script’ as I 
interpret the term.  See Walter Benjamin, One-way Street and Other Writings   
(London: Penguin, 2008), p. 67.  
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each theory, it is this organising principle of a Benjaminian singularity which 
underlies the temporalities within and across these theories, and which will 
become explicitly manifest as we return to Benjamin in the thesis’ culminating 
chapter.  In the close textual readings in Part II, Benjamin’s thought will be 
also present in direct and indirect modes of influence, whether such 
discussions centre on the avant-garde, the principle of montage, the historicity 
of Jetztzeit, or through Adorno’s own usage of Benjaminian ideas.  The 
category of historicism will also become central in my analyses of these 
theories, partly against Benjamin’s own antipathy towards progressivist 
chronology, but most importantly as I have already highlighted, as a means 
through which to articulate a rapprochement between qualitative and 
quantitative time, and a mediation of different levels of historicity, both in 
terms of scale and in terms of textual interiority. Therefore, the avant-garde’s 
chronopolitics will gradually yet decisively emerge at those very points where 
the seemingly hermetic world of textual criticism becomes a threshold that 
allows the historical temporality of its extra-textual ‘other’ to enter. 
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II. Theorising the Avant-Garde after Modernism  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Proleptic Avant-Garde: Historicism and Narrative Time in 
Peter Bürger's Theory of the Avant-Garde 
 
If there is one text that is synonymous with theorising the avant-garde after 
modernism, then it is unquestionably Peter Bu rger’s Theory of the Avant-
Garde.1  Originally published in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1974, it 
remains the most-cited text on the avant-garde and continues to be translated 
into new languages to this day.2  Bu rger’s theory is infamous as much as it is 
famous, having attracted a host of criticisms that range from accusations of 
political pessimism to attacks on its overall plausibility and empirical rigour.3  
                                                             
1 Peter Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, 2nd edn (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, [1974] 1980); 
Theory of the Avant-Garde, trans. by Michael Shaw; foreword by Jochen Schulte-Sasse 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, [1974] 1984), hereafter cited 
ThdA/ThoA.  Unless otherwise stated, all translations from the German are my own. 
Anglophone readers must note that there are often substantial differences between 
Michael Shaw’s translation and mine, and references to the English edition are given 
primarily for the purposes of comparison.        
2 At the time of writing, Bürger’s theory has been translated into over 15 languages. 
A surprisingly late addition has been the French translation. See Peter Bürger, 
Théorie de l’Avant-garde, trad. Jean-Pierre Cometti (Paris: Questions théoriques, 
2013). 
3 Critical responses are too numerous to mention, especially since it has now become 
obligatory for any scholar using the term 'avant-garde', or examining an avant-garde 
movement, to begin by referencing Bu rger's definition, and then continue by 
critiquing and modifying it.  The most influential critical responses, and the ones that 
Bu rger has addressed himself, are: W. Martin Lu dke, ed., Theorie der Avantgarde. 
Antworten auf Peter Bürgers Bestimmung in Kunst und bürgerlicher Gesellschaft 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976), hereafter cited Antworten; Benjamin Buchloh, 
‘Theorizing the Avant-Garde’, Art in America, November (1984), 19-21; Hal Foster, The 
Return of the Real: The Avant-Garde at the End of the Century (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1996), hereafter cited Return.  Bu rger’s responses to the German collection are 
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Yet despite these not-entirely-unjustified criticisms, forty years after its 
original publication Theory of the Avant-Garde remains the inevitable starting 
point for any theoretical exploration of the avant-garde and, for the purposes 
of my own investigation, it merits detailed and generous analysis.  While 
critical reception has primarily focussed on Bu rger’s privileging of certain art 
movements over others – the recurring issue of an ‘avant-garde part’ standing 
in for an ‘avant-garde whole’ – or on Bu rger’s ambivalence with regard to 
aesthetic autonomy and his inadequate explanation of the mysterious 
workings of the ‘sublation of art into life’,4 my enquiry focusses on the implicit 
temporalities at work in Bu rger’s text, especially through his treatment and 
own critical practice of historicism. Historicism is approached here not in the 
Benjaminian or phenomenological sense of an empty vessel of ‘atemporal 
time’ but in the sense that was elaborated in my introduction: as a form of 
critical practice that weaves in and out of the chiasmus of history (as event) 
and history (as representation).    
Although Theory of the Avant-Garde offers Bu rger’s most elaborated 
position ‘on’ the avant-garde, there are a number of other, less-frequently-
discussed texts which shed light on his implicit conception of an idea of the 
avant-garde as it underpins his theory. The monograph Der französische 
Surrealismus: Studien zum Problem der avantgardistischen Literatur [French 
Surrealism: Studies on the Problem of Avant-Garde Literature, 1971] contains 
detailed close readings of literary texts by Andre  Breton and Louis Aragon and 
can serve to illuminate the rather brief analyses of these texts found in Theory 
                                                             
included in the postscript of the second edition, while the responses to the critics 
Benjamin H.D. Buchloh and Hal Foster can be found in ‘Avant-Garde and Neo-Avant-
Garde: An Attempt to Answer Certain Critics of Theory of the Avant-Garde’, New 
Literary History 41.4 (2010), 695-715. 
4 See, for instance, Foster, Return, p. 15; Richard Wolin, ‘Communism and the Avant-
Garde’, Thesis Eleven, 12 (1985), 81-93; Richard Murphy, Theorizing the Avant-Garde: 
Modernism, Expressionism, and the Problem of Postmodernity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), pp. 26-33.    
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of the Avant-Garde.5 Nach der Avantgarde [After the Avant-Garde, 2014], a 
collection of short essays written for newspapers and exhibition catalogues, 
though separated by the original publication by forty years and in many ways 
departing from the monograph’s main objectives, offers useful clarifications 
on the relationship between the historical avant-garde movements and the 
avant-garde as idea.6  Lastly, and most importantly, Vermittlung-Rezeption-
Funktion [Mediation-Reception-Function, 1979], and the numerous 
publications that Bu rger edited and authored following the publication of the 
theory’s first edition in the late 1970s and early 1980s, proposed a new 
sociological approach for the study of literature.7 Through these analyses, 
developed as part of a research project at the University of Bremen entitled 
‘Literature as Institution: On the Historical Transformation of the Social 
Function of Literature’ and resulting in collaborations with German literary 
scholars Christa Bu rger, Jochen Schulte-Sasse and Peter Uwe Hohendahl 
amongst others, Bu rger formulated a theory of the institution of art and 
literature which was in close and, as I show in my analysis, incongruous 
dialogue with the theses formulated in Theory of the Avant-Garde.   
This chapter seeks to discuss Bu rger’s influential theory alongside 
these lesser-known texts in order to revisit the historical temporalities at 
                                                             
5 Peter Bürger, Der französische Surrealismus: Studien zum Problem der 
avantgardistischen Literatur (Frankfurt: Athenäum Verlag, 1971).  See also the edited 
collection of essays,  Surrealismus, hg. Peter Bürger (Darmstadt: Wissenschafltiche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1982).  
6 Peter Bürger, Nach der Avantgarde (Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2014). 
7 Peter Bürger, Vermittlung-Rezeption-Funktion. Ästhetische Theorie und 
Methodologie der Literaturwissenschaft (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1979), hereafter ‘V-R-
F’; Peter Bürger, Aktualität und Geschichtlichkeit. Studien zum gesellschaftlichen 
Funktionswandel der Literatur (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977), p. 17; hereafter ‘AuG’; 
hg. Peter Bürger, Zum Funktionswandel der Literatur (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983); 
hg. Peter Bürger, Christa Bürger, Jochen Schulte-Sasse, Aufklärung und literarische 
Öffentlichkeit (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1980). 
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work in Bu rger’s broader conceptualisation of the idea of the avant-garde. 
Deploying narratological methods of analysis, I argue that Bu rger’s theory is 
characterised less by a cause-and-effect logic, as the theory’s historicism has 
been read by some critics, than by a narrative logic which reveals an 
anticipatory, proleptic temporality. The narratological distinction between 
‘narrated time’ and ‘narrative time’ – of the time in narrative and the time of 
narrative – enables us to distinguish the different levels of historicism at work 
in Bu rger’s theory.  As I argue below, while narrated time in Theory of the 
Avant-garde is stagist and developmental, narrative time is proleptic, following 
a logic of ‘it is only after x that y is made possible’.  This proleptic logic 
manifests itself at two different levels of historical time, which I call ‘first’ and 
‘second historicism’, and at both levels we see a disruption of sequentiality and 
linear causality.  This disruption of causality is exemplified at the first 
historical level through the relationship between the avant-garde and the 
category of the institution of art, and at the second meta-narrative, or ‘extra-
diegetic’, level through the relationship between the theorising of the avant-
garde itself and its author’s self-situating of his theory ‘in history’.  In 
examining narrative time as it weaves in and out of Bu rger’s diegesis, involving 
historical ‘problem horizons’, as Bu rger calls them, such as May ‘68 and 
Adorno’s death, the chronopolitics of the idea of the avant-garde is also viewed 
through a new prism: Bu rger’s notion of the avant-garde, as distinct from the 
periodising category of the historical avant-garde and his tentative list of 
‘isms’, emerges as an idea that does not fully belong to the specificity of the 
historical moment of the ‘historical avant-gardes’, but is instead singularised 
into a relational notion in/of historical time. 
            
2.1  First as Effect then as Cause: The Proleptic Logic of Bürger’s 
Historicism 
 
Thanks to the influential critiques of Benjamin H.D. Buchloh and Hal Foster, 
Bu rger's theory has become synonymous with praise for the radicalism of the 
historical avant-gardes and dismissal of the experiments of their post-war 
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counterparts. As I briefly discussed in the thesis’ introduction, Buchloh and 
Foster famously took aim at the elevated historical position that Bu rger 
attributed to the historical avant-gardes, setting out to correct what they saw 
as Bu rger's unfair assessment of the neo-avant-gardes. Foster’s critique, in 
particular, hinted at the narrative logic that characterised Theory of the Avant-
Garde and sharply criticised its historicism, which he described ‘as the 
conflation of before and after with cause and effect, as the presumption that 
the prior event produces the later one’.8  Such a criticism is not without merit 
but, as this chapter argues, it is problematised by other historical 
temporalities at work in Burger’s text. The conflation of sequence with 
causality highlighted by Foster is indeed evident in the monograph’s pages.  
Yet Foster’s description of ‘[t]he Bu rger narrative of direct cause and effect, of 
lapsarian before and after, of heroic origin and farcical repetition [...]’ is only 
partly accurate.9  For as I show in this chapter, the historical typology, which 
to Foster’s eyes is a deterministic cause-and-effect historicity, forms part of a 
broader narrative logic encompassing different narrative levels of conflicting 
temporalities.    
If we are to analyse the ‘Bu rger narrative’ as narrative, as I set out to do 
in this chapter, then we need to pay close attention to the different narrative 
levels that unfold within and through Theory of the Avant-Garde. One 
productive way of doing so is by turning to narratological theory and its 
treatment of temporal difference. In narratology, the question of temporal 
difference is explored through the distinction between ‘narrated time’ 
[erzählte Zeit] and ‘narrative time’ or ‘story time’ [Erzählzeit].10 Narrated time 
                                                             
8 Foster, Return, p. 10 (emphasis original). 
9 Foster, Return, p. 13. 
10 See Michael Scheffel, Antonius Weixler, Lukas Werner, ‘Time’, in The Living 
Handbook of Narratology < http://www.lhn.uni-hamburg.de> [accessed 23 January 
2015]. ‘Prolepsis’ is one of the many aspects of ‘metalepsis’: a boundary crossing 
between ‘story-time’ and ‘discourse-time’. See also John Pier, ‘Metalepsis’, in 
Handbook of Narratology, ed. by Peter Hu hn et al. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), pp. 190-
 
[93] 
designates the time of the thing being told, while narrative time designates the 
time of telling (or, to put it in the structuralist terms used by ‘classical’ 
narratologists, narrated time is the time of the signified, and narrative time is 
the time of the signifier).11 According to Ge rard Genette’s foundational 
analysis, temporal difference between these two narrative levels can be 
analysed with reference to order, duration or frequency.12  Of relevance here is 
the first category – temporal order – because it bears on the questions of 
sequence and historical causality.  Genette defines the study of temporal 
difference with regard to order as follows: ‘To study the temporal order of a 
narrative is to compare the order in which events or temporal sections are 
arranged in the narrative discourse with the order of succession these same 
events or temporal segments have in the story […]’.13 As Tyrus Miller explains, 
in narratological theory, narrative ‘takes shape from a differential between the 
time of action and events within the narrated world and the temporal 
organisation of the narrative representation by which this narrated world is 
evoked’.14  In other words, to study the temporal difference between narrated 
and narrative time means to compare the order in which events occur through 
the narration (i.e. their arrangement in the narrative discourse), and the order 
in which events occur within the narrative (i.e. their depiction or description 
within the story).     
                                                             
203; Monika Fludernik, ‘Scene Shift, Metalepsis, and the Metaleptic Mode, Style, 37.4 
(2003), 382-400; Dorrit Cohn, ‘Metalepsis and Mise en Abyme’, Narrative, 20.1 
(2012), 105-14.      
11 Ibid. 
12 See Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method, trans. by Jane E. 
Lewin; foreword by Jonathan Culler (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, [1972] 
1980), pp. 25-160. 
13 Genette, Narrative Discourse, p. 35. 
14 Tyrus Miller, ‘Time’, in Literature Now: Key Terms and Methods for Literary History, 
ed. by Sascha Bru et al. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), pp. 137-151 
(p. 144; emphasis added). 
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Adopting this narratological distinction to examine temporal difference 
as it manifests itself in Theory of the Avant-Garde, we can discern that there is 
indeed a marked difference between the order of the time of the thing being 
told, and that of the time of telling.  Bu rger’s theorisation can be understood 
as a form of historical narrative, as it sketches a historical typology of art’s 
development in bourgeois society and reflects on the role of historicism in 
formulating a critical literary theory.15  The temporal difference at stake in 
Theory of the Avant-Garde can thus be understood as a difference between two 
levels of narrative temporality, which from now on I will refer to as ‘first 
historicism’ and ‘second historicism’.  First historicism is the telling of the 
story of art’s development from the middle-ages to the present (that is to say, 
the text’s present: the early 1970s), with the pivotal point in this story being 
the historical avant-garde movements. Second historicism is the telling of the 
story of the Theory of the Avant-Garde’s own historicity. It includes aspects of 
‘first historicism’ but it also encompasses methodological reflections which 
are meta-historical and which fall outside the narrative time of first 
historicism. I use here the terms ‘first’ and ‘second’ to denote a movement from 
a simpler to a more complex form of historicism, and, as I show below, the 
temporal difference between the order of narrated and narrative time is at 
work in both these forms.16      
Let us begin by examining temporal order in first historicism. Of the two 
historicisms, it is first historicism that most gives the illusion of sequence, 
since it can be easily summarised in a linear, chronological fashion.  Since 
Bu rger’s theory is most often accessed and discussed in a ‘summary form’, it is 
                                                             
15 See especially the methodological reflections on the historicity of aesthetic 
categories, ThdA, pp. 20-26/ThoA, pp. 15-20; and the famous diagram ThdA, p. 
65/ThoA, p. 48.  
16 Genette uses the terms ‘first narrative’ and ‘second narrative’, with the second 
narrative acting as deviation from the main ‘first’ narrative. Here second historicism 
should not be seen as a deviation from a first historicism, but as a self-reflexive, meta-
historical form of historicism. Cf. Genette, op. cit., pp. 48-49. 
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perhaps understandable that this linear narrative is often mistaken as the 
theory’s argument.  Told in a linear order, the infamous ‘Bu rger narrative’ of 
first historicism goes like this: Considering art in relation to its conditions of 
production and reception across the ages, we see a movement towards 
aesthetic autonomy, namely, art’s separation from its social function. In the 
middle-ages, art is inextricably linked to its cultic or religious function, 
whereas in court society, it gains its social function through serving the 
political establishment. With the emergence of bourgeois society in the 
nineteenth century, art begins to separate itself from everyday life practices 
(whether of the people, in the first case, or of the ruling order, in the second), 
and becomes an end in itself.  This movement reaches its apogee in the late 
nineteenth-century with aestheticism, when art becomes its own subject 
matter and comes to represent nothing but itself.17  At that moment, art enters 
the stage of crisis.  In the first decades of the twentieth century, the historical 
avant-garde movements (Dada, Surrealism, Constructivism and – with 
qualifications – Cubism, Futurism and Expressionism) protest against 
aestheticism and pronounce the re-integration of art into everyday life 
practices. This protest is epitomised by Marcel Duchamp’s act of signing and 
exhibiting found objects such as a bottle-rack or a urinal. Duchamp’s act 
exemplifies the avant-gardist project of protesting against aesthetic autonomy 
and attacking art as a bourgeois institution. However, the bourgeois institution 
welcomes the protest with open arms, the anti-art protest is turned into art, 
and the avant-gardist project fails. In the post-war period, there is an 
emergence of neo-avant-garde art movements that follow in the footsteps of 
the historical avant-gardes yet their acts of anti-art protest are ineffectual. 
Today, although a genuine avant-garde protest is no longer possible, the avant-
                                                             
17 By ‘aestheticism’ we ought to understand here both a particular art movement (and 
thus an ‘Aestheticism with a capital A’) as well as a periodising category with trans-
historical, epistemological implications. I will elaborate on the importance of this 
interplay between historical specificity and epistemological generality below.    
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garde project remains crucial in art’s historical development by having 
exposed art as a bourgeois institution.     
The familiar narrative I have just sketched is unmistakeably marked by 
a developmental historicism. Not only are the changes in the history of art 
sketched in stagist terms, but these stages are also posited as historically 
necessary.  Bu rger writes of the ‘law of development [Entwicklungsgesetz] to 
which the sphere of art is also subject’ and recommends using the avant-garde 
as a historical starting point through which to understand what has come 
before.18  We cannot fail to miss the Hegelian undertones of a forward march 
of reason towards emancipation when Bu rger describes art’s movement 
towards autonomy,19 or when it is proposed that: ‘in the development of art in 
bourgeois society, the avant-garde movements represent the logical point 
from which art’s development can be grasped’.20  When art reaches the point 
of aestheticism – a point where the separation between art and social function 
cannot be stretched any further – art enters the stage of crisis.21  Thus, 
aestheticism serves as the peak in that development and as ‘the logically-
necessary precondition [entwicklungslogische Voraussetzung] of the historical 
avant-garde movements’.22  In this narrative, both aestheticism and the 
historical avant-gardes have their rightful place in a linear art-historical 
development, each stage being necessitated and justified by the course of 
history.    
It may seem, therefore, that Foster’s criticism of a stagist, cause-and-
effect historicism is not entirely unjustified.  It is precisely on this point, 
however, that the difference in the temporal order between narrated time and 
                                                             
18 See, respectively, ThdA, p. 43/ThoA, p. 33 and ThdA, p. 24/ThoA, p. 19. 
19 ThdA, p. 64/ThoA, p. 47. 
20 V-R-F, p. 11 (trans. mine); Cf. ThoA, p. li. 
21 ‚Mit dem Ästhetizismus erreicht die Entwicklung der Kunst in der bürgerlichen 
Gesellschaft in gewissem Sinne ihren Höhepunkt, zugleich tritt sie damit ins Stadium 
der Krise ein.‘ AuG, p. 17.  See also ThdA, p. 65/ThoA, p. 48. 
22 ThdA, p. 134/ThoA, p. 96 (emphasis added). 
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narrative time can be productively deployed to reveal a different historicism 
at work.23 The narrative I summarised above was recounted in a linear, 
chronological order.  In Theory, however, it is told in such a way so as to 
anticipate what will occur later.  This anticipatory mode of narrating, I suggest, 
can be understood as a prolepsis (or a 'flash-forward').24  According to 
Genette's theorisation, prolepsis is one of the three 'anachronies', disrupting 
the linear temporality of the narrative and functioning as a deviation from the 
main narrative line.25  I will too deploy the term prolepsis to describe the 
‘deviant’ temporal order at work in Bu rger’s narrative time. Yet I will do so 
with some qualifications because, as I seek to show, in Theory there is no main 
narrative from which to deviate: rather, the developmental historicism told in 
a proleptic manner is that main narrative.  
Proleptic logic manifests itself in Theory of the Avant-Garde both at a 
‘micro’ and a ‘macro’ level: in other words, it is discernible both in the 
rhetorical structure of individual sentences, and in the way in which the 
argument unfolds within the text.  At the level of the individual sentence, we 
find an anticipatory structure which takes the form of: ‘it is not until x that y is 
made possible’.  This structure can be found in several sentences that function 
as a repetition and variation of one of Bu rger's central theses: ‘Art reaches its 
full unfolding in bourgeois society only with [erst mit] aestheticism, to which 
the historical avant-garde movements respond’.26  Instead of deploying an 
                                                             
23 It is worth noting that, for all the stagist logic of the theory’s narrated time, Bürger 
himself has expressed his opposition towards modernisation theory, favouring the 
notion of non-synchronicity. See Peter Bürger, ‘Literary Institution and 
Modernization’, in The Decline of Modernism, trans. by Nicholas Walker (Cambridge: 
Polity, 1992), pp. 3-18 (pp. 6, 13); originally published as ‘Institution Literatur und 
Modernisierungsprozeß’, in Zum Funktionswandel der Literatur, pp. 9-32 (p. 13). See 
also ThdA, p. 31/ThoA, p. 24.         
24 See ‘Time’ in The Living Handbook of Narratology. 
25 Ibid; see also Genette, pp. 48-49.  
26 ThdA, p. 22 (trans. mine); Cf. ThoA, p. 17. 
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accumulative structure of 'x happened, followed by y', or of 'then, and then, 
and then' – narrating the events as instants in a sequence as I do above – 
Bu rger deploys instead a retroactive rhetorical structure. Thus, the end point 
is announced first, and then the earlier moment is revisited (or rather visited 
for the first time) in light of that end point: ‘only when [erst nachdem] art enters 
the stage of self-criticism […]’;27 ‘only after [erst nachdem] art, in nineteenth 
century aestheticism has altogether detached itself from life-praxis […]’;28 
‘only at the moment when [erst in dem Augenblick, wo] contents [Gehalte], too, 
lose their political character, and art wants to be nothing but art, does the self-
critique of art as social subsystem become possible.  This stage is reached at 
the end of the nineteenth century with aestheticism’.29  Thus, the structure of 
‘erst nachdem’ or ‘erst seit’ reveals a temporal logic, whereby an event is 
marked by what will have already been.  It is ‘only after’ or ‘not until’ a pivotal 
point in history that the earlier event can be recognised: ‘only with [erst seit] 
the avant-garde certain general categories of the artwork are made 
recognisable [erkennbar] in their generality.’30  And that pivotal historical 
point is a moment of recognition after which art history is no longer the same. 
These instances of prolepsis at the level of individual sentence form part 
of a broader temporal logic that unfolds in the text’s argument.  This logic of 
‘it is not until x that y is made possible’ characterises one of Bu rger's key 
theoretical propositions which concerns the relationship between the avant-
garde and the category of the institution of art.  In order to examine this 
relationship in narratological terms, however, we need to briefly revisit 
Bu rger’s own definitions, as well as implicit conceptions, of the avant-garde 
and the institution of art and literature (Institution Kunst/Literatur).31  
                                                             
27 ThdA, p. 29/ThoA, p. 22. 
28 ThdA, p.29/ThoA, p. 22. 
29 ThdA, p. 34 (trans. mine); Cf. ThoA, pp. 26-27. 
30 ThdA, p. 23 (trans. mine); Cf. ThoA, p. 19. 
31 The term Institution Kunst/Literatur has been variously translated into English as 
‘institution of art’, ‘institution ‘art’’, and ‘art as institution’.  I have chosen to leave the 
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 As any newcomer to Bu rger’s theory will notice, nowhere in the text does 
Bu rger offer a definition of the avant-garde.  The avant-garde is taken to be 
synonymous with the historical avant-gardes [historische 
Avantgardebewegungen], which themselves are defined with much 
qualification and hesitation.  Not all art movements of the first half of the 
twentieth century deserve the name ‘historical avant-garde’, and those that do, 
might not always live up to the name: only early (and not late) Surrealism is a 
historical avant-garde; Italian Futurism and German Expressionism may 
sometimes be eligible; Cubism is according to one criterion but not according 
to another, and so on.32  Bu rger does set out clearly his criteria for the avant-
garde’s intentions, however.  These criteria, which we have already seen placed 
within a linear historical narrative, are the attack on the institution of art (and 
the notion of aesthetic autonomy), and the re-integration of art into life-praxis.  
This attack on the institution of art and aesthetic autonomy is conceptualised 
by Bu rger in Hegelian terms: not as a destruction or elimination of art but as 
a dialectically-constituted historical movement of negation (and thus also 
preservation through sublation). As Bu rger himself puts it: ‘the Surrealists do 
not intend the destruction of literature and art, but rather its sublation 
[Aufhebung] in a practice [Praxis] in which art and life are no longer 
opposites’.33  Given that these criteria are the starting point for identifying the 
historical avant-gardes and that we cannot simply assume that any ‘ism’ is 
                                                             
term untranslated in order to avoid any misunderstandings which, as I explain below, 
would lead to the false association of the notion of ‘institution’ with an institutional 
body. I have also chosen to omit the second part of the term ‘Literatur’, though it must 
be borne in mind that Bürger intends this term to be applicable to both art and 
literature, and that he makes little distinction – problematically according to many 
critics – between the specificities of visual and literary arts.      
32 See ThdA, p. 44, n. 4/ThoA, p. 109, n. 4.  See also Nach der Avantgarde, pp. 7-8.  
33 Bürger, Der französische Surrealismus, p. 67 (trans. mine).  Cf. G.W.F Hegel, 
Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 
pp. 114-115. 
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necessarily ‘avant-garde’, then we need to infer a definition of the avant-garde 
from these two criteria, so that the avant-garde does not simply become 
another name for Dada, Surrealism, or Constructivism.  Once we do so, we can 
identify Bu rger’s avant-garde as a notion that is negatively constituted: 
defined through what it attacks (the institution of art) and through what it 
intends (re-integration of art into life): in other words, through what it is not 
and what it is not yet.34     
Unlike the notion of the avant-garde, the category of Institution Kunst is 
defined by Bu rger in clear and precise terms.35 Institution Kunst refers to ‘the 
productive and distributive apparatus as well as to the prevailing ideas about 
art that determine the reception of artworks in any given epoch’.36  As Russell 
A. Berman has rightly remarked, Bu rger’s notion ‘represents somewhat of a 
                                                             
34 In a recent radio interview, Bu rger defined the avant-garde with respect to the 
historical past: the avant-garde as that which is no longer historically possible. See 
Theorie der Avantgarde: Peter Bürger im Gespräch (17.10.10), Serie 446: Kunst, 
Spektakel und Revolution <https://www.freie-radios.net/36663> [accessed 23 
January 2015]. 
35 Apart from the definition articulated in Theory of the Avant-Garde, I also draw upon 
various definitions from the following publications: Peter Bürger, ‘Institution Kunst 
als literatursoziologische Kategorie’ – Skizzen einer Theorie des historischen 
Wandels der gesellschaftlichen Funktion der Literatur’, Romanistische Zeitschrift für 
Literaturgeschichte, 1 (1977), 50-71 (p. 51), hereafter cited ‘IK’; ‘The Institution of 
Art as a Category of the Sociology of Literature: Toward a Theory of the Historical 
Transformation of the Social Function of Literature’, in Peter Bürger and Christa 
Bürger, The Institutions of Art, trans. by Loren Kruger (Lincoln & London: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1992), pp. 3-29 (pp. 4-5), hereafter cited IoA.  This essay has also 
appeared in translation by Michael Shaw in Cultural Critique, 2. Winter (1985-1986), 
5-33; references will be made here to Kruger’s more established (and more 
authoritative) translation. See also AuG, pp. 12-13; and Gerhard Goebel, ‘»Literatur« 
und Aufklärung’, in Zum Funktionswandel der Literatur, pp. 79-97 (p. 84). 
36 ThdA, p. 29 (trans. mine); Cf. ThoA, p. 22 
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corollary to Habermas’s concept of public sphere’.37  More recent discourses 
on the institution of art, especially pertaining to the practices of ‘institutional 
critique’ or ‘IC’ have been partly responsible for popularising a conception of 
Bu rger’s category in less Habermasian terms than the author had originally 
intended.38  Thus, whereas institutional critique, now often regarded as a sub-
genre of the avant-garde that continues the history of its radical tradition, 
seeks to expose and explicitly address the structural inequalities of the 
institutions of art, in Bu rger’s Habermasian sense by contrast, it is art as such 
that functions as an institution: namely, as a social subsystem within a given 
socio-historical epoch, alongside the institutions of law and religion.  In this 
sense, therefore, it should not be confused with organisational bodies that 
produce and distribute art and literature (academies, museums, publishing 
houses, etc.).39 As Ulrich Meier’s instructive example on the distinction 
between organisation and institution puts it: ‘a county court is an organisation 
of the institution of law’.40  Similarly, we can say that a museum is an 
organisation of the institution of art, bearing in mind, however, that the 
institution is more than a sum of its parts: it includes but cannot be reduced to 
these individual organising bodies.41 Rather, a ‘Bu rgerian’ art-as-institution is 
                                                             
37 Russell A. Berman, ‘Introduction’, in IoA, p. xviii.  For an application of the notion of 
Institution Kunst by one of Bürger’s own students, see Hans Sanders, Institution 
Literatur und Roman. Rekonstruktion der Literatursoziologie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 
1981). 
38 For an instructive essay that situates the label ‘institutional critique’ in the context 
of the October-inflected reception of Bürger’s theory, see Andrea Fraser, ‘From the 
Critique of Institutions to an Institution of Critique’, in Institutional Critique and After, 
ed. by John C. Welchman (Zurich: JRP Ringier, 2006), pp. 123-135.  
39 See IoA, pp.  4-5. 
40 Ulrich Meier, ‘Soziologische Bemerkungen zur Institution Kunst’, in Zum 
Funktionswandel der Literatur, pp. 33-58 (p. 58, n. 29). 
41 Bürger associates the study of individual institutions with positivist sociology, from 
which he wishes to distance himself (see IoA, p. 5). It would thus be unfair to assess 
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a system of social relations that recognises and legitimises art as art; it is a 
legitimising system that confers on art/literature its status, both economically 
and discursively, in a particular socio-historical context.  
According to this definition, Institution Kunst is clearly delineated as a 
‘historicist’ category: it is historically specific and historically variable. As we 
have seen within Bu rger's proleptic first historicism, it is the avant-gardes that 
make the historical recognition of Institution Kunst possible: ‘[the category 
Institution Kunst] becomes recognisable only after [erst nach] the avant-garde 
movements’ critique of the autonomy society’.42  Although its peak comes with 
aestheticism, the institution of art can also be discerned in earlier periods, 
such as the early Enlightenment.43  At the same time, however, Institution 
Kunst is proposed as a hermeneutic category whose purpose is to enable the 
practice of a new sociology of art and literature: ‘the proposed category – 
[Autonomiestatus] of art in developed bourgeois institution of art – should be 
understood as a hermeneutic rather than historical category.  The point of 
introducing this category is to make possible a critique of the evolution of art 
in bourgeois society’.44 Here Institution Kunst is intended as a methodological 
tool that can be used in empirical studies that trace the changing function of 
art and literature from epoch to epoch.45  Therefore, Institution Kunst in the 
latter sense is a category upon which this new ‘institutional-sociological’ 
approach rests: it is what makes institutional-sociological analysis 
conceptually possible.  Having defined and elaborated on the notions of the 
avant-garde and Institution Kunst, we can now return to our narratological 
concerns as they relate to difference in temporal order. As we have seen, 
                                                             
Bürger's theory as inadequately ‘sociological’ on positivist grounds as such an 
assessment is expressed for instance in Ian Heywood, Social Theories of Art: A Critique 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1997), pp. 9, 46-63. 
42 V-R-F, p. 12 (trans. mine); ThoA, p. lii. 
43 See IoA, pp. 78, 137-138. 
44 IoA, p. 83 (emphasis added). 
45 See IoA, p. 13. 
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Institution Kunst is both a historical and a hermeneutical/sociological 
category.  Because of its double function, it relates to the avant-garde in two 
different ways which, when considered together, I contend, produce a 
temporality of prolepsis.  As a historical category, Institution Kunst is 
inextricably linked to aestheticism – it is recognised as institution once 
aesthetic autonomy has fully unfolded and art's subject matter has become its 
very autonomy. Without the institution of art, the avant-garde would 
conceptually vanish, since it is defined negatively as its opposition.  In this 
sense, therefore, Institution Kunst is historically and conceptually prior to the 
avant-garde.  As a hermeneutical/sociological category, however, the 
institution of art provides the foundation for a new sociological analysis of art 
and literature, which aims to offer an alternative to dialectical and positivist 
social theories.46  In this latter sense, it is a trans-historical category whose 
core unchanging characteristics are applied to different epochs.  However – 
and it is at this very point that prolepsis occurs – the institutional-sociological 
approach, which itself theoretically relies upon the category Institution Kunst, 
requires the avant-garde to have happened historically.  To quote from a 
particularly illuminating passage: 
 
If the thesis presented there [CP – in Theory of the Avant-Garde] is right, that 
is, if the historical avant-garde movements attacked and thus made the 
autonomous status of art recognisable, then the end of the historical avant-
garde movements enables [erlaubt] the formulation of a sociology of art that 
takes art's autonomous status as the determining institutional condition 
[institutionelle Rahmenbedingung] of the production and reception of art in 
bourgeois society.47  
 
In other words, it is only after the historical avant-gardes and their attack on 
the institution of art that an institutional-sociological theory is made possible.  
(And note how we return once more to the temporal logic of ‘erst nachdem’.) 
Bu rger notes how the historical avant-gardes mark a historical break that 
                                                             
46 See IoA, pp. 3-5. 
47 IK, p. 51/IoA, p. 4 (trans. modified; emphasis added). 
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impacts upon scholarship, as the avant-gardist attack of Institution Kunst has 
practical consequences for scholarship that need to be addressed at the 
methodological level.48 Christa Bürger also adopts such a perspective in her 
analyses: ‘Institutional-sociological literary scholarship departs from 
traditional scholarship in that it does not treat the conception of artistic 
autonomy as the essence of art but rather as a historically given framework. 
This departure is possible because historical avant-garde movements 
challenged the framework of autonomy.’49  In this other sense, therefore, it is 
the avant-garde that is historically prior to the institution of art.  This double 
function has led some commentators to identify a tautological relationship 
between the avant-garde and Institution Kunst.50  Martin Lu dke, in particular, 
has insightfully remarked that in Bu rger’s theory the avant-garde is both 
‘determining and determined [bestimmend und bestimmt].  That is to say, the 
definition at the level of mediation [Vermittlungsebene] which takes the form 
of Institution Kunst is itself dependent on the avant-garde’s attack on this 
Institution Kunst, because it is only the attack on the institution that makes the 
institution recognisable as such’.51  This reciprocity of determination leads us 
then to question what exactly is being theorised and to what end.  Is Theory of 
the Avant-Garde really a theory of the avant-garde or is it rather a theory of 
Institution Kunst?  According to the US publisher’s online description, Theory 
of the Avant-Garde is a book that ‘sets before English-language readers for the 
first time a fully elaborated theory of the “institution of art”.’52  When 
translated into the realm of historical time, this relationship of logical 
                                                             
48 See AuG, p. 11. 
49 IoA, p. 138 (emphasis added). 
50 See Hans Burkhard Schlichting, ‘Historische Avantgarde und Gegenwartsliteratur. 
Zu Peter Bürgers Theorie der nachavantgardistischen Moderne’, in Antworten, pp. 
209-251 (pp. 239-241). 
51 See W. Martin Lüdke, ‘Einleitung’, in Antworten, pp. 8-26 (p. 13). 
52 See University of Minnesota Press website <http://www.upress.umn.edu/book-
division/books/theory-of-the-avant-garde> [accessed 15 January 2015].   
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dependency becomes a relationship of reciprocal recognition, which involves 
a reciprocal ‘making possible’ and a reciprocal indebtedness. On the one hand, 
Institution Kunst and the avant-garde enable one another’s theorisation; on the 
other, Institution Kunst and the avant-garde both require one another 
historically.   
Having examined the logic of prolepsis at the level of first historicism, 
we can now open up this investigation into the more elusive terrain of second 
historicism.  Here we find a prolepsis that implicitly involves the author’s own 
biographical time as it is narrativised in relation to the ‘external’ markers of 
Adorno’s death and May ’68, which become two additional points around 
which the notion of the avant-garde revolves.  Thus, being indebted to 
Adorno’s aesthetics or to the ‘failed’ moment of May ‘68 becomes, as we will 
see below, a ‘meta-narrative’ form of prolepsis.  
 
2.2  Leaving Adorno Behind: Afterness as Prolepsis   
 
In a little-known book review of Theory of the Avant-garde, Bu rger’s book is 
aptly described by the reviewer as ‘self-reflexive, [as] an explanation and 
justification of its own methodology’53 and as a theory that ‘transforms its own 
understanding of the historical avant-garde into a general theory of art […]’.54 
As is evident from the self-reflexive, self-historicising statements that typify 
the book, and which are prominent in its opening sections, Bu rger is 
committed to the project of a kritische Literaturwissenschaft [critical literary 
studies] understood as continuing the intellectual tradition of critical theory 
as articulated by the Frankfurt School.  As Bu rger clearly states: ‘criticism can 
produce new knowledge only when it involves itself with what is critiqued’55 
and when it acknowledges the institutional restrictions of that criticism: 
                                                             
53 Leah Ulansey, ‘Review: Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde’, MLN, 99.5 (1984), 
1192-1195 (p. 1193). 
54 Ulansey, 1192 (emphasis added). 
55 V-R-F, p. 9; Cf. ThoA, p. xlix. 
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‘insofar as the literary scholar himself works within the institution he 
examines, criticism describes a process of self-reflection.’56  According to this 
intellectual standpoint, since this self-criticism is itself historically 
conditioned, a project of critical literary studies cannot but self-historicise.57 
Bu rger is aware of the difficulty of developing a theory while also attempting 
to historicise it, and defines the kind of historicism that he wishes to pursue 
as an ‘insight into the connection between the unfolding of the object 
[Entfaltung des Gegenstandes] and the categories of a discipline’.58 It is this 
attempt to capture the historicity of one’s own theory, and – to refer to the 
reviewer’s formulation above – to transform its own understanding of the 
avant-garde into a general theory of art to which my analysis will now turn. 
 In second historicism, the temporal difference shifts from the level of 
mediation between the avant-garde and Institution Kunst to the level of 
mediation between the theorisation of the avant-garde and the development 
of an institutional-sociological theory ‘after Adorno’. In this respect, the 
prolepsis occurring at the level of second historicism can also be thought of as 
a meta-narrative prolepsis. As I suggest, the avant-garde operates at both 
these levels in Bu rger’s text, at once as a historical category (and then 
synonymous with the historical avant-garde movements) and a conceptual 
category (and then synonymous with Bu rger’s transformation of his 
conception of the avant-garde into a general theory of art).  
Second historicism, too, is guided by a proleptic logic.  Bu rger’s self-
reflexive, self-historicising statements are interspersed with flash-forwards, 
which little by little give away the story line.  One of these anticipations hints 
at the plot-to-come as well as making reference to an already-formulated 
theory: 
      
                                                             
56 AuG, p. 14.  
57 See ThoA, p. 15. 
58 ThdA, p. 21; Cf. ThoA, p. 16. 
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It was only because my point of departure was that the avant-garde movements 
should be today seen as historical [historische] that I could leave aside the 
value judgements that are central to the theories of Luka cs and Adorno, and 
could hope to pass beyond the theoretical level they attained.59  
 
Whereas in the prolepsis discussed earlier the temporal dislocation occurs at 
the level of the historical typology that moves from the Middle Ages through 
Aestheticism and though the avant-garde to the present, here prolepsis occurs 
at a meta-historical level, involving Bu rger's own argumentation into its 
narrative: it was only because the avant-garde movements were theorised as 
historical that the theories of Luka cs and Adorno could be overcome, asserts 
Bu rger.  Another form of prolepsis, which admittedly was not intended by its 
author, has an editorial, textual dimension.  Readers who approach the 
Anglophone edition of Theory of the Avant-garde linearly – reading the book in 
its entirety from beginning to end – will be faced with another temporal 
dislocation.  The statement I have cited above is made in the book’s 
introduction: narratively speaking, the avant-garde movements have not yet 
been introduced, and the central theses on the avant-garde’s intention have 
not yet been declared.  Furthermore, readers who look closely at the text’s 
bibliographic details will note that the 1980 English edition contains two 
additional parts (the introduction and the first chapter), which have been 
extracted from a different publication, Vermittlung-Rezeption-Funktion, 
published in 1979, a few years after Bu rger had formulated his theses on the 
avant-garde.60  It is perhaps understandable that such a bibliographic detail 
has received no scholarly attention.  Yet the narratological analysis to which 
we have subjected the text demands that this editorial dislocation is addressed 
– particularly as it expresses a dislocation of historical time. The introductory 
statements taken from Vermittlung-Rezeption-Funktion were written and 
                                                             
59 V-R-F, p. 12/ThoA, p. lii (trans. modified; emphasis added). 
60 See ‘Einleitung: Theorie der Avantgarde und Theorie der Literatur’ and 
‘Hermeneutik – Ideologiekritik – Funktionsanalyse’, in V-R-F, pp. 9-17, 147-159.  
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published after the first German edition of Theory of the Avant-Garde.  In other 
words, Bu rger’s initial formulations had already occurred historically, and 
when writing the above sentences, Bu rger has already historicised his own 
theory and incorporated his findings into his historical narrative.   
In addition to this prolepsis-in-translation, there is a more profound 
epistemological prolepsis.  In Theory of the Avant-garde and elsewhere, Bu rger 
insists that the avant-garde must be distinguished from modernism, and that 
Adorno and Luka cs were mistaken for not acknowledging a distinction 
between the two.61  Or rather, suggests Bu rger, the fact that they could not see 
that difference means that their aesthetic theories are today as ‘historical’ as 
the avant-gardes themselves.  For Bu rger, fighting for or against the avant-
garde is the sign of a bygone age: ‘To the extent that Adorno does that [CP – 
positions himself against realism], he himself as theoretician belongs to the 
era of the historical avant-garde movements.  This is also clear from the fact 
that Adorno saw the avant-garde movements not as historical, but as still alive 
in the present’.62  What is more, adds Bu rger, Adorno’s theory does not 
recognise the co-existence of multiple artistic material in one epoch; that is 
another reason why it begins to be seen as historical.63 As foundational as 
Adorno’s aesthetic theory may be, states Bu rger, it is no longer contemporary: 
‘Aesthetic theory today finds its model in the aesthetic theory of Adorno, 
                                                             
61 ‘For Luka cs, there is no difference between modernism and [the] avant-garde, a 
difference that is crucial in my view. Modernism accepts the institution of art, [the] 
avant-garde fights it.’ ‘Interview with Peter Bu rger: 27 December 1991, Bremen’, in 
Lukács after Communism: Interviews with Contemporary Intellectuals, ed. by Eva L. 
Corredor (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), pp. 46-60 (p. 51); see also ThoA, 
pp. 60-63. 
62 ThdA, p. 86 (trans. mine); Cf. ThoA, p. 63. 
63 See Peter Bu rger, 'Der Anti-Avantgardismus in der A sthetik Adornos' (1985), in Das 
Altern der Moderne. Schriften zur bildenden Kunst (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2001), pp. 
31-47 (p. 33).  
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whose historicity has become recognisable’.64  In this respect, Bu rger proposes 
that in order to recognise the avant-garde as avant-garde (i.e. distinct from 
modernism) one has no choice but to leave Adorno’s theory behind.   
Critical theorist and literary scholar Peter Uwe Hohendahl has helpfully 
distinguished between three kinds of Adorno readers.  At the opposite 
extremes we find the orthodox reader, who remains faithful to Adorno’s 
philosophical and political position, and the dismissive reader, who considers 
Adorno’s thought to be historically outdated.  In the middle stands the reader 
whose position ‘foregrounds the historical relevance of Adorno, but also the 
task of going beyond Adorno’s theory’.65  Peter Bu rger, both in Theory of the 
Avant-Garde and in later essays that critically engage with Adorno’s aesthetics, 
belongs to this latter group. However, the ways in which Bu rger’s theorisation 
of the avant-garde interrelates with Adorno’s thought renders such a task 
proleptic since, as I show below, Bu rger’s leaving-behind of Adorno’s thought 
also constitutes a form of return.  
While Bu rger leaves Adorno’s aesthetic theory behind because it does 
not recognise the avant-garde as distinct from modernism, he paradoxically 
raises the avant-garde to the status of a historical necessity in order to justify 
that very theoretical move.  In the essay that expands Bu rger’s critique of 
Adorno’s ‘anti-avant-gardism’, it is proposed that abandoning Adorno’s thesis 
‘facilitates the insight that the later development of artistic material can run 
into internal limits. This can be observed in Cubism.’66 In other words, Bu rger 
suggests that only when we leave Adorno’s aesthetics behind can we recognise 
the avant-garde as avant-garde.  Yet, as we have seen above, the exact opposite 
                                                             
64 ThdA, p. 130; Cf. ThoA, p. 94. 
65 Peter Uwe Hohendahl, ‘The Ephemeral and the Absolute: Provisional Notes to 
Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory’, in Language without Soil: Adorno and Late Philosophical 
Modernity, ed. by Gerhard Richter (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009), pp. 
206-226 (p. 206). 
66 Bürger, ‘The Decline of Modernism’, in The Decline of Modernism, pp. 32-47 (p. 36); 
Cf. Das Altern der Moderne, p. 16. 
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logical and temporal movement has occurred: it is the 'fact' of the historical 
avant-gardes’ having overcome the parameters of that debate (i.e. by having 
broken out of the aestheticist formalism of modernism) that justifies the claim 
that Adorno's thought is no longer contemporary.  
In what we might describe, following Genette, as a ‘mark of narrative 
impatience’, Bu rger’s working hypotheses take on the character of logical and 
historical preconditions to support a theory to-come.67  In Theory of the Avant-
Garde’s final chapter, ‘Avant-Garde and Commitment [Engagement]’, we see 
the theses introduced in earlier chapters becoming foundational statements 
upon which a third, additional hypothesis can be tested out: if the theory of 
the avant-garde is correct then it should also make the modernism/realism 
debate obsolete.68  Similarly, in the abstract that accompanied the original 
publication of the essay ‘Institution Kunst als literatursoziologische Kategorie’ 
(Institution Kunst as Literary-Sociological Category), Bu rger makes reference 
to the theses formulated in Theory of the Avant-Garde.  Yet these theses are 
presented not as hypotheses but as research findings, which are then posited 
as historical preconditions.  Bu rger thus suggests that the methodological 
question of overcoming the dichotomy between dialectical and positivist 
approaches to the study of literature is answered by the avant-garde: 
   
I believe to have found this theoretical field [CP – beyond the dichotomy] in 
the avant-garde movements (Futurism, Dadaism, Surrealism). In revolting 
against a certain conception of art, a conception dominant in bourgeois society 
where the artwork is ‘autonomous’, and in attempting to reintegrate the 
artwork in the context of other social practices, the avant-garde movements 
have proceeded to a rupture in the development of art and, as a result, have 
allowed us to see art as an institution.69 
 
Historical precondition is expressed this time at the meta-narrative level.  As 
                                                             
67 Genette, op. cit., p. 72. 
68 See ThdA, p. 117; ThoA, p. 83. 
69 IK, p. 75. 
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Bu rger mobilises his earlier theses in order to substantiate his sociological-
institutional theory, the logic of ‘it is not until x that y is made possible’ 
continues in second historicism. Whereas at the level of first historicism it was 
aestheticism that was historically necessary for the avant-garde, at the level of 
second historicism, it is the avant-garde that becomes historically necessary 
for a post-Adornian theory of art and literature.70  It thus seems unavoidable 
to raise the following question, which parallels the one asked at the level of 
first historicism: Does Bu rger critique Adorno in order to better theorise the 
avant-garde, or does he theorise the avant-garde in order to better critique 
Adorno?  If it is the avant-garde that is at the service of a sociological-
institutional theory, then the historical specificity of the avant-garde becomes 
important for Bu rger because it is the avant-garde as distinct from modernism 
that makes his critique of Adorno possible.  If it is the critique of Adorno that 
is at the service of a theory of the avant-garde, then it is the abandonment of 
Adorno and the formulation of a post-Adornian sociological theory of 
literature that makes the avant-garde possible.   
From my analysis so far, it might seem that Bu rger’s narrative time is 
hermetically sealed from history (as res gestae).  Yet the epistemological 
prolepsis of second historicism is possible only because Bu rger assigns two 
historical events prime significance: namely, May ’68 and Adorno’s death. 
Although the historical marker of ‘68 does not seem to play a role in the 
narrative time of the first historicism –  being simply designated by the ‘today’, 
the moment after May ‘68 where avant-garde protest is no longer possible – it 
does play an important role in second historicism.  At the meta-narrative level, 
the avant-garde becomes recognisable as avant-garde only after the historical 
imaginary of ‘68 (as ‘event’) because, according to Bu rger, it is that event’s 
failure that also makes the failure of the historical avant-gardes to re-integrate 
                                                             
70 For another instance of the avant-garde providing the ‘answer’ to a methodological 
problem, see Peter Bürger, ‘The Decline of Modernism’, in The Decline of Modernism, 
p. 45.  
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art into life-praxis recognisable.71  When defending Theory of the Avant-Garde 
against the early criticisms collected in the Suhrkamp edition, Bu rger holds on 
to his original thesis because ‘it corresponds to a historical problem-horizon 
[Problemhorizont], as it emerged after the end of the May-events of 1968 and 
the failure of the student movement in the early seventies’ 72  In a more recent 
article, Bu rger once again stresses the significance of the May events and, by 
way of reference to Benjamin's theses on history, describes ‘68 as ‘the moment 
of recognisability’ [der Augenblick der Erkennbarkeit]: as the moment where 
the historical avant-gardes became alive again following the period of silence 
in the early post-war years.73 
The second historical marker that provides the link between narrative 
time and the time of res gestae brings us back to the figure of Adorno.  In an 
essay from the early 1990s, Bu rger traces the point of transition from the 
modern to the postmodern in relation to Adorno: ‘A garden gnome is no longer 
a garden gnome. […] Up until a certain moment (let us take 1969, the year of 
Adorno’s death, as a marker) a garden gnome was still a garden gnome’.74  The 
implications of this statement are that seeing the garden gnome, not as a 
symbol of petit-bourgeois cultural capital, but rather with postmodern irony, 
is something that can occur only 'after Adorno'. Leaving the validity of this 
witticism aside, it is, nevertheless, telling that a broader shift in cultural 
history, which has of course little to do with Adorno’s actual biological death, 
has been marked by the figure of Adorno.  The temporal distance – the 
Abschied, the leaving behind – of Bu rger’s narrative time is coupled here with 
the temporal distance of biological time – Adorno’s death.  We have seen that 
leaving Adorno’s thought behind required the avant-garde’s failure to have 
happened in history. Yet this historical necessity is coupled with a historical 
                                                             
71 See Bürger, ‘Ende der Avantgarde?, in Das Altern der Moderne, pp. 186-187. 
72 ThdA, p. 134 (translation mine, emphasis added); Cf. ThoA, p. 95. 
73 Bu rger, Nach der Avantgarde, p. 9. 
74 Peter Bu rger, ‘Aporias of Modern Aesthetics’, trans. by Ben Morgan, New Left 
Review, 184. November-December (1990), 47-56 (p. 47; emphasis added).  
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impossibility: Adorno did not live to see the aftermath of May ’68, which 
according to Bu rger, enables the recognition of the avant-garde’s failure. 
Taking Bu rger’s narrative logic at its own word, therefore, for both Luka cs and 
Adorno it would have been not simply intellectually impossible to recognise 
the avant-garde as distinct from modernism, but historically impossible.  Thus, 
in the ‘Bu rger narrative’, understood now in the broader sense extending far 
beyond the confines of the linear historicism of the text’s narrated time, 
Adorno’s death becomes another ‘historical problem-horizon’.    
As with May ’68 so with Adorno’s death, the question of afterness looks 
back to the moment of prolepsis. For the question of temporal order that has 
been guiding our enquiry is not merely a matter of sequence and causality, but 
also a matter of historical indebtedness.  Bu rger is conscious of this historical 
debt as he exclaims: ‘And where do we stand, we who are both the heirs of 
aestheticist formalism and of the avant-garde protest against it?’75  The 
response he seems to give through Theory of the Avant-Garde, and through the 
prolepsis we have identified in terms both rhetorical (‘it was not until’) and 
epistemological (logical precondition as historical consequence), is that this is 
a debt that flashes forward into the future. Put in less narratological and more 
Benjaminian terms, the question of the idea of the avant-garde after 
modernism, or of an avant-garde inheritance – whether this is approached 
through the problem-horizon of May 68 or of a post-Adornian aesthetics – 
requires a temporality of a present futurity.  Yet that present futurity is not the 
space between the present and future in the sequence of beads in a rosary (as 
Benjamin’s image of historicism has it), but rather it has more in common with 
the gaze of the ‘backward-looking prophet’ described in Benjamin’s Angelus 
Novus, where fortune-telling requires the past in order to find itself back in the 
critical moment of the present.76    
                                                             
75 Bürger, ‘The Decline of Modernism’, in The Decline of Modernism, p. 46. 
76 See Benjamin, Thesis IX, ‘On the Concept of History’, in SW4, p. 392; GS I.2, pp. 697-
98.  
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Revisiting Peter Bu rger’s canonical Theory of the Avant-Garde, in this 
chapter I have argued for an alternative interpretation of the historical 
temporality underpinning Bu rger’s conception of the avant-garde, beyond the 
narrow textual and narrative confines of his theory.  Drawing on narratological 
theory and analysing the two levels of historicism that weave in and out of 
Bu rger’s text, I have suggested that the notion of the avant-garde implicitly 
posited by Bu rger is distinct from the periodising category of the historical 
avant-gardes, and that its relationship to the key hermeneutic category of 
Institution Kunst is marked by a double temporality.  At once historically 
specific and trans-historical, bound to the moment of aestheticism but also 
going beyond it in its heuristic function as the epistemological foundation of a 
new sociology of art, Institution Kunst was shown to both determine, and to be 
determined by, the idea of the avant-garde. This double temporality was then 
discussed with reference to the proleptic epistemology at work in Bu rger’s 
historicisation of his own theory, where the theory’s indebtedness to Adorno’s 
aesthetics was articulated as both historical consequence and precondition. 
Although reading Theory of the Avant-Garde in autobiographical terms would 
stretch the existing text beyond recognition, my analysis has hinted at the self-
narrativising dimensions of Bu rger’s text, so as to expose the multiple levels 
of historical time that have so far been obfuscated by scholars’ over-emphasis 
on the text’s surface-narrative of the ‘failed’ dream to re-integrate art into life. 
Through this unorthodox narratological reading, therefore, I have sought to 
offer one iteration of ‘unmooring’ the avant-garde from modernist 
periodisation, and to propose that in this split between hermeneutical and 
historical causality the avant-garde at once belongs to, and remains at a critical 
distance from, its time.  
Chapter 3 
 
Repeating Rupture: John Roberts’ post-Adornian Avant-
Garde with and against the New 
 
 
“Fine”, said K., “I’ll buy it”.  K.’s curtness had been unthinking and so he was 
glad when the painter, instead of being offended, lifted another canvas from 
the floor.  “Here’s the companion picture”, he said.  It might be intended as a 
companion picture, but there was not the slightest difference that one could 
see between it and the other; here were the two trees, here the grass, and 
there the sunset.  But K. did not bother about that.  “They’re fine prospects”, 
he said.  “I’ll buy both of them and hang them up in my office”.  “You seem to 
like the subject”, said the painter, fishing out a third canvas.  “By a lucky chance 
I have another of these studies here”.  But it was not merely a similar study, it 
was simply the same wild heathscape again.1  
– Franz Kafka, The Trial 
 
Kafka’s nameless protagonist is in an artist’s atelier and is being presented 
with paintings, one after another.  The narrator describes the first painting, 
and then notes coolly that the ‘companion picture’ is not discernibly different.  
Then, a third painting is shown.  Once again, it is not a variation – it is exactly 
the same painting.  This remarkable passage, cited and remarked upon by 
Benjamin in the Arcades Project, lends itself to familiar readings that 
destabilise the relationship between ‘original’ and ‘copy’ in the age of the 
artwork’s technical reproducibility.  Yet it also calls for analysis with regard 
to its nightmarish temporality: the identical nature of the heathscapes 
foregrounds a paradoxical repetition.  As each painting is shown in sequence 
yet each painting appears the same as the one that has just been encountered, 
it is as if time had not lapsed.  It is this repetition – a movement in stasis, an 
absence of variation – that is foregrounded by Benjamin:  ‘Definition of the 
“modern” as the new in the context of what has always already been there [des 
immer schon Dagewesnen]. The always new, always identical [immer neue, 
                                                             
1 Franz Kafka, The Trial, trans. by Willa and Edwin Muir (London: Secker & Warburg, 
1996), p. 154.     
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immer gleiche] “heathscape” in Kafka (Der Prozeß) is not a bad expression of 
this state of affairs.’2  Rather than defining the modern as a radical rupture 
with the past that leaves the past behind, Benjamin proposes the modern as 
that which is ever new yet ever same.  This repetition of the same, which 
arguably disrupts the novel’s linear narrative temporality for a brief moment, 
is therefore taken by Benjamin to the realm of historical time: it is modernity’s 
very historicity that now has to grapple with this nightmare.    
Having examined historical time with reference to progressivism and 
sequentiality in Theory of the Avant-Garde in the previous chapter, in this 
chapter I examine a different iteration of the question of ‘the new after the 
new’ by turning to the issues of novelty and historical repetition.  As has been 
noted in the thesis’ introduction, even though the term ‘avant-garde’ 
continues to attract interest from within art-historical discourses, there have 
been few attempts to theorise the avant-garde since Bürger’s seminal 
publication and the ensuing critical responses articulated by Benjamin 
Buchloh and Hal Foster.  An exception to this tendency is provided by the 
polemical work of British art theorist John Roberts, whose essays on the 
avant-garde have been in circulation since the turn of the new century and 
most recently reformulated in the book-length publication Revolutionary Time 
and the Avant-Garde (2015).3  Focussing on Roberts’ intellectual indebtedness 
                                                             
2 AP [S1, 4], p.  544.  See also AP [S1, 5], p. 544; [S2a, 3], p. 548; [S5, 2], p. 552.     
3 John Roberts, Revolutionary Time and the Avant-Garde (London: Verso, 2015), 
hereafter cited RTA. My analysis also draws upon the following: John Roberts, ‘On 
autonomy and the avant-garde’, Radical Philosophy, 103. September/October (2000), 
25-28; ‘After Adorno: Art, Autonomy, and Critique’, Historical Materialism, 7.1 
(2000), 221–39; ‘The Labour of Subjectivity, The Subjectivity of Labour: Reflections 
on Contemporary Political Theory and Culture’, Third Text, 16.4 (2002), 367–85, 
hereafter ‘LS’; ‘The Logics of Deflation: Autonomy, Negation and the Avant-Garde’ 
(PhD Dissertation by Publication, University of Bath, 2005); ‘Avant-Gardes after 
Avant-Gardism’, Chto Delat?/What is to be Done?, Debates on the Avant-Garde, 17 
(2007) <http://www.chtodelat.org> [accessed 29 March 2012]; ‘Productivism and 
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to Adorno’s aesthetics and his formulation of a ‘third’ or ‘suspensive’ avant-
garde, this chapter seeks to enquire into the chronopolitics of such a 
formulation, asking whether, and the extent to which, it might, malgré soi, 
submit the avant-garde to the hellish vision of the ‘always new, always 
identical’.  If both the ‘historical avant-garde’ and the ‘neo-avant-garde’ are 
now ‘historical’, is the ‘third’ avant-garde but one in a series of ruptures that 
will simply become historical in thirty years’ time?  Is the ‘suspensive’ avant-
garde an avant-garde ‘again’ (‘for the third time’), and therefore a second 
repetition in the footsteps of the neo-avant-garde’s alleged repetition, or does 
it constitute an avant-garde ‘anew’ – a truly new, radical rupture untainted by 
capital-time?   
Enlisting Adorno as my primary aide in this endeavour, I investigate 
John Roberts’ re-deployment and critical appropriation of Adorno’s thought, 
paying particular attention to the notion of ‘the new’ [das Neue].4  As is 
                                                             
Its Contradictions’, Third Text, 23.5 (2009), 527–36, hereafter ‘PC’;  ‘Art and Its 
Negations’, Third Text, 24.3 (2010), 289–303, hereafter ‘AN’; ‘Revolutionary Pathos, 
Negation, and the Suspensive Avant-Garde’, New Literary History, 41.4 (2010), 717–
30, hereafter ‘SA’.      
4 My analysis is drawn primarily from: Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, ed. by 
Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann; trans. by Robert Hullot-Kentor (London: 
Continuum, 1997), hereafter cited AT.  The following have also been consulted: 
Theodor W. Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, 20 vols. ed. by Rolf Tiedemann with Gretel 
Adorno, Susan Buck-Morss and Klaus Schultz (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970-1986), 
hereafter cited AGS and by volume number; The Adorno Reader, ed. by Brian O’Connor 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2000); Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, trans. by John Cumming (London: Verso, [1979] 1997), hereafter DE; 
Kierkegaard: The Construction of the Aesthetic, trans. by and ed. by Robert Hullot-
Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989); Minima Moralia: 
Reflections from Damaged Life, trans. by E. F. N. Jephcott (London: Verso, [1974] 
2005), hereafter MM (AGS Bd. 4); Negative Dialectics, trans. by E.B. Ashton (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), hereafter ND (AGS Bd. 5); Prisms, trans. by Samuel 
Weber and Shierry Weber (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1967); Quasi una fantasia: 
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discussed below, a link between Adorno’s notion of the new and the idea of 
the avant-garde has been established since the publication of Bürger’s theory.  
However, although the new has received some attention within Adorno 
scholarship, its import for theorising the avant-garde has not been extensively 
explored.5  It is my intention in this chapter to re-examine the relationship 
between the idea of the avant-garde and the chronopolitics of the new and, by 
doing so, also suggest new avenues for re-assessing more established 
discussions pertaining to the relationship between Adorno’s aesthetics and 
the idea of the avant-garde.       
 This focus on the notion of the new in Adorno’s aesthetics entails viewing 
Adorno’s broader intellectual project though a very particular intellectual 
prism. As is widely acknowledged, and as Susan Buck-Morss’s pioneering 
study was one of the first to show, Adorno’s philosophical project is deeply 
indebted to Benjamin’s Trauerspiel dissertation, and the theory of mimesis 
presented in Aesthetic Theory owes much to Benjamin’s own reflections on the 
mimetic faculty.6  Without underestimating the crucial differences between 
                                                             
Essays on Modern Music, trans. by Rodney Livingstone (London: Verso, [1963] 1998). 
Page references are given in the English editions followed by the Gesammelte 
Schriften edition, with any modifications to the English translations noted as such.  
References to Aesthetic Theory (AGS Bd. 7) are accompanied by section headings to 
help guide the reader through the text’s unedited corpus.  
5 The most detailed treatment of the notion of the new in Adorno’s aesthetics appears 
in the dissertation-based monograph: Sylvia Zirden, Theorie des Neuen. Konstruktion 
einer ungeschriebenen Theorie Adornos (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 
2005). Fredric Jameson’s better-known yet less reliable reading in Late Marxism: 
Adorno, Or, The Persistence of the Dialectic (London: Verso, 1990) is discussed below.  
See also Tilo Wesche, ‘Adornos Engführung von Kunst und Moderne – Zum Begriff 
des Neuen in der Ästhetischen Theorie’, in Das Neue – Eine Denkfigur der Moderne, hg. 
Maria Moog-Grünewald (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 2002), pp. 73-89; 
Stewart Martin, ‘Renewing Aesthetic Theory', Radical Philosophy, 89 (1998), 46-47.  
6 See Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter 
Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1977), passim.  On 
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the two thinkers, or overemphasising the affinities between Benjamin’s and 
Adorno’s thought (as is done by some scholars who discount Adorno’s 
Hegelianism, for instance),7 my adopted position nonetheless insists on 
examining the notion of the new by locating it within a common Adorno-
Benjaminian project. Thus, my analysis resists the treatment of Adorno’s 
thought as ‘pure’ and ‘uncontaminated’ by external influences and, in this 
respect, is in agreement with musicologist Max Paddison’s assessment that: 
‘to fall under the hypnotic spell of [Adorno’s] prose style and abandon any 
attempt at a systematic understanding’ would be ‘a form of fetishisation that 
would contradict the spirit of critical theory itself’.8  It is in the spirit of critical 
theory, therefore, that I propose the adoption of a certain distance towards 
Adorno’s writing, one that does not, however, altogether dismiss it, as does 
Thierry de Duve when he exclaims: ‘negative dialectics is a way of thinking 
that you either embrace or reject but with which you cannot enter into 
discussion.’9  Rather, my move of adopting a certain distance has more in 
common with Lambert Zuidervaart’s mode of ‘going after’ Adorno in social 
philosophy: of being indebted to yet also chasing after Adorno and his 
                                                             
Adorno’s academic seminars on Benjamin, and Benjamin’s reservations about 
Adorno’s unacknowledged deployment of his thought, see Stefan Müller-Doohm, 
Adorno: A Biography, trans. by Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: Polity, [2003] 2005), 
pp. 145-50. 
7 See Shierry Weber Nicholsen, ‘Aesthetic Theory’s Mimesis of Walter Benjamin’, in 
The Semblance of Subjectivity: Essays in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, ed. by Tom Huhn 
and Lambert Zuidervaart (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 55-91. 
8 Max Paddison, ‘Review Article: Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory’, Music Analysis, 6.3 
(1987), 355-77 (p. 356).   
9 Thierry de Duve, ‘Resisting Adorno, Revamping Kant’, in J. M. Bernstein et al., eds., 
Art and Aesthetics after Adorno (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010), 
pp. 249-99 (p. 258).   
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‘followers’.10  I thus intend to re-visit Adorno’s aesthetics and address the way 
in which, and the extent to which, John Roberts as one of his followers, and the 
theory of the suspensive avant-garde as a self-proclaimed ‘post-Adornian’ 
theory, re-articulates the category of the new for the early twenty-first 
century.  As I argue below, Roberts’ appropriation of Adorno’s texts reveals a 
new chronopolitics for the idea of the avant-garde after modernism that 
establishes a deeply aporetic relationship between historical periodisation 
and historical rupture.           
 The analysis that follows is structured in three parts.  Part 1 offers a brief 
overview of Aesthetic Theory’s reception with reference to some common 
misconceptions surrounding the applicability of Adorno’s aesthetics to the 
avant-garde. Revisiting the Anglophone scholarly reception of Aesthetic 
Theory since its publication in the 1980s, and historically situating this 
reception in the context of debates over modernism’s relationship to realism 
and postmodernism, it is suggested that the commonly-portrayed image of 
Adorno as a theorist of the avant-garde needs to be interrogated and critically 
re-sketched beyond its underlying Cold War assumptions about ‘autonomous 
art’ and ‘mass culture’.  Part 2 examines Adorno’s notion of the new through 
the double prism of the essay-form and the commodity-form, stressing 
Adorno’s phenomenological conception of time while also foregrounding the 
centrality of the category of the ever-same for his dialectical conception of 
aesthetic autonomy.  With these clarifications on the avant-garde’s role in 
Aesthetic Theory and the character of the new in mind, Part 3 turns to an 
assessment of Roberts’ post-Adornian theory of the avant-garde, suggesting 
that the suspensive avant-garde, despite its revolutionary aspirations, is 
marked by a ‘non-evental’ chronopolitics that ultimately remains wedded to a 
progressivist conception of historical time.    
 
                                                             
10 See Lambert Zuidervaart, Social Philosophy after Adorno (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), p. 7.   
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3.1  Adorno and the Avant-Garde: Re-sketching the Physiognomy  
 
Upon hearing the words ‘Adorno’ and ‘avant-garde’, one may be forgiven for 
conjuring up the following mental image: Adorno, the avant-gardist – ardent 
admirer of literary and musical modernism, friend of Thomas Mann and loyal 
pupil of Viennese composer Alban Berg, staunch critic of mass culture and ‘the 
culture industry’, bourgeois intellectual mistrustful of the ‘committed’ stance 
of Georg Lukács, Jean-Paul Sartre and Bertolt Brecht. Though hardly 
inaccurate, this image is nonetheless deceptively simple, especially because it 
relies on a clichéd correlation between Adorno’s own personal taste – a taste 
notoriously Eurocentric and high-brow – and the philosophical role that the 
avant-garde (as name and notion) plays in Adorno’s body of work.  Re-visiting 
the Anglophone reception of Adorno’s aesthetics, and the posthumously 
published Aesthetic Theory in particular, in this section I aim to briefly re-draw 
this physiognomy, identifying key turning points in the reception of Adorno’s 
aesthetics, while situating this reception within a broader intellectual history 
of the late twentieth century.  Such a re-drawing thus serves as the starting 
point for articulating an idea of the avant-garde after modernism that 
mobilises Adorno’s thought while going beyond his own assertions and 
polemics.          
 Aesthetic Theory has received substantive critical attention, especially 
since the publication of Robert Hullot-Kentor’s authoritative 1997 English 
translation.11  A wealth of scholarship has been published on issues ranging 
from mimesis to natural beauty to artistic labour, and Aesthetic Theory’s status 
                                                             
11 Robert Hullot-Kentor’s more recent translation has now superseded Christian 
Lenhardt’s earlier attempt. Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. by 
Christian Lenhardt (London: Routledge & Keagan Paul, 1984).  See also the exchange 
between the two translators, Robert Hullot-Kentor, ‘Aesthetic Theory: The 
Translation’, Telos, 65. Fall (1985), 143-47; Christian Lenhardt, ‘Response to Hullot-
Kentor’, Telos, 65. Fall (1985), 147-52. 
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within Adorno’s body of work as a whole has been fervently debated.12  
Whatever the emphasis, the discursive parameters have been demarcated 
along philosophical lines.  This has meant that some of the art-historical 
concerns regarding the avant-garde have been bypassed, with the work’s 
afterlife coming to seem like a sardonic response to Friedrich Schlegel’s 
quotation that Adorno intended as the book’s epigram: ‘What is called the 
philosophy of art usually lacks one of two things: either the philosophy or the 
art’.13  That is not to say, of course, that Aesthetic Theory is lacking in art.  What 
I contend, rather, is that the critical emphasis on debating the Kantian, 
Hegelian, or Benjaminian dimensions of Adorno’s aesthetics has shifted 
attention away from the question of how Adorno’s anti-systematic philosophy 
precisely mediates the two spheres – philosophy and art – in practice.14  
Therefore, the obstacles in distinguishing the avant-garde from modernism 
that have been outlined in the thesis’ introduction resurface in the context of 
Adorno’s aesthetics, as otherwise dependable commentators continue to 
                                                             
12 Mentioning for now only the publications that will be referred to extensively below, 
see Gerard Delanty, ed., Theodor W. Adorno, Vol. II, Aesthetic Theory (London: SAGE 
Publications, 2004), hereafter cited ‘Delanty’; Tom Huhn and Lambert Zuidervaart, 
eds., The Semblance of Subjectivity: Essays in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1997), hereafter cited ‘Semblance’.     
13 See AT, ‘Editors’ Afterword’, p. 366/544. 
14 One must also note the critical purchase of analyses that focus on Adorno’s writing 
as writing, proposing his aphoristic, paratactical style as exemplary of literary 
modernism (and/or ‘the avant-garde’).  See inter alia Fredric Jameson, Marxism and 
Form: Twentieth Century Dialectical Theories of Literature (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1971), p. 58;  Edward Said, ‘Adorno as Lateness Itself’, in Adorno: A 
Critical Reader, ed. by Nigel Gibson and Andrew Rubin (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 
193-208;  Richard Wolin, ‘Benjamin, Adorno, Surrealism’, in The Semblance of 
Subjectivity: Essays in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, ed. by Tom Huhn and Lambert 
Zuidervaart (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 93-122 (p. 114); Ulrich Plass, 
Language and History in Theodor W. Adorno’s Notes to Literature (London & New 
York: Routledge, 2007), p. xl. 
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circumvent the implications of this relationship, describing Aesthetic Theory 
by turns as: ‘a historico-philosophical justification of modernism’,15 a 
‘monument to the critical metaphysics of the modernist aesthetic’,16 or a 
theory that ‘not only defends and legitimizes modernism and the avant-garde, 
[but that] may well be called a theory of the avant-garde’.17  The anti-
systematic, deeply personal manner in which Adorno engages with specific 
artworks, however, is, as Simon Jarvis has noted, closer to the approach of a 
critic than to a theorist.18  And, therefore, as Rüdiger Bubner has also correctly 
remarked, Adorno’s evocation of particular artworks on a ‘case-by-case’ basis 
– that basis often expressing simply cultural preferences – is deeply at odds 
with the prescriptive generality of his category of ‘modern art’.19  What this 
means for our present enquiry is that when little or no distinction is drawn 
between the idea of the avant-garde and avant-garde art, or between 
modernism and the modern (die Moderne), Adorno can easily masquerade as 
                                                             
15 Richard Wolin, ‘The De-aestheticization of Art: On Adorno’s Aesthetische Theorie’, 
Telos, 41 (1979), 105-27, reprinted in Delanty, pp. 5-30 (p. 13). 
16 Peter Osborne, ‘Adorno and the Metaphysics of Modernism: The Problem of a 
‘Postmodern’ Art’, in The Problems of Modernity: Adorno and Benjamin, ed. by Andrew 
Benjamin (London & New York: Routledge, 1989), pp. 23-48.   
17 Peter Uwe Hohendahl, ‘Autonomy of Art: Looking Back at Adorno's Ästhetische 
Theorie’, The German Quarterly, 54.2 (1981), 133-48, reprinted in Delanty, pp. 49-65 
(p. 54).  For other such accounts see Stewart Martin, ‘Autonomy and Anti-Art: 
Adorno’s Concept of Avant-Garde Art’, Constellations, 7.2 (2000), 197-207; reprinted 
in Delanty, pp. 179-91; David S. Ferris, ‘Politics and the Enigma of Art: The Meaning 
of Modernism for Adorno’, Modernist Cultures, 1.2 (2005), 192-208; Thomas Huhn, 
‘Adorno’s Aesthetics of Illusion’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 44. Winter 
(1985), 181-89 (p. 181). See also how Adorno’s thought is problematically 
refashioned after Bürger to ‘explain’ the avant-garde in Ann Gibson, ‘Avant-Garde’, in 
Critical Terms for Art History, pp. 205-6. 
18 See Simon Jarvis, Adorno: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), p. 138.          
19 See Rüdiger Bubner, ‘Concerning the Central Idea of Adorno’s Philosophy’, in 
Semblance, pp. 147-175 (pp. 162-167).  
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a champion of Surrealism and Expressionism.20  And the less attention is paid 
to how the ‘modernist’ or ‘avant-garde’ artworks that Adorno mentions 
favourably operate within the theory and mediate his philosophical categories 
– ‘the ugly’, ‘enigmaticalness’, or ‘dissonance’ – the more the erroneous 
impression of Adorno as a theorist of the avant-garde persists.21     
That said, such reception should not be entirely dismissed, especially 
because it can function as a historical compass for broader debates concerning 
the avant-garde’s relationship to realism and postmodernism, the 
implications of which I will also discuss with reference to the Italian 
Neoavanguardia in the following chapter.  Thus, attempting here a brief 
intellectual history of Aesthetic Theory’s reception, my proposition is that 
there are three main areas where such sedimentation – one is almost tempted 
to say ‘reification’ – of Adorno’s avant-gardism has taken place.  Two of the 
three areas can be identified, firstly, with respect to the so-called 
‘Expressionism debate’ and, secondly, with respect to the frequent 
comparisons between Adorno’s notion of aesthetic autonomy and the 
aesthetic formalism of US art critic Clement Greenberg.22  While the former 
context has repercussions both within and beyond West Germany, the latter 
has been more influential in an Anglophone art-historical context. 
                                                             
20 As an exception, see Hauke Brunkhorst’s apt distinction between modernism and 
the modern in Hauke Brunkhorst, Theodor W. Adorno. Dialektik der Moderne 
(München: Piper, 1990), pp. 113-16.  I discuss the extent to which Adorno was 
sympathetic towards the various ‘isms’ below.     
21 To pre-empt any misunderstanding, I do not mean to suggest that these categories 
have not been discussed with reference to avant-garde artworks; my point is rather 
that these categories have not been deployed to sufficiently challenge assumptions 
about these artworks’ ‘being avant-garde’.  
22 For a comparable reception in the field of English literature, undertaken with 
reference to the New Criticism of F.R. Leavis, see David Cunningham and Nigel Mapp, 
‘Introduction’, in Adorno and Literature, ed. by David Cunningham and Nigel Mapp 
(London: Continuum, 2006), pp. 1-7 (pp. 2-3).    
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Nevertheless, and despite the marked differences between the historical and 
political contexts in the West German and Anglo-American receptions, in both 
cases the question of Adorno’s modernism has not been too far from the 
question of Adorno’s Marxism, and thus within an ever-present and 
underlying Cold War ‘political unconscious’.23 Therefore, with respect to the 
‘Expressionism debate’ and especially the debate’s later reception, which pits 
the avant-garde against realism, Adorno has been painted as defender of the 
avant-garde because he is on the side that opposes ‘committed realism’.24  In 
the comparisons with Greenberg, on the other hand, Adorno has found himself 
in a united front against kitsch, with the category of kitsch functioning as the 
avant-garde’s Gegenbegriff (counter-concept) and showing both intellectuals’ 
allegiance to both high art and the anti-traditional tradition of the modern.25   
                                                             
23 Although an analysis of the German reception is beyond my present scope, the 
following publications give an indication of the text’s reception in the context of the 
German New Left.  Wilfried F. Schoeller, hg., Die Neue Linke nach Adorno (München: 
Kindler Verlag, 1969); Theodor W. Adorno Special Issue, Text + Kritik, ed. by Heinz 
Ludwig Arnold (1977); Materialien zur ästhetischen Theorie. Theodor W. Adornos 
Konstruktion der Moderne, ed. by Burkhardt Lindner and W. Martin Lüdke (Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp, 1979).    
24 See Hans-Jürgen Schmitt, hg. Die Expressionismusdebatte. Materialien zu einer 
marxistischen Realismuskonzeption (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1973); Special Issue: 
‘Brecht/Lukács/Benjamin. Fragen der marxistischen Theorie (I)’, Das Argument, 46 
(1968); Theodor W. Adorno, et. al., Aesthetics and Politics, ed. by Rodney Livingstone 
et al. (London: New Left Books, 1977), especially pp. 100-109.  For a useful historical 
overview, see Eugene Lunn, Marxism and Modernism: An Historical Study of Lukács, 
Brecht, Benjamin, and Adorno (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982).        
25 See Ian McLean, ‘Modernism and Marxism, Greenberg and Adorno’, Australian 
Journal of Art, 7.1 (1988), 97-111; Peter Osborne, ‘Aesthetic Autonomy and the Crisis 
of Theory: Greenberg, Adorno and the Problem of Postmodernism in Visual Arts, New 
Formations, 9. Autumn (1989), 31-50; J. M. Bernstein, ‘The Death of Sensuous 
Particulars: Adorno and Abstract Expressionism’, Radical Philosophy, 76. 
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The third element that I wish to bring to this brief intellectual history 
is the role that Peter Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-Garde has played in the 
reception of Adorno’s aesthetics. Such a role may seem paradoxical 
considering Bürger’s indisputable indebtedness to Adorno’s work, and as we 
have seen in Chapter 2, his theory coming decidedly ‘after Adorno’.  Yet, with 
their English translation historically coinciding (and within the context of 
renewed debates on the legacy of the modern in light of the postmodern), 
Aesthetic Theory and Theory of the Avant-Garde were often discussed side-by-
side.26  These discussions drew on Bürger’s own critical engagement with 
Adorno (most notably, Theory of the Avant-Garde’s section entitled ‘The 
New’).27 They also mobilised Adorno and Bürger in an effort to re-read the 
history of late twentieth-century art and culture, and thus re-habilitate art’s 
‘critical’ dimension, at the time considered to have been erased by 
postmodern tendencies.28 Significantly, such reception was part of a broader 
                                                             
March/April (1996), 7-18; Nancy Jachec, ‘Modernism, Enlightenment Values, and 
Clement Greenberg’, Oxford Art Journal, 21.2 (1998), 123-32 (pp. 123-24).  
26 See Lambert Zuidervaart, ‘The Social Significance of Autonomous Art: Adorno and 
Bürger’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 48 (1990), 61-77; reprinted in Delanty, 
pp. 67-92; Lambert Zuidervaart, Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory: The Redemption of Illusion 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 217-247; Richard Wolin, ‘Utopia, Mimesis, and 
Reconciliation: A Redemptive Critique of Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory’, Representations, 
32 (1990), 33-49; reprinted in Delanty, 31-48 (46-47).  Christian Lenhardt would 
even go as far as to suggest that, after Bürger’s publication, the English translation of 
Aesthetic Theory ‘comes on the scene too late’.  See Lenhardt, ‘Response to Hullot-
Kentor’, 151.  
27 See ThoA/ ThdA, pp. 59-63/81-86. 
28 A prominent role in this re-articulation of the avant-garde against the postmodern, 
with the legacy of the Frankfurt School as a primary point of reference, was played 
by the journal New German Critique and the affiliated Center for Twentieth Century 
Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, which was at the time the 
institutional home for scholars such as Andreas Huyssen.  See Andreas Huyssen, After 
the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism (Bloomington: Indiana 
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re-assessment of Adorno and Benjamin as thinkers of the postmodern, a 
reading supported by emphasising their critique of totality, systematicity and 
progress, and bypassing any Hegelian or Marxist traces that might have 
supported the case to the contrary.29  The distinctions between culture ‘high 
and low’, and realism and modernism sustaining Adorno’s clichéd 
physiognomy were by then beginning to wane.  The cliché was arguably still 
sustained, however, through the persistence of debates surrounding Adorno’s 
status in relation to Derridian deconstruction.  The camps were once more 
delineated as ‘for’ and ‘against’ deconstruction and the postmodern, with this 
very ‘for/against’ logic perpetuating the image of Adorno as a modernist, and 
by extension, of Adorno aesthetics as an aesthetics ‘of the avant-garde’.  
 Since the turn of the millennium and the diminishing influence of 
deconstruction within cultural theory, the reception of Adorno’s aesthetics 
has arguably become less polarised, and the more familiar philologico-
philosophical approaches now co-exist alongside debates in fields as diverse 
                                                             
University Press, 1986), passim; Jochen Schulte-Sasse, ‘Introduction: Modernity and 
Modernism, Postmodernity and Postmodernism: Framing the Issue’, Cultural 
Critique, 5. Winter (1986-1987), 5-22 (p. 7); Andreas Huyssen and David Bathrick, 
Modernity & the Text: Revisions of German Modernism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1989), passim; New German Critique, Theodor W. Adorno Special 
Issue, 56. Spring/Summer (1992); Andreas Huyssen, Twilight Memories: Marking 
Time in a Culture of Amnesia (London & New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 17-23, 92-
101. 
29 Regarding the Benjamin reception, see the scholarship discussed with reference to 
‘undecidability’ in Chapter 1.  Regarding the Adorno reception, see, for instance, 
Sabine Wilke, ‘Adorno and Derrida as Readers of Husserl: Some Reflections on the 
Historical Context of Modernism and Postmodernism’, boundary 2, 16 (1989), 77-89; 
J. M. Bernstein, The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1992); Christoph Menke, The Sovereignty of Art: Aesthetic 
Negativity in Adorno and Derrida, trans. by Neil Solomon (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
[1988] 1998).  
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as postcolonial studies and environmental aesthetics.30  The Marxist approach 
taken by John Roberts can be seen in this regard as a response to older debates 
on autonomy and the status of Kantian thought in Adorno’s project.31  With 
regard to the question of the avant-garde more specifically, Roberts’ 
discussion of the role of the avant-garde in Aesthetic Theory offers a new, if 
misguided, perspective.  His critical appropriation of Adorno’s aesthetics for a 
theorisation of the avant-garde, not only after modernism and the historical 
avant-garde, but also after the neo-avant-garde – the historical avant-garde’s 
so-called ‘repetition’ – thus raises important questions with respect to the 
legacy of Adorno’s aesthetics for the avant-garde, and vice versa.  Before 
examining Roberts’ post-Adornian avant-garde, let us first turn to Adorno’s 
aesthetics and consider its chronopolitical implications in more detail.   
  
  
                                                             
30 With respect to literary criticism, see Robert Kaufman, ‘Negatively Capable 
Dialectics: Keats, Vendler, Adorno, and the Theory of the Avant-Garde’, Critical 
Inquiry, 27.2 (2001), 354-84; Robert Kaufman, ‘Aura, Still’, October, 99. Winter 
(2002), 45-80. For postcolonial attempts, see Robert Spencer, ‘Thoughts from 
Abroad: Theodor Adorno as Postcolonial Theorist’, Culture, Theory & Critique, 51.3 
(2010), 207-21.  In the field on environmental aesthetics, see Donald Burke, ‘Adorno’s 
Aesthetic Rationality: On the Dialectic of Natural and Artistic Beauty’, in Critical 
Ecologies: The Frankfurt School and Contemporary Environmental Crises, ed. by 
Andrew Biro (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), pp. 165-86.   
31 See, for instance, the polemic launched against Kantian approaches in Dave Beech 
and John Roberts, eds., The Philistine Controversy (London: Verso, 2002). 
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3.2  Reading without a Dictionary: the Essay, the Commodity, the 
New 
 
The essay lends itself to concepts in a manner most likely comparable to the 
behaviour of someone abroad, who, rather than bungling the elements of the 
foreign language together from a school-book, is instead forced to speak that 
language.  They will read without a dictionary.32    
 
– T.W. Adorno, ‘The Essay as Form’  
 
Adorno’s sudden death brought the manuscript preparation for Aesthetic 
Theory to an abrupt end. Had he been able to complete the manuscript, 
however, the text would still remain unfinished.  For as has often been noted, 
despite being a lengthy monograph, Aesthetic Theory is guided by the principle 
of the ‘essay-form’.33  Such ‘finished unfinishedness’, frequently taken for a 
form of proto-postmodernism as we have seen, is encapsulated in Adorno’s 
famous chiasmatic inversion of Hegel’s aphorism found in Minima Moralia – 
‘Das Wahre ist das Ganze’ [The true is the whole] becomes, in Adorno’s hands, 
‘Das Ganze ist das Unwahre’ [The whole is the untrue].34  It is also aptly 
                                                             
32 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘The Essay as Form’, trans. by Bob Hullot-Kentor and Frederic 
Will, in The Adorno Reader, pp. 91-111 (101, trans. modified); ‘Der Essay als Form’, 
AGS XI, pp. 9-33 (21).  All subsequent references are to these editions, hereafter ‘EF’. 
33 See Peter Uwe Hohendahl, The Fleeting Promise of Art: Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory 
Revisited (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), p. 160; James Gordon 
Finlayson, ‘The Artwork and the Promesse du Bonheur in Adorno’, European Journal 
of Philosophy, 23.3 (2012), 392-419 (p. 393).   
34 See MM, p. 50/55 (trans. modified).  It must be noted that Adorno insisted on a 
distinction between an ‘accidental fragment’ (viewed unfavourably and associated 
with aleatory practices) and the fragment ‘as form’ (viewed favourably and guiding 
the essay principle).  On the former, see AT, ‘Universal and Particular’, pp. 221-
222/328-330; on the latter, see AT, ‘Situation’, p. 45/74; ‘Coherence and Meaning’, 
pp. 136-147/205-221. Cf. the audio recording of a radio interview with Adorno, ‘Das 
Fragment als Form und Zufall’, Gespräch zwischen Adorno und Peter von Haselberg. 
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captured by Adorno’s aphoristic image of a person reading without a 
dictionary.  Combining a theory of experience with a theory of cognition, this 
passage from the celebrated 1958 essay ‘Essay as Form’ finds Adorno at his 
most Benjaminian.  Just as Baroque language is ‘constantly convulsed by 
rebellion on the part of the elements which make it up’ for Benjamin, so too 
for Adorno must the relationship between word and meaning be emancipated 
from the logic of equivalence.35  Thus, to read without a dictionary means to 
read in a manner that the word’s meaning is variable, each new encounter 
between word and reader producing its meaning in constellation.  
The variable correspondences produced by the essay-form have 
chronopolitical as well as epistemological implications.  In a comparable 
image from the foundational formulation of constellation in Negative 
Dialectics, the safe-deposit box is unlocked and reveals its meaning only 
through a number combination, not a single key.36  Or in yet another image 
from Aesthetic Theory, a child playing the piano stumbles upon a never-heard-
before chord that in its accidental and discordant character provides the 
model for the experience of ‘the new’.37  Bringing these images of ‘non-identity 
thinking’ together, in this section I examine the implicit epistemology of time 
that can be found in Adorno’s philosophical project.  As I suggest below, the 
critique launched by the essay-form finds its temporal counterpart in the 
notion of the new, both figures of thought enacting a critique of time-as-
measurement.  Yet, as I demonstrate, such critique can only be articulated 
through foregrounding the dialectical relationship between the new and the 
ever-same, thus exposing the limitations of interpretations that read Aesthetic 
Theory as a theory of modernism.  
                                                             
Aufnahme beim HR, 2 Februar 1967; Sendung: NDR, 18 April 1967. Berlin, Akademie 
der Künste, Theodor W. Adorno/Walter Benjamin Archiv, Audio File TA_003.    
35 Benjamin, Origin, p. 207.  
36 See ND, pp. 163/163-164. 
37 See AT, ‘Situation’, p. 32/55. 
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 Adorno may not have explicitly set out to develop a philosophy of time, yet 
the question of historical time permeates his major philosophical antagonism 
with Heideggerian phenomenology, on the one hand, and positivist social 
science, on the other.  Viewed by Adorno as two sides of the same coin, 
phenomenology and social science were both considered to be lacking in 
historicity: whereas phenomenology’s focus on ‘mere temporality’ is found 
guilty of subjectivism, the erasure of the subject’s experience in social science 
leads to ‘identity-thinking’ [Identität Denken].38 Considered chronopolitically, 
therefore, the principle of the essay-form, and Adorno’s broader critique of 
the logic of equivalence found in a philosophy of ‘first principles’ (or prima 
philosophia) also constitutes a critique of time-as-measurement.  Thus, 
despite Adorno’s hostility towards the thought and figure of Martin Heidegger, 
there is a common origin between Heideggerian phenomenology and 
Adorno’s conception of time, especially considering the intellectual affinities 
between Edmund Husserl and Adorno’s mentor and academic supervisor 
Hans Cornelius.39  As we have also discussed in the context of Benjamin’s 
critique of historicism in Chapter 1, the phenomenological ‘now’ is distinct 
from a present that can be measured as an instant, its ‘now-ness’ or ‘present-
ness’ involving not only what ‘has-been’ but also what is ‘to-come’.  Adorno’s 
intellectual project is indisputably also guided by this underlying conception 
                                                             
38 See especially ‘The Actuality of Philosophy’, trans. by Benjamin Snow, in The Adorno 
Reader, pp. 23-39; ‘Die Aktualität der Philosophie’, AGS X, pp. 325-344; and Theodor 
W. Adorno, Against Epistemology: A Metacritique. Studies in Husserl and the 
Phenomenal Antinomies, trans. by Willis Domingo (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), pp. 
38-40; AGS 5, pp. 46-47. 
39 On the role of Husserl in Adorno’s early philosophical development, see Ernst 
Wolff, ‘From Phenomenology to critical theory: The genesis of Adorno’s critical 
theory from his reading of Husserl’, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 32.5 (2006), 555-
72. See also Roger Foster, Adorno: The Recovery of Experience (Albany: SUNY Press, 
2007), pp. 89-111.  
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of time, his critique manifesting itself more polemically in the writings on 
chronometrisation in music and the critique of leisure time.40 
  This fundamental affinity notwithstanding, the Adorno-Benjaminian 
conception of time-as-experience departs from the above phenomenological 
framework as soon as it comes into contact with the humanist Marxism of 
Georg Lukács.  As is well established, Lukács’s landmark analysis of the fetish 
character of the commodity that re-reads the opening chapter of Marx’s 
Capital and formulates the notion of reification as a process of de-
temporalisation, and relatedly de-humanisation, has had a profound influence 
on both Adorno and Benjamin.41  Understood in Lukács’s Marxist terms, the 
critique of quantitative time is none other but the critique of the principle of 
capitalist commodity exchange that reduces human labour to an abstract 
concept of median labour-time.42  Thus, in Adorno and Horkheimer’s classic 
account in The Dialectic of Enlightenment, the culture industry is defined with 
respect to its lack of historicity: ‘Nothing remains as of old; everything has to 
run incessantly, to keep moving.’43  And we are categorically reminded that, 
                                                             
40 See ‘Free Time’, in Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, trans. by Henry 
W. Pickford, introduction by Lydia Goehr (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2005), pp. 167-75; ‘Freizeit’, AGS 10. 2, pp. 654-55.  Cf. MM, ‘Morality and Temporal 
Sequence’, pp. 78-81; ‘Timetable’, pp. 130-31.  It is telling in this regard that Adorno’s 
conception of time is broadly equated with variance and duration, so that temporal 
variance is often evoked to denote historicity.  See, for instance, EF, p. 99; AT, ‘Art 
Beauty’, pp. 79-80/81-85, pp. 85-86/132-34; ‘Subject-Object’, p. 175/262; ‘Toward a 
Theory of the Artwork’, pp. 175-78/262-66, pp. 191-93/272-74.  
41 See Georg Lukács, ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’, in History 
and Class Consciousness, trans. by Rodney Livingstone (London: Merlin Press, [1923] 
1971), pp. 83-222.  Cf. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Volume I, 
trans. by Ben Fowkes (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976), pp. 125-77 
(especially, pp. 129-31).     
42 See ND, p. 146/147.  See also ‘Progress’, in Critical Models, pp. 143-160; 
‘Fortschritt’, AGS 10.2, pp. 617-38.    
43 DE, p. 134; AGS 3, p. 156.  
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despite its frenetic movement, the culture industry ‘is constituted by 
repetition’ [besteht in Wiederholung], the constant pull towards a superficial 
‘up-to-date-ness’ masking a deeper historical stasis.44     
 In Adorno’s aesthetics, too, the loss of historicity associated with reification 
defines the artwork’s paradoxical relationship to the commodity.  Whereas 
the authentic artwork grows old, the commodity, like the doomed-to-youth 
Dorian Gray, never ages.  For Adorno, the authentic artwork is necessarily 
historical.45  Yet such historicity does not denote a distinction between an 
(aesthetic) interiority opposed to a (historical) exteriority.46  Rather, the 
artwork’s immanent historicity is to be understood alongside the artwork’s 
‘social asociality’, famously captured by such aphoristic statements as: ‘what 
is social in art is its immanent movement against society’; ‘art is the social 
antithesis of society, not directly deducible from it’; ‘even in the most extreme 
refusal of society, art is essentially social'.47  Therefore, the artwork’s social 
and historical import is to be found not in a supplementary engagement with 
an external socio-historical reality but in its dialectical negation of a socio-
historical exteriority, articulated through its autonomy.     
                                                             
44 DE, p. 136/AGS 3, p. 158 (trans. modified).  This chronopolitical motif recurs in 
selected aphorisms in Minima Moralia as well as Adorno’s notorious critique of jazz.  
See MM, ‘Gala Dinner’, pp. 118-119; ‘Consecutio temporum’, pp. 217-219; ‘Late extra’, 
p. 235; ‘Perennial Fashion–Jazz’, P, pp. 123-127.  Cf. AP [J56a, 10], p. 331; [S1, 3], p. 
544; [S1, 5], p. 544. 
45 See inter alia, AT, ‘Art Beauty’, pp. 85-86/132-133; ‘Semblance and Expression’, p. 
112/170; ‘Toward a Theory of the Artwork’, p. 191/285; ‘Paralipomena’, p. 286/426; 
‘Draft Introduction’, pp. 357-359/530-533. 
46 On the idea of immanent critique being at the same time a critique ‘from outside’ 
[von außen], see ND, p. 145/147.  Cf. Adorno’s Benjaminian analysis of the bourgeois 
intérieur in Kierkegaard, pp. 40-46; AGS 2, pp. 65-69.  See also the famous Letter 39, 
‘Adorno and Gretel Karplus to Benjamin, Hornberg, 2-4 and 5 August 1935’, in CC, pp. 
104-116.   
47 See, respectively, AT, ‘Society’, p. 227/336; ‘Art, Society, Aesthetics’, p. 8/19; 
‘Paralipomena’, p. 320/475; ‘Draft Introduction’, p. 349/519.   
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If considered in isolation from the critique of the culture industry, Adorno’s 
definition of aesthetic autonomy might elicit the conclusion that the 
temporality of the commodity-form exists in a world apart from that of the 
artwork.  Such conclusions have been sometimes drawn by scholars of 
modernism who, as we have touched upon in the previous section, regard 
Aesthetic Theory as a theory of aesthetic modernism. Fredric Jameson has 
been one such reader, problematically de-dialectising Adorno’s thought by 
dissociating ‘culture’ from ‘industry’ and assigning the notion of the new a 
privileged, autonomous position so that its utopian chronopolitics remains 
untainted by the compromised temporality of the culture industry.48  Yet, if 
one does not conflate Adorno’s philosophico-historical conception of the 
modern (which cannot operate but within modernity’s compromised social 
relations and unrepresentable atrocities), and an aestheticist, genre-bound 
conception of modernism, then it is evident that Adorno’s aesthetics considers 
art’s participation in the dialectic of Enlightenment.49  Not only is progress 
another name for barbarism, but the artwork is never fully exterior to the 
commodity.  Rather, the artwork requires the commodity because it is 
negatively constituted by it.  ‘If it is essential to artworks that they be things, 
it is no less essential that they negate their own status as things […]’, to cite 
one of many such explicit formulations found in Aesthetic Theory.50   
     
                                                             
48 See Fredric Jameson, Late Marxism, pp. 144, 151, 171, 185.  I am not alone in having 
made this observation.  See Espen Hammer, Adorno and the Political (London & New 
York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 78-79.  See also the summary of critical accounts by Eva 
Geulen, Robert Hullot-Kentor and Peter Osborne in John Pizer, ‘Jameson’s Adorno, or, 
the Persistence of the Utopian’, New German Critique, 58. Winter (1993), 127-51 (p. 
127). 
49 See, for instance, AT, ‘On the Categories of the Ugly, the Beautiful and Technique’, 
p. 47/76; p. 61/97. 
50 AT, ‘Subject-Object’, p. 175/262.  
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In a short essay that attends to the artwork’s relationship to the 
commodity, Marxist art theorist Stewart Martin has convincingly argued that 
such relationship is a ‘contradictory relation of recognition’.51  Re-translating 
Hullot-Kentor’s rendition of the clause ‘the absolute artwork converges with 
the absolute commodity’ as ‘the absolute artwork meets the absolute 
commodity’, Martin has foregrounded a relationship of mutual recognition 
between the artwork and commodity that manifests itself in a moment of 
encounter.52  This encounter – this very spatio-temporal point at which the 
artwork meets with or, to modify Martin’s translation further, is encountered 
by the commodity – is marked with the threat that the artwork will be 
overwhelmed by the commodity.  As Hohendahl has also noted, Adorno’s 
problematisation of art’s autonomy is taken to such an extreme that it is at 
risk of disappearing.53  Considering this relationship of encounter in 
chronopolitical terms, therefore, the encounter between the new and the 
ever-same can also be said to be such a ‘contradictory relation of recognition’: 
it is the threat of kairós being overpowered by the repetitive up-to-date-ness 
of capital-time.  Indeed, Adorno himself posits this relationship between the 
two temporalities in such terms: ‘The category of the new, as the abstract 
negation of the category of the permanent, converges with it: its invariance is 
its weakness’.54  The new is always at risk of becoming the ever-same, and 
                                                             
51 See Stewart Martin, ‘The absolute artwork meets the absolute commodity’, Radical 
Philosophy, 146. November/December (2007), 15-25 (pp. 18, 24-25, n.18).   
52 Martin, 24 n.18. 
53 See Hohendahl, Fleeting, p. 61.  On the artwork being ‘under threat’, see also AT, 
‘Paralipomena’, p. 308/456. 
54 AT, ‘Paralipomena’, p. 271/404 (trans. modified).  This conception of the 
qualitatively new (as ‘a movement that does not play itself out in mere identity, mere 
reproduction of what has always been’) appears as early as the foundational 1932 
lecture ‘The Idea of Natural History’. See Theodor W. Adorno, ‘The Idea of Natural-
History’, trans. by Robert Hullot-Kentor, in Robert Hullot-Kentor, Things beyond 
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must remain in suspension between identity and non-identity so as not to 
lapse into mere novelty.55  While the new cannot be thought without the 
temporality of industrial commodity production, the latter’s repetition 
‘contain[s] a principle antithetical to the new.  This exerts itself as a force in 
the antinomy of the aesthetically new’.56  The new ‘dreams’ of being liberated 
from such temporality, writes Adorno in Minima Moralia, yet ‘its concept 
remains attached to that sickness’.57  Yet the risk of catastrophe at the same 
time signals a utopian promise.  This is why it is crucial for Adorno that the 
new remain unfulfilled and temporally incomplete: ‘The new is the longing for 
the new, not itself; it is from this that everything new suffers’.58  Therefore, it 
is within this spatio-temporal point of encounter between the new and ever-
same that Adorno’s dialectical relationship of utopia and catastrophe unfolds.  
 To retrace our steps so far, in this section I have examined how Adorno’s 
crucial epistemological category of the essay-form rests on a particular notion 
of historical time indebted to a phenomenological conception of time-as-
experience and a humanist Marxist critique of quantitative time. Following 
Stewart Martin’s analysis of the relationship between artwork and 
commodity, and correcting common assertions that view the new as identical 
with aesthetic modernism and circumvent its dialectical relationship with the 
culture industry, I have sought to demonstrate that the new is best understood 
in its dialectical encounter with the ever-same – an encounter that signals the 
possibility of both utopia and catastrophe.  If the principle of the essay-form 
lies neither within chronos nor kairós but in the encounter between the two, 
as has been argued here, then what happens when such principle is deployed 
                                                             
Resemblance: Collected Essays on Theodor W. Adorno (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2006), pp. 252-269 (p. 253).  Cf. ‘Idee der Naturgeschichte’, AGS 1, pp. 345-365. 
55 AT, ‘Situation’, p. 21/36; p. 23/41.  Cf. MM, ‘Late extra’, p. 237. 
56 AT, ‘Paralipomena’, pp. 272/405.  
57 MM, ‘Late extra’, p. 235.  See also AT, ‘Paralipomena’, pp. 270-272/402-405. 
58 AT, ‘Situation’, p. 32/55 (trans. modified).   
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in the context of Roberts’ post-Adornian theory of a suspensive avant-garde?  
We can now turn our attention to answering this very question.   
 
3.3 Exceptionally New? The Suspensive Avant-Garde’s Adornian 
(In)fidelities   
 
John Roberts’ theorisation of the idea of the avant-garde after modernism – or 
of ‘an avant-garde after avant-gardism’, as he himself calls it – is highly 
germane to our present investigation of repetition in historical time.59 Roberts 
has described his broader intellectual project as a ‘negative dialectical and 
anti-poststructuralist research programme’60 and a ‘dialectical art theory 
informed by a Hegelian-Marxist model’,61 and his theorisation of the avant-
garde can certainly be situated along these axes.  Despite his critique of the 
alleged pessimism articulated in Theory of the Avant-Garde, Roberts’ 
theoretical standpoint is in fact broadly aligned with Bürger’s overall 
intellectual aims.  Both are guided by a Hegelian-Marxist conception of history, 
and both are at pains to rescue Adorno’s autonomy from a perceived apolitical 
formalism.62  With reference to their conception of the avant-garde’s 
historicity, too, there are notable convergences (even if the differences in the 
deployed terminology can somewhat mask such affinity).  Both Roberts and 
Bürger distinguish between an ‘authentic’ and a ‘false’ sublation of art into life, 
with the latter being represented (largely, though not consistently in the case 
of Roberts) by the neo-avant-garde, and both concede that, even though the 
historical avant-garde failed in its aims, traces of these aims manifest 
                                                             
59 AN, 293 (italics original).  
60 LS, 382. 
61 AN, 303.  
62 As we have seen in Chapter 2, Bürger attempts to modify Adorno through turning 
to a more empirical, sociological model of art and literature, whilst Roberts, as is 
discussed below, combines Adorno’s aesthetic theory with elements from Soviet 
Productivism.  
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themselves in later art.63        
 Where Roberts and Bürger differ is in their prior assumptions about the 
avant-garde’s continuing radical function. As we have seen in Chapter 2, 
Bürger’s theorisation of the avant-garde is posited in such a manner so as to 
affirm the category of Institution Kunst, and any claims related to the avant-
garde’s contemporary historical relevance are inflected by this priority.  In the 
case of Roberts, the primary intellectual and political starting point is 
precisely the affirmation of the avant-garde’s contemporary relevance.64  It is 
upon this categorical belief in the avant-garde’s continuing radical function 
that Roberts’ further claims and propositions rest.  Responding to Bürger’s 
claim that the historical avant-garde failed in its aim to re-integrate art into 
life praxis, Roberts constructs a new theory of the avant-garde, basing his 
theory on this very failure.  He introduces a distinction between a historicist 
and a trans-historical conception of the avant-garde, vehemently maintaining 
that ‘the political and social defeat of the originary avant-garde is not the same 
as the defeat of the category of the avant-garde’.65  This distinction between 
the avant-garde as the periodising category of the ‘historical avant-gardes’ and 
a trans-historical category of the avant-garde as notion also guides the main 
premise in my own enquiry.  However, as I argue below, the historicity at work 
in Roberts’ theorisation renders this distinction untenable. In what follows, I 
assess Roberts’ indebtedness to Aesthetic Theory while also identifying his 
textual, and by extension chronopolitical, infidelities to Adorno’s 
epistemology of time.     
Roberts’ dialectical art theory resonates with Adorno’s thought on 
several levels.  Remaining in close and faithful proximity to Adorno’s classic 
                                                             
63 Cf. ThoA/ThdA, p. 59/80 and AN, 292-293, 299-300.   
64 Apart from Bürger, Roberts also positions himself against popular narratives of the 
avant-garde’s co-optation such as those of Suzi Gablik.  See Suzi Gablik, Has 
Modernism Failed? (London: Thames & Hudson, 1984), pp. 65-82.     
65 Roberts, LS, 378 (emphasis original); see also RTA, pp. ix-x, 14-15, 103-104; RP, 
718; AN, 300; PC, 532-533.  
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conception of aesthetic autonomy, Roberts is careful to emphasise that such 
autonomy remains bound to its heteronomous other: it is variously described 
as a ‘socialised autonomy’, an ‘autonomy-as-negation’, and an ‘autonomy-as-
the-critique-of-autonomy’.66  It is on such clearly discernible Adornian 
grounds that Roberts’ attack on relational aesthetics, for instance, is played 
out.  Whereas for Roberts relational aesthetics subsumes artistic practices 
under social concerns and thus instrumentalises them, the category of the 
avant-garde that he instead advocates remains delicately ‘suspended’ in the 
space between aesthetic autonomy and social praxis.67  Revolutionary Time 
and the Avant-Garde devotes a long discussion to Adorno’s relevance for a 
theory of contemporary art and explicitly calls for an Adornian method that 
can ‘be brought to bear on Adorno’s categories’.68  Correspondingly, his 
conception of avant-garde historicity has distinct Adornian echoes.  According 
to Roberts’ proposition, the avant-garde’s original aims failed to be realised 
and it is precisely because of this past failure that the relevance of the avant-
garde (as ‘category’) persists.69  Although the allusion is not made by Roberts 
himself, one need only think of the famous opening sentence of Negative 
Dialectics – ‘philosophy, which once seemed outmoded, lives on because the 
moment of its realisation was missed’ – to discern the Adornian logic 
underpinning the suspensive avant-garde.70      
Equally formative for the development of a theory of the suspensive 
avant-garde has been Roberts’ deep-seated fidelity to the political imaginary 
of the October Revolution.  It is therefore telling that when referring to a 
‘historical avant-garde’ Roberts has in mind only a small fraction of what art 
historians usually associate with the term, his implicit typology of what 
constitutes ‘avant-garde’ being in this respect even narrower than Bürger’s.  
                                                             
66 See RTA, chapter 2, pp. 92-122; and pp. 33-37, 54-57, 71.    
67 See RTA, pp. 35, 47-50, 73, 80-83, 91.  
68 RTA, p. 99. 
69 See RTA, pp. 14-21, 55-57, 90-91, 197. 
70 ND, p. 3/13 (trans. modified). 
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(Whereas Bürger’s avant-garde typology includes, as we have seen, Dada, 
early Surrealism, Constructivism, and with further qualifications, 
Expressionism, Futurism and Cubism,71 Roberts posits a canon that is 
concerned only with post-revolutionary Russian movements and any Soviet 
affiliations these may have had in Weimar Germany.72)  It is from this highly 
selective canon that Roberts draws his distinction between the avant-garde 
understood as a failed historical phenomenon and the avant-garde as a radical 
category that remains alive in the present.  Thus, looking to a Soviet 
Productivist model of art practice where there is no distinction between artist 
and technician or between artist and engineer, Roberts proclaims that the 
avant-garde today ought to be conceived as an ‘open-ended research 
programme’.73  Here, however, Roberts’ intellectual project becomes 
distinctly ‘post-Adornian’, disrupting the notion of autonomy that was 
elsewhere so fiercely endorsed, and suggesting a theoretical category that can 
only be seen as deeply incompatible with Adorno’s foundational 
programmatic statement that introduced the idea of philosophy as founded 
not on research, but on interpretation.74     
Roberts’ Productivist adaptation of Adornian aesthetics is further 
complicated by the presence of another kind of infidelity.  This form of 
infidelity is best understood in the context of language and translation theory: 
in other words, in a sense that does not denote allegiance or loyalty, but 
                                                             
71 See ThdA/ThoA, pp. 44-45/109, n. 4. 
72 See, for instance, PC, 528, 538; SA, 718, 727-729.   
73 RTA, p. 105. 
74 Roberts insists that such a research programme is ‘open-ended’ and untainted by 
the technocratic demands of the creative industries, yet the very fact that the 
category of art falls under the more important category of the research programme 
constitutes a significant departure from Adorno’s idealist, in this regard, aesthetics, 
which is founded upon maintaining art’s philosophical import.  See ‘Actuality of 
Philosophy’, p. 31.          
 
[141] 
textual (or translational) deviation from the original.75  While Roberts’ 
intellectual debt to Adorno is incontestable, his presentation of Adorno’s own 
ideas, especially with regard to the avant-garde, is far from dependable.  Such 
textual infidelities perhaps owe something to the confusion surrounding 
Adorno’s relationship to the avant-garde, as has been discussed above; and 
Adorno’s elusive references and ambiguous statements have certainly not 
helped.  In the section of Aesthetic Theory entitled Die Ismen, for instance, the 
‘isms’ are understood in the art-historiographical sense of ‘avant-garde 
movements’ but Adorno also reserves the then-still-current journalistic sense 
of ‘avant-garde’ denoting ‘advanced’ or ‘vanguard’ to describe any kind of  art 
that may have been, rightly or wrongly, considered pioneering.76 Often the 
two senses converge, especially when describing ‘contemporary avant-garde 
art’, which like ‘new, new music’ is regarded by Adorno with suspicion.77  
Bürger’s theory has perhaps also contributed to this confusion, since Bürger 
adopts key Adornian categories such as the new and the non-organic artwork 
(which Adorno would have deployed with reference to Samuel Beckett or 
Arnold Schoenberg) and then applies them to Dada and Surrealist works 
(which would not have been selected to exemplify these categories by Adorno 
himself).78  Moreover, as Richard Wolin has aptly noted, Adorno’s own view 
                                                             
75 See Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses (London 
& New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 213.  See also Barbara Johnson, ‘Taking Fidelity 
Philosophically’, in Difference in Translation, edited with an introduction by Joseph F. 
Graham (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 142-48.  
76 Cf. AT, ‘Situation’, pp. 24-25/43-44.  For examples of the latter instance see AT, 
‘Toward a Theory of the Artwork’, p. 183/273; ‘Paralipomena’, p. 287/426.  
77 See AT, ‘Situation’, p. 22/40; ‘Music and New Music’, in Quasi una fantasia, pp. 249-
268.   
78 See ThoA, pp. 73-82; ThdA, pp. 98-111.  Cf. AT, ‘Situation’, pp. 29-30/51-52; ‘Art 
Beauty’, p. 90/139.   
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on Surrealism remained deeply ambivalent.79 When compared to Benjamin’s 
favourable assessment and sometimes direct influence, Adorno’s position 
finds him closer to Georg Lukács’s assessment that deemed Surrealist works 
to be overly subjectivist.80  Yet in Aesthetic Theory, although avant-garde 
movements generally receive similar treatment, at the same time and often in 
the very same passage, Adorno will write in favour of the ‘isms’, specifically 
defending their ideology in light of these artists’ victimisation and persecution 
                                                             
79 See Richard Wolin, ‘Benjamin, Adorno, Surrealism’, in Semblance, pp. 106-119.  Cf. 
Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Looking Back on Surrealism’ (1956), in Notes to Literature. 
Volume 1, ed. by Rolf Tiedemann; trans. by Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 86-90.  See also the passing, rather cryptic 
comment in an early essay, where Kurt Weill’s musical collaborations with Brecht are 
described as ‘surrealistic’ and as part of a ‘hybrid’ type of music that remains clearly 
distinct from the ‘modern’ music of Schoenberg.  ‘On the Social Situation of Music’ 
(1932), Essays on Music: Theodor W. Adorno, ed. by Richard Leppert; trans. by Susan 
H. Gillespie (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 391-436 (pp. 396-
97).    
80 Adorno’s relationship to Surrealism is most often discussed with reference to his 
relationship to Benjamin.  Yet a different dimension to Adorno’s relationship with 
Surrealism could be opened up through an examination of his relationship with the 
graduate student Elizabeth Lenk, whose dissertation on the lyric poetry of André 
Breton also provided a frame of reference for Bürger’s analysis.  See ThoA/ThdA, pp. 
53, 113-114/72, 75; Elizabeth Lenk, Der Springende Narziss. André Bretons poetischer 
Materialismus (München: Rogner & Bernhard, 1971). Cf. Elizabeth Lenk, hg. Theodor 
W. Adorno und Elisabeth Lenk: Briefweschsel 1962-1969 (München: edition text + 
Kritik, 2001), for instance, letters 4 and 5, pp. 27-29; recently translated as The 
Challenge of Surrealism: The Correspondence of Theodor W. Adorno and Elisabeth 
Lenk, ed. and trans. by Susan H. Gillespie (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2015).    
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by the Soviet and Nazi regimes.81  These complications notwithstanding, 
Roberts’ presentation of the avant-garde in Aesthetic Theory can be seen as a 
typical case of textual infidelity.  Having sustained a long and extensive 
intellectual engagement with the work of Adorno, Roberts habitually projects 
his own claims and propositions onto Adorno’s voice and intentions, thus 
lapsing into a form of ventriloquism.82 There are many instances of such 
ventriloquism, concerning discussions of autonomy and the institution of art, 
and Bürger’s critique of Adorno’s aesthetics.83  For the purposes of our 
enquiry, however, we can focus on one example that has direct bearing on the 
temporality of the new.  Since this act of ventriloquism has in part to do with 
Roberts’ tendency to over-generalise and paraphrase without offering any 
references or citations, it is necessary to cite it here at length: 
   
In Aesthetic Theory (1970), Adorno recognises the historical defeat of the 
Soviet and Weimar avant-gardes and the present impossibility of art’s critical 
sublation into life.  But, rather than sacrificing the negativity of the avant-
garde to some untroubled notion of ‘political art’ or conservative restitution 
of an older modernism, he rearticulates the question of the avant-garde on the 
terrain of art’s autonomy. […] Autonomy and the avant-garde, then, are the 
codeterminate names given to the production of the ‘new’ as the condition of 
art’s necessary emergence from heteronomy.  On this basis, I would argue, 
Adorno introduces into the debate on the avant-garde a distinction between 
the avant-garde as Event and the avant-garde as the temporal, global 
experience of modernity.  Rather than treating the avant-garde as the failed 
repetition of an original lost moment, he sees the postwar avant-garde as 
aesthetically and critically equivalent to the early avant-gardes.84 
                                                             
81 AT, ‘On the Categories of the Ugly, the Beautiful, and Technique’, pp. 55-56/90-92; 
‘Art Beauty’, pp. 93-94/145-146; ‘Society’, pp. 229, 256-257/343, 380-382; 
‘Paralipomena’, p. 270/402.  
82 Roberts’ tendency to ventriloquise has also been noted by some reviewers of his 
earlier work.  See Steve Edwards, ‘A Duchamp for the Left?’, Radical Philosophy, 149. 
May/June (2008), 56-58 (p. 58). 
83 See, respectively, RTA, pp. 98; 94-95.   
84 LS, 378-79 (emphasis original). 
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Even though Roberts makes no specific references to any parts of Aesthetic 
Theory, it is evident from the above passage that he uses Adorno’s theory so 
as to speak through it.  As one can fairly easily establish, nowhere in Aesthetic 
Theory does Adorno use the terms ‘historical avant-garde’ and ‘neo-avant-
garde’, let alone write in defence of the latter.  One may infer Adorno’s 
awareness that there were now two waves of avant-gardism (the essay ‘The 
Ageing of New Music’ confirms this), but when he makes a passing remark on 
‘Neo-Dadaism’, for instance, this is an ironic dismissal and certainly not its 
defence against the avant-garde’s failure.85  Similarly, the two kinds of 
temporality that Roberts suggests can be found in Adorno’s text are an 
expression of his own theorisation of the suspensive avant-garde.  Thus, as we 
will see below, this particular case of textual infidelity reveals an underlying 
manifestation of historical infidelity. 
 This ventriloquised distinction between two kinds of historical time can be 
neatly captured through the distinction between measured and experienced 
time.  Loosely basing his conception of historicism on the familiar Benjaminian 
critique of progress that seeks to replace the seriality of empty, homogeneous 
time with a time of radical rupture, Roberts intends to ‘lift the avant-garde out 
from its conventional art historical categories’.86  Instead of seeing the avant-
garde as a series of art movements – or as events on a string of rosary beads, 
to revisit Benjamin’s memorable image – Roberts proposes the avant-garde as 
a ‘spatial concept’87 and rejects those ‘vulgarly historicist’ positions that view 
the avant-garde as politically irrelevant.88  Here, Roberts’ account 
problematically reduces historicism to a form of defeatism, where, crudely 
put, those who consider the avant-garde dead are ‘historicists’, and those who 
                                                             
85 See AT, ‘Coherence and Meaning’, p. 153/230.  Cf. ‘The Ageing of New Music’ (1955), 
in Essays on Music: Theodor W. Adorno, pp. 181-202.  
86 RTA, p. 16. 
87 AN, 293; cf. RTA, pp. 14-15.  
88 See SA, 717. 
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do not are ‘anti-historicists’.89 Assuming the position of an ‘anti-historicist’ 
(against Bürger’s alleged historicism), therefore, Roberts proposes the avant-
garde as ‘the place where the co-temporality of historical and revolutionary 
time is restored’.90  This place is categorically situated against the avant-garde 
understood as an ‘empirical historical sequence’, its historicity being 
reclaimed in the service of revolutionary time.91  The suspensive avant-garde 
is thus proposed as a moment of radical rupture that breaks away from the 
ever-same linearity of capital-time, and thus as a moment of kairós.92  
 Roberts’ foregrounding of the ruptural dimensions of avant-garde 
temporality is intensified by his adoption of Alain Badiou’s notion of ‘the 
Event’.93  In Revolutionary Time and the Avant-Garde, Badiou is extensively 
critiqued for aestheticising modernism and equating the avant-garde with a 
non-dialectical (read, non-Adornian) notion of autonomy.94  Yet in an earlier 
                                                             
89 See RTA, pp. 17-21. 
90 RTA, p. 49. 
91 RTA, p. 176. 
92 See, RTA, pp. 48-49, 132; AN, 291, 303; LS, 379, 381, 383-384.  
93 The summary of Badiou’s thought that follows relies on my reading of: Alain 
Badiou, Being and Event, trans. by Oliver Feltham (London: Continuum, [1988] 2005), 
pp. 232-61; Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, trans. by Peter Hallward 
(London: Verso, [1993] 2001). My understanding has been greatly aided by the 
following introductions and interpretations: Marian Eide, ‘Otherness and Singularity: 
Ethical Modernism’, in A Handbook of Modernism Studies, ed. by Jean-Michel Rabaté 
(Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), pp. 313-26 (pp. 321-24); Andrew Gibson, 
Intermittency: The Concept of Historical Reason in Recent French Philosophy 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), chapter 2, pp. 24-67; Gary Gutting, 
Thinking the Impossible: French Philosophy since 1960 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), chapter 9, pp. 165-83; Peter Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), chapter 5, pp. 107-51.  
94 See RTA, pp. 71, 73-91; AN, 302; John Roberts, ‘On the limits of negation in Badiou's 
theory of art’, Journal of Visual Arts Practice, 7.3 (2008), 271–82.  An examination of 
Badiou’s turn to theorising the avant-garde is beyond the scope of my analysis; for a 
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essay whose main ideas also reappear in a slightly modified form in Roberts’ 
monograph, one can identify allusions to the Badiouian Event, specifically 
with reference to the idea of fidelity.95  We have seen in Chapter 1 that 
Benjaminian Jetztzeit is often likened to the Badiouian Event, both notions 
generally thought to be expressions of a radical rupture of historical time.  
Whereas Benjaminian Jetztzeit arguably negotiates a liminal position between 
quotidian and exceptional time, in the case of the Badiouian Event, however, 
one is resolutely located in the realm of exception.  Such exception is marked 
retroactively through the notion of fidelity: after the Event’s occurrence, one 
is propelled to show fidelity to what has occurred, for it is no longer possible 
to act, and to continue acting, as if nothing had happened.96  In Roberts’ 
deployment of the notion of fidelity, the Event emerges in the form of the 
‘historical avant-garde’, which revolves around the political imaginary of the 
October Revolution.  Roberts urges his readers ‘to hold onto the truth of the 
failure of the original avant-garde’ in an act of fidelity towards the ‘original’ 
avant-garde’s failure and, by extension, the failure of the October Revolution 
to bring about communism.97  Thus, for Roberts, the suspensive avant-garde 
is constituted by its fidelity to the ‘failed Event’ of the historical avant-garde, 
and it is this fidelity that produces its revolutionary temporality.    
Through mobilising the Badiouian Event and a kairotic conception of 
Jetztzeit, Roberts’ new may appear to be even more ruptural than its Adornian 
counterpart.  Yet the suspensive avant-garde’s newness occupies a less 
exceptional space than his author might have intended.  We have seen that 
                                                             
brief discussion, see Jan Voelker, ‘Reversing and Affirming the Avant-gardes: A New 
Paradigm for Politics’, in Badiou and the Political Condition, ed. by Marios 
Constantinou (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), pp. 147-163.  Cf. Alain 
Badiou, ‘Avant-gardes’, in The Century, trans. by Alberto Toscano (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2007), pp. 131-47.     
95 See LS, 379, 381, 383-84; RTA, pp. 90-91, 132, 176, 185. 
96 See Badiou, Ethics, pp. 40-44.   
97 LS, 384. 
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Roberts opposes historicist accounts of the avant-garde, preferring instead to 
view the avant-garde as a space of temporal possibility.  Nonetheless, his 
overall intellectual framework follows a loose chronological conception of art 
movements moving through the decades of the twentieth century – the ‘30s, 
the ‘60s, the ‘90s – that relies heavily upon the historicist accounts he rejects.98  
Such chronology is romantically attached to lists of calendrical years that 
denote key turning points in history – ‘1848, 1871, 1917, 1956, 1968, 1974, 
1989’ – in a manner that might well be closer to the socialist-democratic 
mechanistic belief in progress attacked by Benjamin, than to the moment of 
Jetztzeit.99  The series of dates that are listed here are, of course, in themselves 
ruptural and could be read as temporal indexes of revolutionary rupture. Yet 
the extent to which Roberts’ own historicism is guided by a chronological 
imperative means also that the suspensive avant-garde is inserted into a 
linear, chronological narrative that tells the story of the ‘historical avant-
garde’, the ‘neo-avant-garde’ – and now ‘third’ avant-garde – in a chain of 
periodising categories.     
Roberts’ textual infidelity to Adorno is crucially implicated in this 
periodisation of rupture. Whereas Roberts is careful to consider the artwork’s 
dialectical relation to the commodity-form, the centrality of the ever-same in 
negatively constituting the new is problematically elided.  As we have 
discussed in Part II, while the Adorno-Benjaminian new denotes a historicity 
of rupture, it is never external to the threat of the ever-same.  Thus, when such 
temporal relationship is taken to the discussion of continuity and rupture in 
history, the chronopolitics guiding Roberts’ suspensive avant-garde is 
revealed as non-evental, indeed operating ‘as if nothing had happened’.  Unlike 
Hal Foster’s reworking of Freudian belatedness that Roberts partly espouses 
because of its ‘anti-historicism’, in the suspensive avant-garde, there is no 
traumatic event to be re-enacted and re-told.  Unlike Adorno’s or Benjamin’s 
                                                             
98 As an indication see RTA, pp. 20-28, 37-39, 167.  
99 See LS, 371. 
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moment of decision which expresses a liminal, hazardous position, in the 
suspensive avant-garde, defeat does not carry with it the possibility and threat 
of absolute catastrophe.  The historical avant-garde’s failure is seen merely as 
a relative blow – there is no encounter with the threat of fascism, with the 
singularity of Auschwitz, with the finitude of death.  We are then left only to 
speculate that, should the suspensive avant-garde itself now fail, things will 
simply continue ‘as usual’.  
In light of this analysis, we can now return to the opening questions 
prompted by Benjamin’s reading of Kafka.  Does the suspensive avant-garde 
constitute an avant-garde ‘anew’ or is it nothing but a re-enactment of the 
hellish repetition of the ‘ever-new, ever-same’?  The suspensive avant-garde 
is certainly not a ‘faithful copy’ of the historical avant-garde, nor is Roberts’ 
post-Adornian theory faithful to Adorno’s writing.  As we have seen, the 
suspensive avant-garde is constituted by a relationship of fidelity towards the 
failed aims of the historical avant-garde. In opposition to Bürger’s claim that 
the historical avant-garde has been defeated and therefore that the avant-
garde is irrelevant as a whole, Roberts introduces a distinction between the 
avant-garde as a sequence of art movements and the avant-garde as the space 
of an open-ended research programme, so as to affirm the avant-garde’s 
relevance for the present.  Yet, as my analysis suggests, since Roberts’ 
periodising logic remains wedded to a historicist chronology, the suspensive 
avant-garde becomes quickly incorporated into the very seriality that it 
sought to disrupt.  This periodisation of the avant-garde as rupture is striking 
when the suspensive avant-garde is examined in relation to Adorno’s Aesthetic 
Theory.  As I demonstrate, Roberts crucially misreads the role that the avant-
garde plays in Aesthetic Theory, and deploys Adorno’s text as a vessel through 
which to express his own intentions.  Roberts carefully attends to the function 
of aesthetic autonomy as a relational category.  Yet the underlying temporality 
that structures the dialectical relationship between artwork and commodity-
form escapes his attention.  Whereas Adorno’s notion of the new is 
dialectically constituted by its heteronomous other, the ever-same, Roberts’ 
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new instead foregrounds its kairotic aspects, thus bringing the notion closer 
to the readings of Jetztzeit as kairós and to the exceptional chronopolitics of 
the Badiouian Event.  Paradoxically, therefore – or, rather, consistent with the 
paradoxical logic that guides Adorno’s dialectics – the further the notion of the 
new is pulled towards kairós by Roberts, the more distant its potential for 
historical rupture becomes. To those who, like Roberts, are invested in the 
category of the avant-garde as a locus of revolutionary politics, this conclusion 
may itself seem like an expression of defeat.  Yet, if the idea of the avant-garde 
after modernism is still bound by the temporal contradictions of the modern, 
then it is imperative that the unwelcome chronopolitics revealed through 
Roberts’ theory is galvanised so as to prompt a deeper questioning of the 
avant-garde’s participation in the hellish newness-in-repetition of modernity.  
Chapter 4 
 
Strangers to Our Times: Belatedness, Modernisation and the 
Auto-Allochronism of the Neoavanguardia 
 
Strangely, the stranger inhabits us. 1  
– Julia Kristeva 
    
Having examined afterness through the theorisations of Peter Bürger and John 
Roberts, the last iteration of ‘the new after the new’ takes us to a point in time 
before Roberts’ proposition of a third, suspensive avant-garde and before 
Bürger’s much-disputed affirmation of the historical avant-gardes.  The time 
of the neo-avant-garde – a time when the terms ‘neo-avant-garde’ and 
‘contemporary avant-garde’ meant one and the same thing, and the ‘neo’ had 
yet to become a ‘second historical’ – is examined in this chapter, not through 
the now-canonised essays of Hal Foster and Benjamin Buchloh, but instead 
from ‘the periphery’ of the Neoavanguardia.       
 The literary, artistic and critical output of the Neoavanguardia is itself far 
from unknown. Within a national Italian context, it represents a pivotal 
moment in the historiography of twentieth-century Italian culture. 
Nevertheless, Neoavanguardia remains marginal in avant-garde studies and 
its theoretical contributions tend to fall outside the remit of currently-
circulating genealogies of ‘avant-garde theory’.  Exceptions to this rule are 
offered by Matei Calinescu’s Five Faces of Modernity and the encyclopaedic 
volume Les avant-gardes littéraires au XXe siècle (both of which date from the 
1980s and focus on summarising the debates), while more recent Anglophone 
scholarly reception, though vibrant, is still firmly situated in the disciplinary 
field of Italian studies.2  My own aim is to place the critical discourses of the 
                                                             
1 Julia Kristeva, Étrangers á nous-mêmes (Paris: Fayard, 1988), p. 9.  
2 This is primarily because many of the texts are yet to be translated into English.  Cf. 
Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity, pp. 122-123, 128-129, 144; and Alessandra 
Briganti, ‘Italien’, trans. by Françoise Carpinelli, in Les avant-gardes littéraires au XXe 
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Neoavanguardia in a new historical constellation but also, just as importantly, 
to investigate the ways in which this avant-garde movement has itself been 
historicised as avant-garde.  Although this study greatly relies on the wealth 
of Italian secondary sources on the Neoavanguardia (as well as on the small 
number of Anglophone sources available), my aim has been to expose the 
historical temporalities underpinning such historiographies.  To this end, I 
partly adopt an empirico-historical approach, so as to situate the discourses 
within a broader intellectual-historical context, and partly adapt Johannes 
Fabian’s notion of ‘allochronism’, so as to articulate a critique of 
modernisation theory discourses (especially in their Italian ‘variant’).  My 
analysis also draws on recent Italian studies scholarship that has sought to 
problematise the often-crude distinction between ‘political realism’ and 
‘apolitical postmodernism’, or between ‘impegno’ [commitment] and ‘riflusso’ 
[retreat].3 Although the focus of this scholarship has been on literary and 
cultural production during the period of the so-called ‘political retreat’ of the 
1980s, and therefore does not examine the Neoavanguardia, its 
problematisation of the realism/ postmodernism dichotomy with reference to 
the question of commitment is, as I show below, also highly pertinent to the 
period of the early 1960s.       
                                                             
Siècle: Vol. I: Histoire, ed. by Jean Weisberger (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1984), pp. 
24-32 (pp. 28-30).  I will be engaging with the latter body of scholarship at length 
below.    
3 See the essays collected in Pierpaolo Antonello and Florian Mussgnug, eds., 
Postmodern Impegno: Ethics and Commitment in Contemporary Italian Culture 
(Oxford: Peter Lang, 2009); and Jennifer Burns, Fragments of Impegno: 
Interpretations of Commitment in Contemporary Italian Literature, 1980-2000 (Leeds: 
Northern University Press, 2001), especially p. 13.    
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The issue of impegno was at the centre of Neoavanguardia debates.4 It was 
often raised as a direct, immediate question: should today’s avant-garde be 
impegnato, and, if so, how exactly?  Is it an oxymoron to speak of a ‘committed 
neo-avant-garde’, particularly when commitment has hitherto been 
associated with realism?  While I elaborate on how selected figures in the 
group responded to such questions, I also attempt to raise the issue to another, 
meta-historical, level.  This means investigating not just the relationship 
between the avant-garde as ‘form’ and commitment (or lack thereof) as 
‘political intent’, but also the relationship between political intent and 
historical periodisation. Here, I argue, Neoavanguardia, and the name ‘avant-
garde’ more generally, become placeholders for a historical narrative of 
‘deprovincialising’ Italian culture, where such ‘deprovincialising’ crucially 
entails a movement from a ‘provincial’, ‘backward’ realism to an ‘international’ 
‘up-to-date’ postmodernism. While the avant-garde is historically posited as a 
moment of transition between realist commitment and postmodern diversity, 
these historiographical accounts also exhibit what I describe as an ‘auto-
allochronism’, namely, a temporal ‘self-othering’.  It is this auto-allochronism, 
I suggest, that produces a temporal distance, and self-differentiation, between 
the pronounced specificity of the calls of the Neoavanguardia for an avant-
garde of the ‘here and now’ and the sense of ‘backwardness’ or ‘belatedness’ 
expressed with reference to an international, cosmopolitan ‘modernism’.  
 This chapter is organised in two parts.  In the first part I introduce the 
various intellectual positions adopted within the Neoavanguardia, situating 
these in the context of the Italian New Left, and the recurring debates on 
impegno both inside and outside the group.  While focussing on a few 
examples of selected figures’ differing positions on the question of historicism, 
and of ‘history with a capital H’, I also sketch their relationship to figures such 
as Adorno and Benjamin.  In the second part, I turn to the historiography of 
                                                             
4 See, for instance, the special issue ‘Avanguardia e impegno’, Il Verri, 10. October 
(1963), 42-84.  See also Renato Barilli, ‘Quale impegno?’, Il Verri, 8. June (1963), 17-
36.       
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the Neoavanguardia, paying particular attention to the ways in which the neo-
avant-garde has been related to the periodising categories of modernism and 
postmodernism.  Here I read the repeated calls for a ‘de-provincialisation’ of 
Italian culture in a broader context of modernisation theory discourses 
(shared across the pro-communist/anti-communist political spectrum in the 
Neoavanguardia and reflected in the continuing purchase of a so-called ‘myth 
of backward Italy’).  As I elaborate, these calls for deprovincialization, 
expressed in an undialectical polarisation between sviluppo [development] 
and arretratezza [backwardness], are not unique to the debates of the 
neoavanguardisti.  Nevertheless, my proposition is that when this discursive 
tendency is formulated in relation to the term and periodising category ‘avant-
garde’, a distinct dimension of the chronopolitics of ‘the new after the new’ is 
revealed, especially when considered alongside other theorisations of the 
avant-garde where the geopolitical questions of modernisation do not seem 
as prevalent, as was the case with Bürger and Roberts.  In the seemingly-
neutral looking-ahead-towards, and looking-forward-to an innovative, open 
culture offered by the modernising promise of the postmodern, therefore, we 
find traces of a temporal self-othering, where the particularity of the 
Neoavanguardia is at once advocated and denied.  
 
4.1  ‘No Manifesto and No Intention to Write One’: 
Neoavanguardia, impegno and the Italian New Left      
   
 
The name Neoavanguardia refers to a loose circle of writers, poets and 
intellectuals who played a key role in restoring the status of avant-gardism in 
post-war Italian literary culture.5  Active in several northern Italian cities from 
                                                             
5 For this general introduction to the Neoavanguardia, I have drawn from a number 
of sources, including: Fabio Gambaro, Invito a conoscere la neoavanguardia (Milano: 
Mursia, 1993); Giorgio Luti and Caterina Verbaro, Dal neorealismo alla 
neoavanguardia: Il dibattito letterario in Italia negli anni della modernizzazione, 1945-
1969 (Firenze: Casa Editrice Le Lettere, 1995); Renato Barilli, La neoavanguardia 
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the mid-1950s to the late 1960s, the group that would later become 
synonymous with Neoavanguardia initially comprised five poets: Nanni 
Balestrini, Alfredo Giuliani, Elio Pagliarani, Antonio Porta and Edoardo 
Sanguineti. During the late 1950s, the five poets had regular outlets for their 
work through the Milanese literary quarterly Il Verri, whose editor Luciano 
Anceschi also acted as the poets’ mentor and publicist.6  Within the space of a 
few years, and especially after the publication of the poetic anthology I 
Novissimi in 1961, their poetry began to receive attention beyond narrow 
intellectual circles, and the names novissimi, Il Verri and Neoavanguardia 
started to become interchangeable.7        
                                                             
italiana: dalla nascita del ‘Verri’ alla fine del Quindici (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1995); John 
Picchione, The New Avant-Garde in Italy: Theoretical Debate and Poetic Practices 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004); Francesco Muzzioli, Il Gruppo 63: 
istruzioni per la lettura (Roma: Odradek, 2013). I have also consulted the following 
shorter entries: Christopher Wagstaff, ‘The Neo-avantgarde’, in Writers and Society in 
Contemporary Italy, ed. by Michael Caesar and Peter Hainsworth (Leamington Spa: 
Berg, 1984), pp. 35–61; Christopher Wagstaff, ‘Neoavanguardia’, The Oxford 
Companion to Italian Literature, ed. by Peter Hainsworth and David Robey (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 405-6; and Andrea Ciccarelli, ‘Neoavanguardia’, 
in Cassell Dictionary of Italian Literature, ed. by Peter Bondanella and Julia Conaway 
Bondanella (London: Cassell, 1996), pp. 396-97. 
6 Il Verri (Milan; ed. by Luciano Anceschi) was one of many self-published literary 
periodicals that sprang up in Italian urban centres during that period.  Other 
influential ventures run by left-wing writer-intellectuals included Officina (Bologna; 
ed. by Pier Paolo Pasolini and others), Il Menabò (Bologna; ed. by Elio Vittorini and 
Italo Calvino), and Angelus Novus (Venice; ed. by Massimo Cacciari and Cesare De 
Michelis), named after the influential Italian edition of Walter Benjamin’s writings, to 
which I return below. 
7 It is telling that, although the first edition had been possible through a family-owned 
publishing initiative, only four years later, the anthology had its second edition with 
the prestigious publishing house Einaudi.  See Alfredo Giuliani, ed., I Novissimi – 
Poesie per gli anni ’60 (Milano: Rusconi, 1961/ 2nd edn; Torino: Einaudi, 1965).  For 
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The novissimi – the name itself pronouncing the poets’ ‘newness’ or 
‘lateness’ – attracted attention as much for their poetics as for their polemics, 
often drafted in response to other writer-intellectuals who were involved in 
rival literary ventures.8  Translator, poet and essayist Franco Fortini found it 
‘ridiculous’ that these poets thought ‘dynamiting syntax’ was somehow 
revolutionary.9 Equally unconvinced, poet and filmmaker Pier Paolo Pasolini 
found the errors in their experimentations all too perfect: ‘Even though the 
pages of Sanguineti, Balestrini, and the others are tormented by parentheses, 
grammatical cuts, typographical chasms, interruptions, inversions and 
iterations of every kind […], the page never collapses, never wrinkles, never 
opens into internal surfaces […] and therefore never has an ambiguity (unless 
                                                             
the English translation, see I Novissimi – Poetry for the Sixties, ed. and with a new 
preface to the American edition by Alfredo Giuliani; prose and notes translated by 
David Jacobson; poetry translated by Luigi Ballerini et al. (Los Angeles: Sun and Moon 
Press, 1995).  
8 On the polemics between the neoavanguardisti and other writer-intellectuals such 
as Italo Calvino, Pier Paolo Pasolini and Franco Fortini, see Éanna Ó Ceallacháin, 
‘Polemical Performances: Pasolini, Fortini, Sanguineti, and the Literary-Ideological 
Debates of the 1950s’, Modern Language Review, 108.2 (2013), 475–503; Guido 
Bonsaver, ‘Il Menabò, Calvino and the ‘Avanguardie’: Some Observations on the 
Literary Debate of the Sixties’, Italian Studies, 50 (1995), 86-96.  See also the colourful 
interview with the writer Giorgio Bassani in Nello Ajello, ‘Rome: La Dolce 
Avanguardia’, trans. by Gavin Ewart, The London Magazine, August (1964), 65-70.     
9 Franco Fortini, Summer is Not All: Selected Poems, trans. by Paul Lawton (London: 
Carcanet, 1992), p. 11. See also Franco Fortini, ‘Due Avanguardie’ and ‘Avanguardia 
e mediazione’, in Verifica dei poteri. Scritti di critica e di istituzioni letterarie (Milano: 
Il Saggiatore, 1965), pp. 95-108, 109-19; recently translated as A Test of Powers: 
Writings on Criticism and Literary Institutions, trans. by Alberto Toscano (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2016); with thanks to the translator for offering access 
to the manuscript prior to publication.       
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it is enunciated), an uncertainty, an excess, a pause, a mistake’.10  The novissimi 
themselves were not held back by such belittling statements, immersed as 
they were in writing and debating the role of the avant-garde in contemporary 
Italian culture, often in little-disguised acts of self-promotion.11    
 Nevertheless, their activity did pay off, as the core group entered into 
discussions and collaborations with other writers, artists and musicians, and 
in a large gathering in Hotel Zagarella near Palermo in October 1963, the much 
broader church of Gruppo 63 was founded.12  From then on, and until 
terminating its activities in 1967, the group would meet annually and, as 
several of its members were eager to stress, Gruppo 63 was a diverse, open 
                                                             
10 Pier Paolo Pasolini, ‘Fine dell’ avanguardia’ (1966), in Empirismo Eretico (Milano: 
Garxanti, 1972); translated as ‘The End of the Avant-Garde’, Heretical Empiricism, ed. 
by Louise K. Barnett; trans. by Ben Lawton and Louise K. Barnett (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1988), pp. 121-41 (pp. 128-29).   
11 It is worth noting that the ‘self-promoting’ elements of their writing were couched 
in an intellectual discourse that attempted to situate neo-avant-garde poetics 
historically. See, for instance, Edoardo Sanguineti’s essay analysing the poetry of his 
fellow travellers Nanni Balestrini and Antonio Porta as early as 1964. Edoardo 
Sanguineti, ‘Il trattamento del materiale verbale nei testi della nuova avanguardia’, in 
Ideologia e linguaggio (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1965), pp. 91-131 (pp. 113-31), hereafter 
cited ‘Ideologia’. Cf. Fausto Curi, ‘Proposta per una storia delle avanguardie’, Il Verri, 
8. June (1963), 6-15.    
12 Detailed proceedings of their meetings can be found in: Nanni Balestrini and 
Alfredo Giuliani, eds., Gruppo 63: la nuova letteratura, 34 scrittori, Palermo ottobre 
1963 (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1964); Nanni Balestrini, ed., Gruppo 63. Il romanzo 
sperimentale (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1966); Renato Barilli and Angelo Guglielmi, eds., 
Gruppo 63, critica e teoria (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1976); newly edited as, Gruppo 63: 
L’antologia (Torino: Testo e immagine, 2002).  The most recent edition combines the 
two volumes from 1964 and 1974.  Cf. Gruppo 63. L’antologia, a cura di Nanni 
Balestrini, Alfredo Giuliani; Critica e teoria, a cura di Renato Barilli, Angelo Guglielmi 
(Milano: I Grandi Tascabili Bompiani, 2013). All references are to the 2013 edition, 
hereafter cited ‘G63’.   
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formation without an official membership.  Remembering the movement 50 
years later, Angelo Guglielmi would insist that: ‘we were diverse but we had 
the same impatience’.13 Semiotician and novelist Umberto Eco, indisputably 
the group’s most renowned participant, maintained that Gruppo was not a 
‘masonry’ but a ‘village fest’, confiding that he saw the other participants as 
‘people with whom it was not a waste of time to argue’.14  Echoing Eco’s 
sentiment, Edoardo Sanguineti would also refer to the group as an ‘open 
laboratory’: ‘there had been no manifesto and no intention to write one’.15 
 Both the criticism that the Neoavanguardia received from Marxist 
intellectuals, such as Fortini and Pasolini, and the insistence with which the 
Neoavanguardia proclaimed the group’s diversity ought to be seen in the 
broader cultural politics of the Italian New Left.  Since the years of the 
Resistance and Italy’s liberation, and during the immediate post-’45 period, 
discussions of the role of the avant-garde among progressive intellectuals had 
been almost entirely absent.16  Neo-realism, on the other hand, had obtained 
the status of cultural orthodoxy and was also officially supported by the Italian 
Communist Party (PCI), whose core policies were still under the direct control 
of Moscow, and which condemned modernist experimentation as ‘bourgeois’ 
and ‘decadent’.17  After the events of 1956 which saw, as in many other 
                                                             
13 Angelo Guglielmi, ‘Chi eravamo’, Alfa 63 cinquanta’anni doppo, IV.33 (2013), p. 5.   
14 Umberto Eco, ‘Il Gruppo 63, lo sperimentalismo e l’avanguardia’, in Sugli specchi e 
altri saggi (Milano: Bompiani, 1995), pp. 93-104 (p. 94).   
15 See Fabio Gambaro, Colloquio con Edoardo Sanguineti (Milano: Anabasi, 1993), p. 
69.  See also Florian Mussgnug, ‘Between Novissimi and Nuovo Romanzo: Literary 
Genre Categories in the Works of the Gruppo 63’, in From Eugenio Montale to Amelia 
Rosselli: Italian Poetry in the Sixties and Seventies, ed. by John Butcher and Mario 
Moroni (Leicester: Troubador, 2004), pp. 21–40 (pp. 23-24).  
16 On the absence of literary debates on the avant-garde in the ‘40s and ‘50s, see 
Briganti, ‘Italien’, in Les avant-gardes littéraires au XXe Siècle, p. 27.  
17 On the relationship between neo-realism, the PCI and left-leaning intellectuals 
(whether party members or not), see David Ward, ‘Intellectuals, Culture and Power 
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Western countries, a mass exodus from Communist Parties, Marxist 
intellectuals who distanced themselves from the PCI began to re-articulate the 
meaning and parameters of impegno beyond party dogmatism and beyond the 
genre of neo-realism.18 Moreover, the years during which the Neoavanguardia 
emerged were marked by unprecedented socio-economic changes.  The ‘new 
social reality’ constantly referred to in the Neoavanguardia debates – a reality 
to which they sought to provide an adequate representation through avant-
garde means – was nothing like the reality of their forefathers. It would not be 
an exaggeration to observe that the years of the so-called ‘economic miracle’ 
(characterised by unprecedented economic growth, mass migration from the 
agricultural south to the industrial north, and overall improvement in health, 
literacy, and living standards) were experienced as a new historical epoch – 
and for the Marxists amongst the group, as a new phase of capitalism that 
required a new form of poetic and cultural expression.19        
                                                             
in Modern Italy’, in The Cambridge Companion to Modern Italian Culture, ed. by 
Zygmunt Baranski and Rebecca West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), pp. 81-96; Stephen Gundle, Between Hollywood and Moscow: The Italian 
Communists and the Challenge of Mass Culture, 1943-1991 (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2000), pp. 114-18; David Forgacs, Italian Culture in the Industrial 
Era, 1880-1980: Cultural Industries, Politics and the Public (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1990), pp. 5-6.  See also Nello Ajello, Intellettuali e PCI, 1944-1958 
(Bari: Laterza, 1979), pp. 201-233. 
18 This emphasis on openness and diversity is, of course, also related to discourses of 
political liberalisation which, in the context of the Italian New Left’s relationship to 
the PCI, mean also a process of de-Stalinisation. See Attilio Mangano, Origini della 
nuova sinistra. Le riviste degli anni sessanta (Massina-Firenze: Casa Editrice G. D’Anna, 
1979), p. 17.        
19 On the miracolo, see Paul Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and 
Politics, 1943-1980 (London: Penguin Books, 1990), pp. 212-17; Michael Caesar and 
Peter Hainsworth, ‘The Transformation of Post-war Italy’, in Writers and Society in 
Contemporary Italy, ed. by Michael Caesar and Peter Hainsworth (Leamington Spa: 
Berg, 1984), pp. 1-34 (pp. 4-5). 
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The relationship between the PCI and the Neoavanguardia, as well as 
the question of Marxism’s relationship to the avant-garde more broadly, was 
discussed both within and outside the group.  On the occasion of the very first 
issue of the periodical Angelus Novus, a panel discussion on the topic of ‘The 
Avant-Garde and Marxism’ in January 1965 introduced the journal’s aims with 
reference to this very topic and suggested that a historical examination of the 
avant-garde phenomenon (that is, of ‘the classical avant-garde’) would be 
most timely.20  These contributions, which were published in Angelus Novus 
soon after, concerned themselves with the Sartrian and Adornian versions of 
commitment, with debating the relevance of Lukács’s anti-avant-garde 
position, and with the more recent, closer-to-home critiques articulated by 
figures such as Pasolini. Underpinning these debates was the question of 
humanism and of political agency through the writing of literature.  Pasolini’s 
attack on the poetics of Neoavanguardia as a form of experimentation that was 
too-controlled was, as we have seen, revealed through these debates as a 
fundamental questioning of the relationship between semiotic and literary 
language, whereby the distinction between historical and neo-avant-gardes 
(and the latter’s inadequacy) rested precisely on Neoavanguardia’s 
prioritisation of language as semiotic communication (and not as literary 
expression).21       
This explicitly antagonistic relationship between semiotic and literary 
language is also discernible in the different positions adopted within 
Neoavanguardia itself.  For the semiotically-oriented amongst the 
neoavanguardisti, it was imperative that any form of writing that deserved the 
name ‘avant-garde’ would be against impegno and against any form of 
historicism.  Angelo Guglielmi’s position, voiced in the 1963 Palermo meeting 
as well as through the key essay ‘Una sfida senza avversari’ [A challenge 
                                                             
20 Paolo Chiarini, Armando Plebe, Tommaso Chiaretti e Vittorio Saltini, ‘Avanguardia 
e marxismo’, Angelus Novus, 3. Primavera (1965), 1-21.  
21 See Paolo Chiarini, ‘Le due avanguardie’, in ‘Avanguardia e marxismo’, Angelus 
Novus, 3. Primavera (1965), 1-9 (pp. 2-3). 
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without adversaries] published originally in the journal Il Menabò as a retort 
against Italo Calvino, crystallises this tendency.  For Guglielmi, the avant-garde 
must take a non-committed stance and oppose the meta-narrative of historical 
development:  
 
La linea ‘viscerale’ della cultura contemporanea in cui è da riconoscere l’unica 
avanguardia oggi possibile è a-ideologica, disimpegnata, astorica, in una 
parola ‘atemporale’; non contiene messaggi, né produce significati di carattere 
generale. Non conosce regole (o leggi) né come condizione di partenza, né 
come risultati di arrivo. 
   
The ‘visceral’ line of contemporary culture, in which one must recognise the 
only avant-garde possible today, is non-ideological, non-committed, 
ahistorical, in one word, ‘atemporal’; it doesn’t contain messages, nor does it 
produce any general meanings. It knows no rules (or laws) neither as a 
condition to depart from nor as results to be arrived at.22  
 
The rejection of commitment pronounced here is characteristically coupled 
with a rejection of historicism, which is instantly translated into a rejection of 
history qua history, and ultimately, of time.  The avant-garde of today, asserts 
Guglielmi, must be ‘atemporal’.  It is beyond my present aim to analyse 
whether Guglielmi’s own poetic practice was in fact able to embody such an 
‘atemporal’ state. Yet it is important to note how this structuralist, 
semiotically-oriented position, which looked to new information and 
communications theories and which was not afraid to embrace ‘mass media’, 
was adopted by members of the group such as Guglielmi as a means through 
which to reject the particular temporality of a certain ‘PCI-approved’ 
historicism.          
If Guglielmi’s position stands at the most anti-historicist end of the 
Neoavanguardia, in the figure of Edoardo Sanguineti we find a position that is 
                                                             
22 Angelo Guglielmi, ‘Il dibattito in occasione del primo incontro del Gruppo a Palermo 
nel 1963’, G63, pp. 779-91 (pp. 785-86). Cf. Angelo Guglielmi, ‘Avanguardia e 
sperimentalismo’, in G63, pp. 15-24; originally published in Il Verri, 8. June (1963), 
38-46.  
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both firmly modernist and firmly historicist. Not only did Sanguineti consider 
himself a historical materialist, remain in the Communist Party until his death, 
and enter Italian parliamentary politics as an independent PCI member, he 
was also a staunch opponent of realism.23  Sanguineti’s collaborations with 
artist Enrico Baj or composer Luciano Berio could easily fit Greenbergian 
models of ‘formalism’ and, considering Sanguineti occupied that very 
particular position of a ‘pro-modernist Marxist’, comparisons with Adorno 
have been at the centre of the reception of his thought.24  It is certainly 
plausible to see the Sanguinetian position on the avant-garde as Adornian, 
especially since Sanguineti advocated that the avant-garde’s social critique 
should be carried out not at the level of ‘message’ or ‘content’ (pejoratively 
described as contenutismo), but at the level of language.  And Sanguineti’s 
declaration that literature ‘is not at the service or revolution but is revolution 
at the level of words’ [non è al servizio della rivoluzione, ma è la rivoluzione 
sopra il terreno delle parole] is certainly in accord with Adorno’s own position 
on cultural-political praxis.25        
 Nevertheless, it is precisely in their theories of language that Adorno’s and 
Sanguineti’s positions diverge. Whereas ideology critique is at the centre of an 
Adornian conception of autonomy, Sanguineti’s position embraces the 
ideological character of all language and in fact calls for the avant-garde’s 
‘ideologisation’.26  Since the avant-garde is the intellectual’s present condition, 
and the most accurate expression of the writer-intellectual’s relationship to 
                                                             
23 See Edoardo Sanguineti, ‘Come si diventa materialisti storici’, in Cultura e realtà, 
ed. by Erminio Risso (Milano: Feltrinelli, 2010), pp. 17-33.   
24 See, for instance, the collected essays in Paolo Chirumbolo and John Picchione, eds., 
Edoardo Sanguineti: Literature, Ideology and the Avant-Garde (London: Legenda, 
2013). 
25 Sanguineti, ‘Per una letteratura della crudeltà’, in Ideologia, pp. 133-35 (pp. 134-
35; emphasis original). 
26 See Edoardo Sanguineti, ‘Pour une avant-garde révolutionnaire’, Tel Quel, 29. 
Printemps (1967), 76-95 (pp. 84-87).  
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bourgeois society, proclaims Sanguineti, it is the avant-garde’s task to 
foreground this ideology by exposing the contradictions of late capitalism 
through linguistic experimentation.27  Therefore, although in the context of a 
crude realism/modernism dichotomy Adorno and Sanguineti appear to be in 
the same camp, their notions of aesthetic autonomy, especially when it comes 
to the question of language, diverge rather significantly.           
More important for Sanguineti’s elaboration of a theory of the avant-garde 
is the intellectual influence of Benjamin. Like many other Italian writers of his 
generation, Sanguineti had been introduced to Benjamin’s writings through 
the translation and editorial work of Renato Solmi, an Adorno scholar who 
presented Benjamin primarily as a thinker of the avant-garde.28  In the later 
years of his life, Sanguineti would refer to the famous aphorism from the entry 
[N1a, 8] of the Arcades Project – ‘I needn’t say anything; merely show’ – and 
suggest that his own work was guided by the principle of montage.29  
Sanguineti was drawn to the idea of a citational literary practice as a way of 
coming to terms with the experience of modernity, and montage was seen as 
providing the means through which to continue the ‘avant-garde 
                                                             
27 See, for instance, Sanguineti’s response to Angelo Guglielmi’s in the Palermo 
meeting in 1963. Sanguineti, ‘Il dibattito in occasione del primo incontro del Gruppo 
a Palermo nel 1963’, G63, pp. 779-91 (pp. 787-91).   
28 Solmi’s editorial introduction to the volume follows the Adornian tendencies that 
marked the first phase of Benjamin’s posthumous reception, and presents Benjamin 
primarily as a philosophical critic of neo-Kantianism. See Walter Benjamin, Angelus 
Novus: saggi e frammenti, traduzione e introduzione di Renato Solmi (Torino: 
Einaudi, 1962). On Benjamin’s early Italian reception, see Momme Brodersen, 
Benjamin auf italienisch: Aspekte einer Rezeption (Frankfurt: Verlag Neue Kritik, 
1982); Riccardo Gavagna, Benjamin in Italia. Bibliografia italiana 1956/80 (Milano: 
Sansoni, 1982).  See also Esther Leslie, ‘Revolutionary Potential and Walter Benjamin: 
A Postwar Reception History’, in Critical Companion to Contemporary Marxism, ed. by 
Jacques Bidet and Stathis Kouvelakis (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 549-66. 
29 Sanguineti, ‘Come si diventa materialisti storici’, p. 17.   
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inheritance’.30  Such an inheritance was mapped in relation to a Benjaminian 
reading of Baudelaire alongside selected references to James Joyce (a key 
influence for Sanguineti), or to Dada and Surrealism, the latter being 
proclaimed by Sanguineti as ‘the ghost that rightfully persecutes any possible 
future avant-garde and denies it peaceful sleep’.31 A Sanguinetian avant-garde 
was thus proposed via Benjamin’s Baudelaire, where artwork and commodity 
go hand-in-hand, and where the experience of the modern is felt precisely 
through this ‘double movement’ away from and towards the heteronomy of 
the market.32       
Although the principle of montage is followed when it comes to identifying 
the avant-garde in terms of form, Sanguineti’s own historicisation of the 
historical and neo-avant-gardes does not follow the same Benjaminian 
temporality.  When it comes to analysing the relationship between the two 
historical periods of the avant-garde, Sanguineti’s historicity arguably 
remains closer to the SPD progressivism attacked by Benjamin than to a 
kairotic, now-time that was espoused by others on the ‘heretic’ Italian left.33 
                                                             
30 See, for instance, Sanguineti, ‘Il percorso dalla filosofia alla leterattura’, Cultura e 
realtà, p. 175.  Sanguineti, ‘Avanguardia, società, impegno’, Ideologia, pp. 67-83 (p. 
72); John Butcher, ‘Da Laborintus a Postkarten: Intervista ad Edoardo Sanguineti’, in 
From Eugenio Montale to Amelia Rosselli: Italian Poetry in the Sixties and Seventies, ed. 
by John Butcher and Mario Moroni (Leicester: Troubador, 2004), pp. 221-33 (p. 221). 
On the influence of Benjamin’s thought on Sanguineti, see also Roberto Esposito, Le 
ideologie della neoavanguardia (Napoli: Liguori, 1976), p. 196. 
31 Sanguineti, ‘Per una letteratura della crueltà’, in Ideologia, pp. 133-35 (p. 134). 
32 See, for instance, Sanguineti, ‘Sopra l’avanguardia’, in Ideologia, pp. 62-66 (pp. 62-
64). Cf. Sanguineti, ‘Avanguardia, società, impegno’, in Ideologia, pp. 67-83 (p. 80).  An 
English translation of these two essays has been published in the poetry journal Lara 
Turner and is also available online. See 
<http://www.lanaturnerjournal.com/archives/edoardo-sanguineti-essays-avant-
garde-poety-commodity-society-commitment> [accessed 02 December 2016].   
33 On the reception of Benjamin alongside other ‘non-PCI-approved’ thinkers by the 
radical Italian left, see Lisa Gerusa, ‘A (Conceptual) History of Violence: The Case of 
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Here we find Sanguineti positing a relationship of structural equivalence 
between the historical avant-gardes’ response to capitalism and the neo-
avant-gardes’ response to neo-capitalism:  
 
L’argomento dice soltanto, in effetti, che le neo-avanguardie costituiscono, 
nella loro configurazione generale, un appello contro l’ordine neo-
capitalistico, in modo al tutto equivalente a quello in cui le avanguardie 
storiche già costituirono, nella loro configurazione generale sempre, un 
appello contro l’ordine del capitalismo storico.  
 
The argument simply says, in effect, that the neo-avant-gardes constitute, in 
their general configuration, a call against the neo-capitalist order, in a way 
quite equivalent to the way in which the historical avant-gardes, in their 
general configuration again, constituted earlier a call against the order of 
historical capitalism.34   
 
The neo-avant-garde is presented here as a reaction against neo-capitalism, 
and this relationship between base and superstructure (i.e. capitalist economy 
and avant-garde culture) is justified through the mirror-image of the avant-
garde’s earlier phase: just as the historical avant-garde was against a 
‘historical capitalism’ [capitalismo storico], so too the neo-avant-garde is 
against this new, latest stage of capitalism through which the tangible 
experiences of the miracolo can be analysed.35 This double relationship of base 
and superstructure in two stages is, of course, not framed in explicitly causal 
terms.  Nowhere is it proposed that because history has entered the stage of 
neo-capitalism that the avant-garde, too, must also enter its neo-avant-garde 
                                                             
the Italian Extreme Left in the 1970s’, in Imagining Terrorism: The Rhetoric and 
Representation of Political Violence in Italy, 1969-2009, ed. by Pierpaolo Antonello and 
Alan O'Leary (London: Legenda, 2009), pp. 128-38 (p. 131).     
34 Sanguineti, ‘Avanguardia, società, impegno’, Ideologia, p. 73, emphasis added.  
35 Although the term ‘neo-capitalism’ is not explicitly defined in these debates, it can 
be broadly understood as synonymous to ‘late capitalism’, a term which would 
become more widespread and commonly-used in the following decades. See for 
instance Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism (London: New Left Books, 1975).   
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phase.  Nevertheless, it is worth stressing this reflectionist, stagist relationship 
between the avant-garde and capitalism, which was prevalent regardless of 
whether one considered the avant-garde to be dead or alive.  For Fausto Curi, 
for instance, who recounts the common narrative of co-optation, there are two 
avant-gardes, and these are historically separated by their relationship to 
capitalist society: ‘The opposition that existed a while ago between the avant-
garde and bourgeois society can no longer be seen in terms of a clear-cut 
separation.  Neo-capitalist society has “accepted” avant-garde art and avant-
garde art has “accepted” neo-capitalist society.’36 In this parallel construction 
of historical avant-garde/bourgeois or ‘high’ capitalism, and neo-avant-
garde/neo- or ‘late’ capitalism, therefore, we see a direct correspondence 
(Sanguineti himself calls it a structural ‘homology’) between each avant-garde 
and each stage of historical development.37  It is true that the notion of the 
avant-garde was not considered in these debates explicitly with reference to 
the question of temporality (Guglielmi’s negation of the avant-garde’s 
temporal character that we saw above is an exception).  Yet the double 
character of the category of the avant-garde within the texts of the 
Neoavanguardia – as equivalent to modernism and the principle of montage, 
on the one hand, and as a periodising category that reflects the stages of 
capitalist development, on the other – exposes a particular chronopolitical 
problematic where the avant-garde, as we will see in the following section, is 
at once ‘located’ and ‘dis-located’.        
 Having examined the Neoavanguardia in the context of the Italian New Left 
and the debates on impegno, as well as outlining the issues of literary 
representation and historical periodisation with reference to Adorno and 
Benjamin, let us now shift our attention to the historiographical discourses 
surrounding the Neoavanguardia.  I have so far suggested that Sanguineti’s 
indebtedness to Benjamin was restricted to the citational practice of montage 
                                                             
36 Fausto Curi, ‘Tesi per una storia delle avanguardie’, in G63, pp. 851-61 (p. 858). 
37 See Sanguineti, ‘Avanguardia, società, impegno’, in Ideologia, p. 72. 
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and did not translate to a Benjaminian conception of history.  Bearing in mind 
the linear, reflectionist historicism that underlies Sanguineti’s texts as well as 
the Neoavanguardia’s complex relationship to Marxism and the PCI, we can 
now further investigate the chronopolitics of this particular ‘neo’, as the 
notion of the avant-garde is articulated with reference to persisting discourses 
of socio-economic modernisation in the context of writing a ‘late modern’, 
‘post-impegnato’ national cultural history.     
 
4.2  Looking Forward (on)to Postmodernism: Historicising the 
Neoavanguardia  
 
Shifting our focus to a meta-historical analysis, the different intellectual 
positions of the Neoavanguardia that were sketched in the previous section 
can now be viewed through a modified prism.  The antagonism between 
Angelo Guglielmi, representing a post-political cynicism associated with a 
postmodern attitude, and Edoardo Sanguineti, representing the committed 
Marxist intellectual invested in analysing the condition of alienation during 
late capitalism through modernist tropes, is itself marked by a particular 
historical temporality that is evident in Neoavanguardia’s historiographic 
reception.38  Personal accounts and memoirs such as the ones that we have 
                                                             
38 The below assessment draws on a number of Italian and Anglophone studies that 
either view Neoavanguardia as an anticipation of postmodernism or simply re-write 
it within a modern/postmodern dichotomy that ‘expels’ its avant-garde-ness from 
the narrative. See Renato Barilli, La neoavanguardia italiana: dalla nascita del ‘Verri’ 
alla fine del Quindici (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1995; 2nd edn: San Cesario di Lecce: Manni, 
2007), pp. 206-19; Romano Luperini, Controtempo. Critica e letteratura fra moderno 
e postmoderno: proposte, polemiche e bilanci di fine secolo (Napoli: Liguori, 1999), p. 
170; Picchione, The New Avant-Garde in Italy, pp. 46-48; Matteo Di Gesù, La tradizione 
del postmoderno. Studi di letterature italiana (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2003), pp. 25-38; 
Luca Somigli and Mario Moroni, ‘Modernism in Italy: An Introduction’, in Italian 
Modernism: Italian Culture between Decadentism and Avant-Garde, ed. by Luca 
Somigli and Mario Moroni (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2004), pp. 3-31. See 
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discussed above, and which stress the diversity of opinion within 
Neoavanguardia, have been taken up by Italian studies scholars who are 
introducing the intellectual parameters of the group to a new (non-Italian) 
readership.39  While these calls to diversity are respected in this reception, 
there has nonetheless been an inescapable tendency to present this diversity 
through a taxonomy where the ‘two camps’ of the Neoavanguardia are 
narrated as pointing towards two different historical periods: ‘one is tied to 
the project of modernity, the other to postmodern aesthetic postures’.40  There 
are those who narrate Neoavanguardia as a precursor to postmodernism (and 
who explicitly write that the movement ‘anticipates’ the postmodern); 
foregrounding Guglielmi’s position and presenting it as the most 
representative in the group serves such a repurposing.41  There are others still 
who have claimed the position of Sanguineti as proto-postmodern, proposing 
that the Neoavanguardia is not really an avant-garde at all, and that holding 
onto the very name ‘avant-garde’ is simply a form of nostalgia.42    
 Scholars such as Florian Mussgnug who have taken issue with the all-too-
easy demarcation of an ‘impegnato realism’ versus a ‘post-political 
postmodernism’ have noted this problematic genealogy which recasts the 
Italian neo-avant-garde as postmodern.43  True, the comparisons with 
                                                             
also Romano Luperini and Massimiliano Tortora, eds. Sul modernismo italiano 
(Napoli: Liguori, 2012).  
39 See, for instance, Picchione, The New Avant-Garde in Italy, pp. 46-48; Luca Somigli 
and Mario Moroni, ‘Modernism in Italy: An Introduction’, in Italian Modernism: Italian 
Culture between Decadentism and Avant-Garde, pp. 3-31.   
40 Picchione, The New Avant-Garde in Italy, p. viii. 
41 See Christopher Wagstaff, ‘Neoavanguardia’, in The Oxford Companion to Italian 
Literature, pp. 405-406. 
42 See Giulio Ferroni, Dopo la fine. Sulla condizone postuma della letteratura (Torino: 
Einaudi, 1997), pp. 36-37, 128.  
43 See Florian Mussgnug, ‘Review: The New Avant-garde in Italy’, Italian Studies, 63.2 
(2008), 335-36 (p. 336); Florian Mussgnug, ‘Review Article: Giorgio Manganelli’s 
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postmodern Anglophone writers or with the French Tel Quelists have served 
as a way of introducing the work of the Gruppo to those who had only been 
familiar with Anglo-American and French debates.44  The trope of 
‘anticipation’ in art and literary historiography is, too, a legitimate means 
through which to map and situate particular movements historically.  
Nevertheless, the historical and cultural ‘translation’ of the Neoavanguardia 
from a form of avant-gardism to a variety of postmodernism ought to be 
considered, I suggest, precisely as a geochronopolitical movement, whereby 
the relationship between genre and political ideology is also a relationship 
between the avant-garde’s place in national, cultural historiographies and its 
implicit placeless-ness in the seemingly borderless, cosmopolitan 
historiography of ‘the isms’.             
 This historical temporality of ‘looking forward’ to a postmodern Italian 
culture is often marked in this historiographic reception by explicit mentions 
of ‘backwardness’ and ‘provincialism’.  Therefore, as the movement that 
anticipates postmodernism, the Neoavanguardia is also tasked with ‘de-
provincialising’ Italian culture.  John Picchione has asserted, for instance, that 
‘[t]here is no doubt that the debate provoked by Gruppo 63 was vital in 
                                                             
Early Clarity’, Italian Studies, 63.1 (2008), 153-58 (p. 157).  See also Viktor Berberi, 
‘Review: The New Avant-garde in Italy’, Italian Culture, 23 (2005), 194-97 (p. 195); 
Lucia Re, ‘Language, Gender and Sexuality in the Italian Neo-Avant-Garde’, MLN, 
119.1 (2004), 135-73 (p. 134, n. 4).   
44 See Picchione, The New Avant-Garde in Italy, p. viii. On the links between members 
of the Neoavanguardia and Tel Quel, see Beate Sprenger, Neoavantgardistische 
Theorienbildung in Italien und Frankreich: das emanzipatorische Literaturkonzept von 
Edoardo Sanguineti und Philippe Sollers (Frankfurt: Lang, 1992); Patrick ffrench, The 
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initiating a process of deprovincialization within post-war Italian culture’.45 
According to similar accounts, the fact that the neo-avant-garde has been 
canonised shows the success of the idea of the avant-garde.  This success itself 
indicates ‘the overcoming of the backwardness [il superamento dell’ 
arretratezza] of Italian culture, trapped between idealism, old Marxism, and 
ideologies of realism’.46 This ‘backwardness’ might be explicitly expressed 
here in rather formal terms – Italian literature had lost its ‘edge’; it had 
become too conservative; was not innovative enough; and so on – yet, from a 
chronopolitical perspective, one cannot ignore the historical temporality that 
underpins such assessment, no matter how ‘formalist’ in its intent.  Not only 
is the avant-garde posited here as a vanguard whose anti-realist 
progressivism leads to the postmodern, Neoavanguardia is also presented as 
a modernism (lest avanguardia be mistaken here for an ‘old-fashioned’ kind 
of polemicism).         
This situating of the avant-garde within a modern/postmodern axis is thus 
explicitly presented as a process of ‘neutralisation’ from the partisan 
connotations of the term avant-garde and from its Italian ‘particularity’. As 
Paolo Chirumbolo and Mario Moroni characteristically put it in their 
introduction, the term ‘modernism’ was preferred because of ‘its relative 
neutrality – its ‘foreignness’ to the Italian tradition, if you will’.47 Once again, 
                                                             
45 Picchione, The New Avant-Garde in Italy, p. 202, n. 17. 
46 Paolo Bertetto, ‘Il cinema sperimentale e il Gruppo 63’, Alfa 63 cinquanta’anni 
doppo, IV.33 (2013), p. 18. 
47 Paolo Chirumbolo and Mario Moroni, ‘Literature and the Arts in the 1960s: An 
Introduction’, in Neoavanguardia: Italian Experimental Literature and Arts in the 
1960s, ed. by Paolo Chirumbolo, Mario Moroni and Luca Somigli (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2010), pp. 3–18 (p. 4).  See also Monica Jansen, ‘Neoavanguardia 
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2003’, in Neoavanguardia: Italian Experimental Literature and Arts in the 1960s, ed. 
by Paolo Chirumbolo, Mario Moroni and Luca Somigli (Toronto: Toronto University 
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the choice of the term modernism over that of the avant-garde can perhaps be 
justified in the institutional context in which such scholarly and 
historiographic reception takes place.  As the editors highlight, the marginal, 
peripheral status of Italian studies in Anglo-American academia (when 
compared to French studies especially) means that a certain amount of 
cultural translation is necessary when the material is aimed at ‘non-Italians’ 
or, as importantly, when in the context of a Cold War reception of Marxist 
thought, the Neoavanguardia is seen as too ‘red’ to be neatly incorporated into 
a Greenbergian or New Critical model of formalism.48    
 While these efforts to take the literary and intellectual output of the 
Neoavanguardia out of its national borders and into the sphere of a globally-
circulating, ‘neutral’  culture are made in the names of modernism and 
postmodernism, it is the particularity (or even exceptionality in some cases) 
of ‘Italian-ness’ that becomes paradoxically foregrounded.  In a little-
discussed article by Hungarian scholar Miklós Szabolsci, entitled ‘Avant-
Garde, Neo-Avant-Garde, Modernism: Questions and Suggestions’ and 
published in the journal New Literary History in 1971, we encounter one of the 
first comparative interpretations of the Neoavanguardia, and one such 
instance of particularisation. Assessing the movement’s originality as well as 
mapping its characteristics in relation to better-known groups (e.g. to Tel Quel, 
as was and continues to be the most common point of comparison), Szabolsci’s 
verdict is that Neoavanguardia is not unique in its avant-gardism: ‘The history 
of the Italian neo-avant-garde between 1960 and 1963 is just another version 
of the French or other West-European movements, only in a more 
                                                             
48 On this issue of language accessibility and anti-communist politics in the Anglo-
American (especially US) reception of the Neoavanguardia, see Paolo Chirumbolo and 
Mario Moroni, ‘Literature and the Arts in the 1960s: An Introduction’, in 
Neoavanguardia: Italian Experimental Literature and Arts in the 1960s, ed. by Paolo 
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[171] 
“ideological”, sometimes more “Marxist”, form’.49 This dismissive assessment 
of the Neoavanguardia as ‘just another version’ is, needless to say, disputable. 
As for its ‘ideological’ position or its ‘Marxism’, we have already seen that 
many members of the group had little interest in writing ideological poetry, 
whether of Marxist orientation or otherwise. And although Sanguineti’s 
intellectual position was categorically Marxist, it is worth stressing that the 
poetic practices of Neoavanguardia could never be sufficiently orthodox to 
gain Moscow’s approval.50  Within the Tel Quel journal itself, on the other 
hand, we see another instance of particularisation, although this time the 
assessment is favourable. Jean Thibaudeau, who frequently translated 
Sanguineti’s writing and promoted the activities of the Neoavanguardia in 
France, reviews Sanguineti’s Ideologia e linguaggio in the journal and 
champions the group precisely because of its uniqueness, and for the ways in 
which it shows the ‘Italian way’ to the avant-garde.51    
 This particularisation of the Neoavanguardia as first and foremost ‘Italian’ 
is not without its chronopolitical consequences.  The very temporality of the 
avant-garde is here under question, especially as the notion is, once more, cut 
in two.  As we have already discussed in the cases of Bürger and Roberts, the 
avant-garde as notion sometimes coincides with and sometimes diverges 
from the avant-garde as periodising category.  Considering the issue of place 
is recurring in these debates, a further ‘cutting-up’ is at work, where the ‘neo’ 
needs to be established not only with reference to the ‘historical’ and to the 
ever-present ‘trans-historical’ avant-garde underpinning these periodising 
                                                             
49 Miklós Szabolsci, ‘Avant-Garde, Neo-Avant-Garde, Modernism: Questions and 
Suggestions’, New Literary History, 3.1 (1971), 49-70 (p. 69). 
50 Neoavanguardia was in fact mentioned unfavourably in the 3rd edition of the Great 
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51 See Jean Thibaudeau, ‘Idéologie et langage’, Tel Quel, 22. Été (1964), 89-90.  
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categories, but also to an imagined avant-gardism that is not ‘backward’.   
 It is instructive here to turn to the thought of anthropologist Johannes 
Fabian as a means through which to critically analyse this discursive tendency. 
In his ground-breaking study Time and the Other, Fabian coins the term 
‘allochronism’.52 Introducing the role of time in the discipline of anthropology, 
Fabian uses the term to describe the anthropologist’s encounter with the 
cognised and represented anthropological subject as Other, and especially as 
a temporal Other. According to Fabian’s compelling analysis, allochronism is 
perpetuated in and by anthropological discourse and practice, where the time 
of the anthropologist is posited as always different from (and implicitly 
historically ahead of) the time of her/his subjects. In his trenchant critique of 
modernisation discourses as they manifest themselves in normative terms 
such as ‘primitive society’ (or even the more politically-correct ‘traditional 
culture’, we might add), Fabian exposes the antagonistic relationship that 
marks the discipline of anthropology.  In the case of the Neoavanguardia, there 
is of course a very different epistemological relation. More importantly, 
allochronism is often articulated by the othered/othering subjects 
themselves. Nonetheless, the temporalisation of the relationship of othering 
one’s self that is enabled by adopting Fabian’s notion is here decisive because 
it allows us to expose the underlying historicity of what might have otherwise 
appeared only as a problem of ‘place’.       
 I have so far stressed the prevalence of discourses on de-provincialisation 
and backwardness with reference to the Neoavanguardia. In order to fully 
articulate the chronopolitical implications of this undialectical historicity, 
however, it is important to return to an empirico-historical analysis and 
situate these discourses in a broader intellectual-historical framework.  These 
discourses, especially as they were expressed in intellectual debates in the 
early 1960s, can be seen as an expression of what geographer John Agnew has 
                                                             
52 See Fabian, Time and the Other, especially pp. 143-44, 151-65.  
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called the ‘myth of backward Italy’.53  On the one hand, we find iterations of 
this self-perpetuating myth of backwardness within orthodox Marxist 
discourses, where the Italian nation is presented as either having failed to 
complete the modernisation process (and thus not having reached the stage of 
‘mature’ capitalism), or as arriving in the modernising game too late.54 On the 
other hand (and these two tendencies are dialectically related), 
modernisation discourse appears in Italy via the widespread influence of the 
modernisation theory model that emerged in the United States in the 1950s.55 
According to this latter model of progressivism, economic and socio-political 
development is a process of emulation and synchronisation with the national 
specificity of the USA.56  However, as has been well-established by scholars of 
modernisation theory, this process of synchronisation is with a US model – 
that is to say, not with the United States’ socio-economic reality at a particular 
historical moment, but with its ideal type (itself empty of historical time). 
Therefore, the distinction between traditional and modern societies, and this 
temporal movement of transition from the traditional to the modern crucially 
                                                             
53 See John Agnew, ‘Time into Space: The Myth of “Backward” Italy in Modern Europe’, 
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54 See Valdo Spini, ‘The New Left in Italy’, Journal of Contemporary History, 7. 1/2 
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rests on a geochronopolitical imaginary beyond the empirical specificity of the 
alleged national units of comparison.  As David C. Pitts has argued in an early 
critique of modernisation theory, these discourses are not only ethnocentric; 
they are also ‘temperocentric’.57  In other words, the privileging and 
valorisation of particular social structures as ‘modern’ or ‘modernising’ posits 
a relationship of centre and periphery not only in terms of nation but also in 
terms of historical time.  
In the case of Italy, once again, modernisation discourses are also 
intimately linked to the infamous ‘Southern Question’ [la questione 
meridionale]: that is, the problem of a supposed gap in development between 
the Italian North and the Italian South, whereby the former stands for a 
rational, secular, urbanised (in short, ‘modern’) geographical imaginary, and 
the latter represents ‘traditional’ religious, agricultural and informal forms of 
social organisation.58 Since the Neoavanguardia debates did not concern 
themselves with the problem of meridionalismo (these writer-intellectuals 
were all based in the urban centres of the North, and their gaze was directed 
even further ‘North’ and ‘West’), this aspect of Italian modernisation discourse 
may appear irrelevant.  Yet meridionalismo, in its persisting concern with a 
gap in development within one nation crucially reveals how ‘Italian-ness’ itself 
has been constructed.  This is so especially when the specificity of ‘modern’ 
Italian culture emerges in its relation to a Western Other, habitually projected 
as historically more ‘advanced’.  As one commentator has astutely observed, 
Italian modernisation discourses are founded upon ‘an imaginary geography 
of modernity, which either excludes Italy from modern Europe or separates 
                                                             
57 See David C. Tipps, ‘Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: 
A Critical Perspective’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 15.2 (1973), 199-
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58 I am here indebted to analyses that consider meridionalismo as a form of 
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the modern North from the backward South’.59     
 The absence of any explicit discussions of the ‘backward South’ in the case 
of Neoavanguardia, therefore, does not necessarily imply that the discourses 
of de-provincialisation that are at the heart of specifying an ‘Italian neo-avant-
garde’ are not formed by the auto-allochronism operating in broader 
discursive tendencies about Italian modernity.  In fact, my wager is that the 
temporal self-othering that we encounter in these debates, precisely in the 
way in which the question of a national modernity is articulated (in this 
instance, Italian, but many other national cases are also applicable), points to 
the foundational question of the avant-garde’s mediation between 
universality and particularity. Thus, as we have seen, while the notion of the 
avant-garde is denounced in some instances because of its associations with 
an inheritance of impegno, in other cases, it is mobilised precisely as a means 
of ‘modernising’ Italian culture within its national borders. This process of 
modernising – where ‘making modern’ means also ‘making modernist’ – is, as 
I have sought to demonstrate, a process of ideological neutralisation which 
itself entails a process of de-particularisation. In other words, making 
Neoavanguardia a ‘modernism’, namely, taking the ‘avant-garde-ness’ (i.e. 
impegno) out of the avant-garde, is at the same time articulated as a movement 
of cultural translation that geochronopolitically takes the ‘Italian’ avant-garde 
out of ‘Italy’.   
Returning to Fabian’s notion of allochronism and proposing the self-
reflective inflection of ‘auto-allochronism’ in the case of Neoavanguardia, 
therefore, we might suggest that such temporal othering between a projected 
‘backward here-and-now’ (itself a geochronopolitical contradiction), and its 
counter-image of a ‘developed elsewhere’ indicates another iteration of the 
avant-garde as afterness.  As is the case with the historical temporality of any 
neo-avant-garde, the ‘new’ of the Neoavanguardia is caught between the 
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temporalities of repetition and rupture.  In its particularisation as an ‘Italian’ 
neo-avant-garde, however, the ‘neo’ is here tasked with yet another mode of 
return.  As a stage between realism and postmodernism, and as an avant-
garde that must itself ‘modernise’ and masquerade as a modernism in order 
not to seem too partisan, or too particular in its Italian-ness, the 
Neoavanguardia’s inheritance is doubly ‘in another time’.     
As has been hinted at above, this ‘Italian case’ of the Neoavanguardia as a 
neo-avant-garde is not discussed here with specifying intentions.  I do not seek 
to propose that the Neoavanguardia is uniquely or exceptionally ‘Italian’, nor 
do I wish to suggest that its inclusion for discussion alongside the 
theorisations of Peter Bürger and John Roberts constitutes a preferable way 
of introducing its legacy within a linear genealogy of theories of the avant-
garde.  Nevertheless, having myself taken the Neoavanguardia out of the 
national and disciplinary borders of Italian studies and into the trans-national 
comparativism of avant-garde studies, let me address the geochronopolitical 
implications of this including gesture by way of conclusion. Unlike the 
allochronic movement that seeks to detach partisan commitment from 
ideological neutrality by safeguarding the separateness of an ‘Italian avant-
garde’ from an ‘international modernism’, my inclusion of Neoavanguardia is 
not done in the name of modernisation. Rather, what the ‘case’ of 
Neoavanguardia in this present constellation of theorisations of the avant-
garde reveals is the chronopolitical dimension of the relationship between 
comparativism and area studies, whether Italian or not.  In the alleged 
movement towards modernisation, the transition from a ‘regional 
backwardness’ to a ‘national modernity’ is necessarily uneven, for the 
‘regional’ is always-already ‘pre-modern’ and the ‘national’ (at least when 
perceived from within its own national borders) appears always as 
historically more ‘advanced’ in comparison.60      
                                                             
60 On this fundamental problem of uneven comparability in modernisation theory, 
both with respect to scale and object of comparison (as exemplified by the categories 
of ‘nation’ and ‘tribe’ for instance), see Tipps, 217-19. 
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When we are guided by a different kind of comparativism the very 
separateness and interiority of a national modernity, and by extension of area 
studies, comes under scrutiny.  Benjaminian comparativism, I have suggested 
in my analysis in Chapter 1, does away with a part/whole relationship where 
the whole is exterior to the part, since Jetztzeit’s relationship to historical time 
is at once expanded and condensed.  Thinking about an indexical, non-
metonymic relationship between the ‘regional pre-modern’ and the ‘national 
modern’, therefore, means critically reconfiguring the manner in which 
particularity and universality function as chronopolitical markers.  It also 
means a further reconfiguration of the part/whole relationship on a bigger 
scale: between the ‘national modern’ and the ‘global modern’, and the ways in 
which the latter regionalises the particularity of a ‘national modern’. Thus, the 
iteration of the new after the new that the Neoavanguardia and its role in 
national and trans-national historiographies articulates exposes the avant-
garde’s relationship to the double temporality of the modern.  In this instance, 
this double character is not expressed in the hellish repetition of the new that 
we encountered in the suspensive avant-garde in Chapter 3, nor is it the 
doubling of the anticipatory movement of prolepsis that we examined in 
Chapter 2.  This doubling takes us further back to the beginning to Chapter 1 
and the discussion of time as vessel.  Here, the false neutrality of the modern 
is exposed and its temporality is revealed for what it is: both vessel and 
content, a time that measures movement (as development) and a time (and 
place) that has been measured (as that which is developed). Not simply the 
static, ahistorical antithesis to tradition, the modern is revealed as both the 
unit of comparison and that comparison’s condition.  As we return to the 
thought of Walter Benjamin and the insights that have been gleaned from 
these iterations of the avant-garde after modernism in the next and final 
chapter (‘Afterness and Singularity’), the chronopolitical dimension of this 
relationship between interiority and exteriority will become foregrounded.  
Especially as the question of writing about the avant-garde ‘in the plural’ is 
addressed with respect to geopolitical concerns, the particular relationship 
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between an ‘Italian avant-garde’ and the ‘avant-garde qua avant-garde’ that 
we have explored in this chapter will be extended and re-situated in a 
comparative, Benjaminian framework that will more adequately allow this 
particularity to become ‘singular’.  
 III. A Singular Avant-Garde  
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Chapter 5 
 
Afterness and Singularity: The Idea of the Avant-Garde after 
Modernism 
 
 
The summer months that Benjamin spent with Brecht in Skovsbostrand in the 
years 1934, 1936 and 1938 involved heated intellectual exchanges about 
literature, theatre and current affairs, but also long sessions of game-playing: 
cards, Monopoly and, above all, chess.1  Brecht and Benjamin played chess 
without any time-measuring devices, allowing Benjamin to develop the slow 
‘tactic of attrition’ that Brecht would poignantly allude to in the poem written 
upon hearing of his friend’s death.2  Alternatives to chess were also pondered.  
Benjamin recommended the ancient Chinese board game Go which, to 
Benjamin’s mind, bore interesting resemblances to epic theatre: rather than 
having pieces moved from one position to another, Go begins with an empty 
board and is gradually filled with pieces during the course of the game.3  
Brecht proposed modifying the rules of chess itself: pieces that have occupied 
the same position for a while should change function, becoming weaker or 
stronger, and thus making the parameters of the game more dynamic.4 ‘As it 
is now’, remarked Brecht, ‘there is no development; [the game] stays the same 
for too long.’5  
Benjamin noted Brecht’s remark in his diary, and this diary entry, 12 
July 1934, has itself become a common reference point for Benjamin 
                                                             
1 See Erdmut Wizisla, Walter Benjamin and Bertolt Brecht: The Story of a Friendship, 
trans. by Christine Shuttleworth (London: Libris, 2009), pp. 55-62.  
2 See Andrew McGettigan, ‘Benjamin and Brecht: Attrition in Friendship’, Radical 
Philosophy, 161. May-June (2010), 62-64.   
3 See Wizisla, p. 58.  
4 Ibid, pp. 58-59. 
5 See ‘Notizen Svendborg Sommer 1934’, GS VI, p. 526.  Cf. ‘Conversations with 
Brecht’, trans. by Anya Bostock, in Aesthetics and Politics, pp. 86-99 (p. 88).  
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commentators.6  Although we cannot ascertain the significance that Benjamin 
attached to this remark (he was, after all, an obsessive note-taker), we might 
nonetheless entertain the implications of Brecht’s suggestion for Benjamin’s 
thought as we take the final steps in our enquiry.  For Brecht’s idea effectively 
temporalises the piece’s function and, as the passing of time enables the piece 
to be liberated from its fixed identity, it introduces an element of self-
determination that also brings about a radical re-constitution of the game 
itself.  No two games of chess can, of course, ever be identical but the very 
possibility of predicting the set of moves that will determine the course of the 
game is here ingeniously disrupted.  The rules of this modified chess-game 
become variable, bringing to mind aspects of Benjamin’s own work, aptly 
described by Miriam Hansen as a ‘mode of thinking in which concepts are 
hardly ever stable or self-identical’.7  It is this figure of self-differentiation – a 
differentiation at once immanent and exterior – that I propose as the guiding 
principle for my line of enquiry in this culminating chapter and, as my analysis 
revisits themes and ideas from the previous chapters, for the thesis more 
broadly.  
In unfolding the full implications of this self-differentiating principle, I 
begin by discussing the question of the avant-garde’s singularity as it is 
expressed in current discourses within new modernist studies.  These 
discourses are generally marked by an apprehension towards using the term 
avant-garde ‘in the singular’, primarily as a move against a Eurocentric or 
Western-centric approach to the study of avant-garde movements.  While 
                                                             
6 See, for instance, Rebecca Comay’s juxtaposition of the diary entry with the famous 
chess-game between historical materialism and theology in Thesis I from ‘On the 
Concept of History’.  Rebecca Comay, ‘Benjamin’s Endgame’, in Walter Benjamin’s 
Philosophy: Destruction & Experience, ed. by Andrew Benjamin and Peter Osborne 
(London & New York: Routledge, 1994; 2nd edn, Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000), 
pp. 246-85 (p. 246). 
7 Miriam Bratu Hansen, ‘Room-for-Play: Benjamin’s Gamble with Cinema’, October, 
109. Summer (2004), 3-45 (p. 5).  
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situating this pluralising tendency within broader intellectual debates on the 
status of ‘alternative’ and ‘multiple modernities’, I argue that a singular avant-
garde must be defended on two grounds: firstly, with reference to the valid 
critical responses against the ‘multiple-modernities’ paradigm launched by 
Marxist and postcolonial scholars; secondly, with respect to the question of 
representation, which as I intimated in the introduction (Part I: ‘Which avant-
garde?: Specificity and its Discontents’), remains the underlying, unspoken 
issue regarding the avant-garde’s mediation of generality and particularity. In 
order to redress the latter issue of representation, I return to the work of 
Benjamin en passant – passing through the thresholds, folds and vessels in 
Benjamin’s writing, in an approach indebted to Pierre Missac’s ‘indirect 
criticism’ in Passage de Walter Benjamin.8  Rather than argue for one kind of 
Benjamin over another (Marxist, mystical, etc.) or offer close textual reading 
of selected essays, this approach allows for a tracing of affinities and analogies 
across Benjamin’s early and late oeuvre, and it is in this spirit of ‘passing 
through’ that the epistemology of a Benjaminian singularity also emerges.   
In the chapter’s final part, I elaborate on this notion of singularity, 
understood not in opposition to ‘plurality’ but in its philosophical sense of a 
multiplicity in self-differentiation.  Drawing on discussions by thinkers Peter 
Hallward and Kojin Karatani while contrasting their articulation of a 
philosophical singularity with my own analysis of Benjamin, I then return to 
the notion of afterness through another ‘passing through’ – this time passing 
through the theories of the avant-garde that were previously discussed in 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4.  In re-visiting these earlier analyses but now re-casting 
them in a Benjaminian light, I conclude by articulating this new 
reconfiguration of the idea of the avant-garde after modernism.  Not unlike 
Benjamin’s idea in the Baroque Trauerspiel, or the historical compass from the 
                                                             
8 Such an ‘indirect criticism’ itself resonates with the chess move en passant, which 
entails an unusual, non-frontal way of attacking and capturing a pawn.  See Pierre 
Missac, Walter Benjamin’s Passages, trans. by Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, [1987] 1995), pp. x-xi; 1-7, 11-13, 106-121.  
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Arcades Project that steers off the North Pole in digression, the idea of the 
avant-garde emerges in this reading as a relational, prismatic category whose 
temporal self-determination also brings about a radical re-constitution of 
historical time itself.  As the periodising categories of ‘historical avant-garde’ 
and ‘neo-avant-garde’ are unmoored from linear historicity, so too are the 
specific avant-gardes unmoored from the generality of the avant-garde as 
concept. As I argue below, this avant-garde emerges as a singularity, and so its 
‘thisness’, precisely as a parallax in/of time, resists both the universalising 
tendencies of a homogeneous, monolithic conception of the avant-garde, and 
the particularisation of ‘local’, multiple avant-gardes whose spatiotemporal 
coordinates remain straitjacketed to an undialectical narrative of historical 
progress.  
  
5.1  In the Plural   
 
Should we refer to the avant-garde in the singular or the plural?  For a number 
of scholars working within avant-garde studies today, this question remains 
central to the very articulation of the avant-garde or, as the tentatively 
pluralising formulation has it, of ‘the avant-garde(s)’.9  Even though current 
scholarship has not addressed this question with reference to the issue of 
temporality, it is my present aim to suggest that the question of the avant-
garde’s singular (or plural) character ought to be understood precisely 
through a temporal, and by extension chronopolitical, lens.  To do so, I will 
proceed by introducing the parameters of the discussion within avant-garde 
studies, while situating this pluralising tendency within new modernist 
studies and broader sociologically-inflected debates on the status of multiple 
                                                             
9 See, for instance, Stephen Forcer and Emma Wagstaff, ‘Introduction’, ‘The French 
Avant-Garde’, Special Issue, Nottingham French Studies, 50.3 (2011), 1-11 (pp. 4-5); 
James M. Harding, The Ghosts of the Avant-Garde(s): Exorcising Experimental Theatre 
and Performance (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2013).   
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or alternative modernities.10 Here comparative literature as discipline, and 
comparativism as a broader epistemological question, become critical: not 
only have developments in comparative literature since the turn of the 
millennium reinvigorated questions on literature’s ‘units of comparison’, but 
they have also sharply re-drawn the contours of the discipline’s assumed 
geopolitical centre in ‘Euro-America’.11 Yet, as these developments have also 
affected the much narrower terrain of avant-garde studies, it becomes 
pertinent to investigate how this tendency to pluralise might be connected to 
the tendency to periodise. To appropriate Fredric Jameson against himself, 
how might his famous injunction that ‘we cannot not periodise’ relate to the 
seemingly-unconnected injunction ‘we cannot not pluralise’?12 
It is worth noting the history of the institutional relationship between 
comparative literature and avant-garde studies. This relationship has 
received almost no scholarly attention, yet many individual figures whose 
texts are considered seminal contributions to avant-garde studies are 
intimately linked to the discipline of comparative literature.  Peter Bürger may 
not be a comparatist in the narrow sense of the term, yet his work has 
                                                             
10 As an indication see, Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, ‘On Alternative Modernities’, 
Public Culture 11.1 (1999), 1-18; Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, ed., Alternative 
Modernities (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001); Special Issue: ‘Multiple 
Modernities’, Daedalus, 129.1 (2000); Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, Comparative 
Civilizations and Multiple Modernities (Leiden: Brill, 2003). 
11 For an instructive summary of the parameters of the debates at the intersection of 
this new comparativism and postcolonial literary studies, see James Graham, Michael 
Niblett and Sharae Deckard, ‘Postcolonial Studies and World Literature’, Journal of 
Postcolonial Writing, 48.5 (2012), 465-71. For a preliminary attempt to ‘temporalise’ 
the question of new modernist studies’ relationship to the postcolonial, see Susan 
Reid, ‘Global modernisms, post/colonialism and time’, Journal of Postcolonial Writing, 
50.6 (2014), 701-703.    
12 See Fredric Jameson, A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present 
(London: Verso, 2002), p. 94.   
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nonetheless involved the negotiation of intellectual and literary histories in 
the early modern and modern periods across the Franco-German border.  The 
author of the first monographic study on the avant-garde, Renato Poggioli, is 
considered to have played an instrumental role in the foundation of 
comparative literature in the United States, while Matei Calinescu, who has 
contributed greatly to tracing the philological origins of the term ‘avant-
garde’, was also a comparatist working across Romance and Slavonic 
languages.13 More decisively perhaps, major collaborative research projects 
that enabled the examination of parallel developments of avant-garde literary 
movements across national borders, and which were pivotal for the 
emergence of the sub-field of avant-garde studies, were undertaken under the 
auspices of the International Comparative Literature Association (ICLA) and 
the American Comparative Literature Association (ACLA).14   
More recently, we might note a comparatist tendency in the 
geopolitical turn within avant-garde studies, which has meant greater 
emphasis being placed on ‘peripheral avant-gardes’, and a focus away from 
the urban metropoles of the long canonised historical avant-garde 
movements.15  Yet this geopolitical turn, rather than ‘de-linearising’ the 
                                                             
13 For Poggioli’s role in US comparative literature, see Natalie Melas, All the Difference 
in the World: Postcoloniality and the Ends of Comparison (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2006), p. 4.  
14 See Jean Weisberger, ed. Les avant-gardes littéraires au XXe Siècle: Vol I: Histoire 
(Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1984); and Dietrich Scheunemann, ‘Preface’, in 
European Avant-Garde: New Perspectives, ed. by Dietrich Scheunemann (Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, 2000), pp. 7-11.   
15 See George Yúdice, ‘Rethinking the Theory of the Avant-Garde from the Periphery’, 
in Modernism and Its Margins: Reinscribing Cultural Modernity from Spain and Latin 
America, ed. by. Anthony L. Geist and Jose B. Monleon (New York: Garland, 1999), pp. 
52–80; Luís Madureira, Cannibal Modernities: Postcoloniality and the Avant-garde in 
Caribbean and Brazilian Literature (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 
2005); Fernando Rosenberg, The Avant-Garde and Geopolitics in Latin America 
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temporality of avant-garde historiography, I suggest, has further entrenched 
the link between periodisation and the injunction that ‘we cannot not 
pluralise’. This pluralising tendency has itself some variability.  In some cases, 
the question is formulated in the general terms of inclusivity and diversity: 
‘[…] is there just one story to tell about the avant-garde?’16 In others, 
pluralisation is proposed as a response to the fragmentation of a previously 
unified nation-state.  In an edited collection devoted to the history of avant-
garde arts in the former Yugoslavia, one contributor expressed their 
reservation about using the term avant-garde in the singular: ‘[O]ne cannot 
use the collective term “Yugoslav avant-garde” without reservations unless 
using the plural: avant-gardes.  It is even tricky to speak of a Slovenian, or 
Croatian, or Serbian avant-garde. They are all linked, nevertheless, by 
common avant-garde features […]’.17  Although the problem is presented here 
with reference to national particularity and cultural diversity within one 
nation-state, the concession expressed in the last sentence (‘they are all linked 
nevertheless, by common avant-garde features’) points to a broader issue of 
representation that is far from specific to the Yugoslav case (and which we 
will directly address below through our return to Benjamin).  
At the heart of this recurring issue of pluralisation lies the status of 
heterogeneity within large-scale analyses of global culture.  In the case of 
avant-garde studies, the consideration of the avant-garde ‘in the singular’ and 
                                                             
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006); and Per Bäckström and Benedikt 
Hjartarson, eds., Decentring the Avant-Garde: Towards a New Topography of the 
International Avant-Garde, Avant-Garde Critical Studies Series 30 (Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, 2014).  
16 Mike Sell, ‘Resisting the Question, “What Is an Avant-Garde?”’, New Literary History, 
41.4 (2010), 753-74 (p. 759).  
17 Sonja Briski Uzelac, ‘Visual Arts in the Avant-gardes between the Two Wars’, in 
Impossible Histories: Historical Avant-gardes, Neo-avant-gardes, and Post-avant-
gardes in Yugoslavia, 1918-1991, ed. by Dubravka Djurić and Miško Šuvaković 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), pp. 123-69 (p. 123). 
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by extension as a singular project, as the common critique goes, runs the risk 
of advocating a monolithic, hegemonically Eurocentric project. Consequently, 
writing of the avant-garde means erasing cultural difference and failing to take 
into account the particularities of avant-gardism across the globe, formed by 
specific cultural and historical conditions. According to one such critique, 
formulated by modernist scholar Laura Winkiel, European avant-garde 
movements such as French Surrealism may have been anti-colonial in their 
conviction, yet their underlying historicist conception of modernity needs to 
be redressed through Homi Bhabha’s notion of ‘time lag’ or through ideas of 
combined and uneven development from world-systems theory, so as to 
tackle both the historicism and the universalising dimensions of an avant-
garde expressed in the singular.18  At the same time, however, scholars who 
have been staunch supporters of opening the canon, have started to question 
the efficacy of pluralisation.  In Planetary Modernisms, Susan Stanford 
Friedman admits that: ‘it is not enough to add alternative modernities to the 
Western instance of modernity’,19 while another commentator who had 
chosen to refer to the avant-garde as ‘the avant-garde(s)’ conceded that the 
plea to pluralise often amounts to little more than ‘a passing 
acknowledgement that ultimately reverts back to a more generalized theory 
of the avant-garde’.20   
My own response to this impasse is informed by the critiques that have 
been formulated against the ‘multiple-modernities’ paradigm and by 
Benjamin’s own thought, whose temporal indexicality, as I explain in the 
following sections, provides a model for an idea of the avant-garde that is both 
                                                             
18 See Laura Winkiel, ‘Postcolonial Avant-Gardes and the World System of 
Modernity/Coloniality’, in Decentring the Avant-Garde, pp. 97-116 (pp. 97-100).  See 
also the key collection in the geopolitical turn within new modernist studies, co-
edited with Laura Doyle: Laura Doyle and Laura Winkiel, eds., Geomodernisms: Race, 
Modernism, Modernity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005). 
19 Stanford Friedman, Planetary Modernisms, p. 4. 
20 Harding, The Ghosts of the Avant-Garde(s), p. 9.   
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heterogeneous and singular.21  As Benjamin is brought into dialogue with 
postcolonial critiques of modernisation theory, two related issues emerge in 
this response: the question of centre and the question of origin. While the 
former may bring to mind notions such as ‘Eurocentrism’, which are crucial to 
critiques of modernisation theory, it is in fact the latter that best articulates 
the spatiotemporal and ethico-political problematic of plural modernities.  
For, not only is modernity as a geopolitical imaginary conflated with the 
location of ‘the West’ to the extent that the critique of modernisation often 
lapses into a critique of westernisation, as Kojin Karatani among many others 
has noted, but also this conflation is coupled with an imaginary of spatial 
expansion.22 Thus, modernity becomes this geopolitical force that originates 
from a particular locus (is born in the West’) and then ‘spreads’, or ‘expands’ 
                                                             
21 For my critical summary below, I am indebted to a range of critical debates, 
including: Arif Dirlik, ‘Global Modernity? Modernity in an Age of Global Capitalism’, 
European Journal of Social Theory, 6.3 (2003), 275-92; Arif Dirlik, ‘Thinking 
Modernity Historically: Is “Alternative Modernity” the Answer?, Asian Review of 
World Histories, 1.1 (2013), 5-44; Benita Parry, ‘Aspects of Peripheral Modernisms’, 
Ariel, 40.1 (2009), 27-55; Harry Harootunian, ‘Some Thoughts on Comparability and 
the Space-Time Problem’, Special Issue: ‘Problems of Comparability/ Possibilities for 
Comparative Studies’, boundary 2, 32.2 (2005), 23-52 (pp. 35-36); Harry 
Harootunian, History’s Disquiet: Modernity, Cultural Practice, and the Question of 
Everyday Life (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); Timothy Mitchell, 
‘Introduction’, in Questions of Modernity, ed. by Timothy Mitchell (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2000), p. xii.  Alongside these Marxist and postcolonial 
critiques, the reservations expressed by Weberian, institutional social theorists are 
also far from negligible. See Göran Therborn, ‘Entangled Modernities’, European 
Journal of Social Theory, 6.3 (2003), 293-305; Volker H. Schmidt, ‘Multiple 
Modernities or Varieties of Modernity?’, Current Sociology, 54.1 (2006), 77-97.  
22 See Kojin Karatani, ‘Wo liegt der Ursprung der Moderne? Interviewt von Steffi 
Richter’, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 44.6 (1996), 1007-1019 (pp. 1007-
1008).  
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into territories previously ‘under-developed’.23 Modernity is here a spatial but 
also necessarily a historical movement ‘from the West to the rest’ – a problem 
famously identified by Dipesh Chakrabarty as the temporal logic of ‘first in the 
West, and then elsewhere’.24 As sociologist Gurminder K. Bhambra has also 
more recently remarked, postcolonial critiques of multiple modernities are 
necessary so as to redress the conception of modernity’s global character, not 
as its consequence, but as its condition.25  Challenging the notion that 
modernity happens as a consequence of modernisation, and that modernity 
therefore ‘expands’, means that we can begin to move beyond what, following 
Fabian, can be described as the underlying allochronism of the multiple-
modernities paradigm (retaining as it does elements of the modernisation 
theory that Eisenstadt himself advocated in the 1950s).26  Modernity, 
therefore, as it is proposed here does not become global as it ‘travels’ in time 
and space from the ‘progressed’ to the ‘backward’, but is understood as the 
condition of a global structure of spatiotemporal inequality.     
With respect to the distinct question of ‘plural avant-gardes’, as 
opposed to ‘plural modernities’, we ought to return once more to the work of 
Benjamin.  For unlike the case of the category of ‘modernity’, the consideration 
of plurality with reference to ‘the avant-garde’ requires an investigation into 
the question of representation. It is through Benjamin’s theory of mimesis, 
especially as it intersects with his conception of history, therefore, that we can 
find a different articulation of the notion of origin and, consequently, a 
different articulation of the relationship between ‘avant-garde-ness’ as a 
common attribute and ‘the avant-garde’ as a geochronopolitical coordinate, 
                                                             
23 See Gaonkar, ‘On Alternative Modernities’, especially pp. 1; 13.  
24 Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, p. 6.  
25 Gurminder K. Bhambra, ‘Historical Sociology, Modernity, and Postcolonial 
Critique’, The American Historical Review, 116.3 (2011), 653-662 (p. 662).  
26 On the links between modernisation theory and the multiple-modernities 
paradigm, see Bhambra, pp. 654-655, n. 7.    
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whose fixed locus in the stream of historical time will soon have been 
reconfigured ‘out of joint’.            
 
 
5.2   Vessels and Timepieces 
 
In the opening paragraphs of Time and the Other, Fabian describes time as a 
form of exchange, analogous to money or language: ‘Time, much like language 
or money, is a carrier of significance, a form through which we define the 
content of relations between the Self and the Other’.27 According to Fabian’s 
brief definition, time is not only the vessel of events, as the perennial problem 
that we encountered in Chapter 1 has it, but rather the vessel of social 
relations.  Time is here a form through which we can make sense of the 
relationship between ‘self’ and ‘other’, but also a system of exchange that 
produces this very relationship. This figure of the vessel, and the limitations 
of its interiority or its ‘ability to carry’, can serve here as an illustration of 
Benjamin’s thought on mimesis and historical time, guiding our path as we 
move towards a conception of the avant-garde as a singularity.  Our passage 
through Benjamin’s writing will take here a loosely chronological direction; 
yet rather than suggesting a linear development of his ideas, I rather seek to 
articulate – and to some extent narratively perform – the affinities and returns 
that take place in selected texts across his early and late thought.    
  Although the Benjamin of the 1930s is a different writer from the Benjamin 
of the 1910s, it is well documented that the early language essays provided 
the basis for the later fragments on the mimetic faculty.28 Central to the early 
idealist essays as well as the later materialist configurations, which also drew 
on Surrealist dream interpretations and Brechtian theatre, is the idea of the 
                                                             
27 Fabian, Time and the Other, p. ix.   
28 See, for instance, Benjamin’s letter to Gerhard Scholem of 28 February 1933, in 
CWB, pp. 402-404.  
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non-communicability of language.29  According to Benjamin’s well-known 
theory, language is a carrier of meaning only insofar as it is not a carrier of 
signification.  A non-vessel of a vessel, language for Benjamin does not signify, 
represent or communicate – all that it communicates is language itself.  As has 
been noted by Christopher Fynsk among many others, language in Benjamin 
is ‘a form of presentation that is prior to any signification in the broad 
semiological sense’.30  Hence also the centrality of naming for these early 
essays: Adamic naming is deployed by Benjamin to facilitate the 
epistemological shift from the concept (and its object) to the idea (without an 
object), and from representation (Vorstellung) to exposition (Darstellung).31  
Accordingly, in Benjamin’s influential essay on translation we discover that 
the translator’s task is not to transfer signification from one linguistic vessel 
to another.  As Carol Jacobs has put it: ‘For Benjamin, translation does not 
transform a foreign language into one we may call our own, but rather renders 
radically foreign that language we believe to be ours’.32  Since the true 
meaning of a language lies not in what it signifies, but in its translatability (in 
its potential to reach the ‘pure language’ of naming), the translator should not 
aim to show a semantic fidelity to the original but to reveal instead the 
                                                             
29 The summary that follows draws on the Trauerspiel study, and the essays ‘On 
Language as Such and on the Language of Man’, in SW1, pp. 62-74 and ‘The Task of 
the Translator’, in SW1, pp. 253-263, hereafter cited respectively Origin, ‘Language’, 
and ‘Translator’.    
30 Christopher Fynsk, ‘The Claim of History’, Diacritics, 22. 3/4, Commemorating 
Walter Benjamin (1992), 115-126 (p. 120). See also Stéphane Symons, ‘The Ability to 
not-shine: The Word 'Unscheinbar' in the Writings of Walter Benjamin’, Angelaki, 18. 
4 (2014), 101-23.   
31 See Origin, especially, pp. 34-38, 44-48, 165-67; GS I.1, pp. 214-218; 225-28; 342-
44.  See also ‘Language’, SW1, pp. 65, 68; GS 2.1, pp. 144, 148.  For a detailed analysis 
of Benjamin’s use of biblical motifs, see Roland Boer, ‘From Plato to Adam: The 
Biblical Exegesis of Walter Benjamin, The Bible and Critical Theory, 3.1 (2007), 1-13.    
32 Carol Jacobs, ‘The Monstrosity of Translation’, MLN, 90.6 (1975), 755-766 (p. 756). 
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translatability that lies hidden in all texts worthy of translation.  The translator 
would thus make ‘both the original and the translation recognisable as 
fragments of a greater language, just as fragments are part of a vessel [wie 
Scherben als Bruchstück eines Gefäßes]’.33  Therefore, fidelity for Benjamin 
does not address the original, but the potentiality of ‘pure language’ whose 
‘essential kernel’ can be discerned in all texts that are ‘translatable’.  And the 
historicity of pure language, though not foregrounded as such by Benjamin, is 
here unmistakeably messianic: pure language is a language-to-come, not 
unlike Wandelschrift, the international exchange-script whose singularity, as 
we saw in Chapter 1, replaces the false universality of Esperanto.  
In the montage of aphorisms that make up One-Way Street, arguably 
the key text on the threshold between Benjamin’s early and late periods, the 
idea of non-communicability of language is also present.  In these later 
formulations, however, the messianic quality of pure language takes forms 
that express and critique the character of the commodity-form under 
capitalism.  As in Adamic naming and the pure language of translatability, in 
the image-texts that Benjamin encounters in the poetic experiments of 
Stephane Mallarmé, or in the advertising billboards that show the brand-name 
of salt ‘Bullrichsalz’, there is no exteriority of signification.34 In his childhood 
recollections, Benjamin delights over this utopian possibility of misheard and 
misremembered words such as Markt-halle (meaning, indoor market), where 
sounds merge beyond recognition of any known language, and both language 
and environment become creaturely.35  In this erosion of distinction between 
the separate words, language becomes also an index for a new system of 
economic exchange, beyond the buying and selling of commodities: ‘No, you 
                                                             
33 ‘Translator’, SW1, p. 260; GS IV.1, p. 18. 
34 See, respectively, ‘Attested Auditor of Books’, One-way Street, in SW1, p. 456; GS IV, 
pp. 102-103; and AP [G1a, 4], pp. 173-174; GS V, pp. 235-236.   
35 See, for instance, ‘The Mummerehlen’, in Berlin Childhood around 1900, trans. by 
Howard Eiland (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2006), pp. 97-99. 
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said “Mark-Talle”, and just as these two words were eroded through habits of 
speech so that neither retained its original “meaning”, in the same way the 
routine of this visit eroded all the images provided by it so that none offer the 
original concept of buying or selling’.36   
More thresholds are evoked in Benjamin’s writing on the urban 
environment. Visiting Naples with Asja Lacis in 1924, a Benjamin in-love is 
fascinated with the city’s porosity: ‘One can scarcely discern where building is 
still in progress and where dilapidation has already set in. For nothing is 
concluded.’37 The experience of the unfinished produces a tentative condition, 
since not knowing where a building begins and ends, or whether construction 
has been completed, means the dissolution of spatial borders.  Even more 
centrally in Benjamin’s corpus, the technological innovations of the 
nineteenth century that are examined in the Passagenwerk position 
architecture, literature and photography on the verge of full immersion into 
the market; yet, insists Benjamin, ‘they linger on the threshold’.38  Described 
in monadological terms, the arcade is ‘windowless’, a passage without an 
outside.39 Between a dwelling and a shell, the arcade becomes an emblem of 
porosity between the domestic interior and the public exterior.40  This 
‘immanent exterior’ of the arcade, as Rebecca Comay has aptly called it,41 also 
marks the arcade as an immanent exterior; as itself a monadological structure 
that provides a counterpart to Benjamin’s figure of awakening, to the 
                                                             
36 Walter Benjamin, Notice 11, in The “Berlin Chronicle” Notices, trans. and with 
commentary by Carl Skoggard (Quebec: Pilot Editions, 2011), pp. 26-27.   
37 Walter Benjamin (with Asja Lacis), ‘Naples’ (1925), in SW1, pp. 414-421 (416).  
38 AP, ‘Exposé of 1935’, p. 13; GS V, p. 59.  Cf. AP [O2a, 1], p. 494; GS V, pp. 617-618. 
39 See AP [L1a, 1], p. 406; GS V, p. 513; AP [Q2a, 7], p. 532; GS V, p. 661.  
40 See Benjamin’s reflections on the ‘shell’ replacing the ‘dwelling’ in AP [I4, 4], pp. 
220-221; GS V, pp. 291-292.  
41 Comay, ‘Benjamin’s Endgame’, p. 278. 
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spatiotemporal experience ‘where the threshold between waking and 
sleeping was worn away […]’.42  
Taking into account the centrality of the threshold for Benjamin’s 
intellectual project, we might return to our earlier critique of the 
chronopolitics of kairós, proposed in Chapter 1.  We can then perhaps replace 
the figure of the fire alarm with a different timepiece that better captures the 
chronopolitics of timing: not an alarm clock or fire alarm, but a charged 
battery.43 ‘To store time as a battery stores energy: the flaneur’, writes 
Benjamin in his notes for the Arcades Project.44  This is the person who waits, 
who knows to store time, and who ‘takes in the energy “time” and passes it on 
in altered form’.45 Indicating a state of impatience rather than contemplation, 
this storing of time carries with it the anticipation of the battery being full, 
charged, and ready to be put to use.  Alongside this secular repository of time, 
we might also consider another temporal figure with a more explicitly 
messianic, and indeed theological character: the notion of tikkun – the 
smashing of the vessels in an act that is at once destruction and restoration. 
As one of Benjamin’s personal interlocutors and first textual interpreters, 
Gershom Scholem is still relied upon for his interpretation of the ‘Translator’ 
essay and its links to the Kabbalistic notion of tikkun.46 In large part because 
                                                             
42 ‘Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia’, in SW2.1, pp. 207-
221 (208); GS II.1, pp. 295-310 (296).  See also AP <Oo, 26>, p. 859-860; GS V, p. 1029. 
43 I am indebted to Jonathan Stafford for drawing my attention to the figure of the 
battery as a counter-image to the fire alarm.     
44 Benjamin plays here with the words einladen [to invite (in)] and laden [to charge], 
where one ought to invite and to charge time.  See AP [D3, 4], p. 107; GS V, p. 164.   
45 AP <Oo, 78>, p. 864; GS V, p. 1034. 
46 See Gershom Scholem, ‘Toward an Understanding of the Messianic Idea in Judaism’, 
in The Messianic Idea in Judaism, and other Essays on Jewish Spirituality (New York: 
Schocken, 1971), pp. 1-36 (p. 13).  See also Gershom Scholem, Walter Benjamin: The 
Story of a Friendship, trans. by Harry Zohn (New York: New York Review of Books, 
[1981] 2001), pp. 40-41, 69-70, 89, 113-128, 152, 258-263; and Gershom Scholem, 
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Scholem’s recollections and textual interpretations are still read as 
authoritative sources by many scholars, the status of Jewish mysticism within 
Benjamin’s work remains highly contested.47  It is beyond my present scope 
to take sides in this ongoing debate.  Nonetheless, at least with respect to 
Benjamin’s writing on historical time, the theological dimension cannot be so 
easily dismissed, especially since tikkun reveals a crucial aspect that the figure 
of the battery cannot: that what is being restored is not itself complete.48  For, 
the storing and restoring of time that is indicated by tikkun (where restoring 
can be read as ‘re-storing’, as a storing anew that does not repeat) bears also 
affinities with Penelope’s labour of weaving and unweaving [‘die 
Penelopearbeit des Eingedenkens’] that for Benjamin expresses the dialectical 
relation between memory and forgetting.49  Irving Wohlfahrt may have 
written decisively against a theological interpretation, yet he is correct that 
the structural relationship at work in Benjamin’s writing on history is one 
where ‘the partial wholes […] presuppose and anticipate their ultimate 
                                                             
‘Walter Benjamin and his Angel’ [1972], in On Walter Benjamin: Critical Essays and 
Recollections, ed. by Gary Smith (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), pp. 51-89.      
47 For a frequently-cited essay that relies heavily on Scholem’s interpretation, see 
Anson Rabinbach, ‘Between Enlightenment and Apocalypse: Benjamin, Bloch and 
Modern German Jewish Messianism’, New German Critique, 34. Winter (1985), 78-
124. For a measured account of the theological/anti-theological disputes (though 
itself from the standpoint of theology), see Roland Boer, Criticism of Heaven: On 
Marxism and Theology (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 57-61.      
48 Fredric Jameson’s claim, for instance, that the theological in Benjamin is merely 
‘strategic’ tells us more about certain Marxist scholars’ frustration about their 
inability to fully assimilate Benjamin’s thought to their intellectual project, than 
about Benjamin’s own relationship to theology. See Fredric Jameson, The Political 
Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1982), p. 69 n. 48.      
49 See ‘Proust’, in SW2.1, p. 238; GS II.1, p. 311. 
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totalization’.50  Not a repetition of the same, but a ‘filling in’ that also empties 
out as it fills, the smashing of the vessel marks another liminal state that 
dissolves the ‘either/or’ position of interiority/exteriority and 
completion/incompletion.   
Perhaps the exemplary vessel that defies such either/or state, 
however, is once again a highly personal and quotidian thought-figure drawn 
from Benjamin’s childhood – a sock.  Although we passed by this thought-
figure through the ‘Proust’ essay in Chapter 1, it is worth re-visiting, especially 
as it illustrates the logic of singularity that will be elaborated in the following 
section. Benjamin’s tale of the sock is described extensively in Berlin Childhood 
around 1900 in two versions (‘The Sock’ and ‘Cabinets’) which lyrically convey 
Benjamin’s memory of looking for, and touching, a pair of socks inside a 
cabinet.51  Narrated as an adventure story taking place in the lilliputian world 
of the drawer, the tale recounts how the hand dives into the pair of socks, 
which is rolled up and turned inside out. As Benjamin (as a young boy) reaches 
for the innermost core of the sock, which also functions as a carrier or pocket, 
he discovers that there is nothing inside, or rather, that as soon as what was 
carried has been grasped, the pocket disappears.  Benjamin (now as an adult 
man) concludes ‘The Sock’ by writing: ‘It taught me that form and content, 
wrap and wrapped [Hülle und Verhülltes], are the same.  It led me to draw truth 
from works of literature as warily as the child’s hand retrieved the sock from 
“the pocket”.’52  The deceptive nature of the sock, where what lies inside ‘turns 
out’ (literally) to be nothing but the sock itself, becomes for Benjamin a lesson 
with epistemological implications: the truth in literature cannot be found in 
the depth of meaning, in representation.  Rather, like in baroque allegory or in 
                                                             
50 Irving Wohlfahrt, ‘On the Messianic Structure of Walter Benjamin’s Last 
Reflections’, Glyph, 3 (1978), 148-212 (p. 172; emphasis added). 
51 See ‘The Sock’, in Berlin Childhood, pp. 96-97; and ‘Cabinets’, in Berlin Childhood, 
pp. 152-158.  Cf. ‘Der Strumpf’, GS IV, pp. 977-978 and ‘Schränke’, GS IV, pp. 283-287. 
52 ‘The Sock’, in Berlin Childhood, p. 97; translation modified.  
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the epic theatre, the truth-import [Wahrheitsgehalt] is on the surface, in 
exposition.   
In the second version (‘Cabinets’), the tale carries on for a little longer.  
This longer version does not leave us with an identification between wrap and 
wrapped, container and contained, but offers a third possibility: ‘They were 
one—and, to be sure, a third thing too: the sock into which they had both been 
transformed.’53  This is not a Hegelian ‘third’ – a dialectical sublation of the 
two prior theses.  Benjamin may himself have been partial to the idea of 
dialectics (most prominently in the figure of the ‘dialectical image’) but, as is 
well established, Benjamin’s thought can be considered dialectical only 
insofar as such dialectics could accommodate a philosophy of the fragment of 
the Jena Romantics.54  Benjamin’s ‘dialectics’ in this instance, a dialectics of 
‘nuances’ as he himself may have put it,55 is then arguably closer to Gilles 
Deleuze’s philosophy of individuation than to Hegelian sublation.56 For the 
                                                             
53 ‘Cabinets’, Berlin Childhood, p. 153. 
54 Although not as dominant as the ‘Frankfurt School’ or the ‘Jewish-messianic’ 
strands of Benjamin reception, the scholarship devoted to Benjamin’s interest in Jena 
Romanticism is nonetheless well-established. As an indication see Thomas Pfau, 
‘Thinking before Totality: Kritik, Übersetzung, and the Language of Interpretation in 
the Early Walter Benjamin’, MLN, 103.5 (1988), 1072-97; Andrew Benjamin and 
Beatrice Hanssen, eds., Walter Benjamin and Romanticism (London: Continuum, 
2002); Rebecca Comay, ‘Benjamin and the ambiguities of Romanticism’, in The 
Cambridge Companion to Walter Benjamin, ed. by David S. Ferris (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 134-51.   
55 See AP [N1a, 4], p. 459; GS V, p. 573.    
56 Although it is beyond my scope to develop a comparative reading of Benjaminian 
and Deleuzian individuation, such a reading would nonetheless necessitate a 
discussion of Deleuze’s writing on Proust and on the Baroque against Benjamin’s.  See 
Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs, trans. by Richard Howard (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2000), especially pp. 150, 163, 168; and The Fold: Leibniz and the 
Baroque, trans. by Tom Conley (London: Athlone Press, 1993).  For an insightful 
reading that brings both Benjamin and Deleuze into the realm of Jena Romanticism, 
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movement from one ‘state’ to another is not one of development but of interior 
unfolding.  This is a movement, as Rainer Nägele has also remarked, often 
traced by Benjamin: ‘moving inward to the point where the innermost “in” 
turns inside out into a radical outside’.57   
Our final stop in this passing-through takes us back to the point of our 
departure in Chapter 1: to the key epistemological fragments from the Arcades 
Project’s Convolute N, and the complementing theses from ‘On the Concept of 
History’. There, we find once again the monadological principle that has been 
carried over from the Trauerspiel, infused this time with the urgent call for 
class struggle, and the historical materialist’s task to bring about a ‘real state 
of emergency’ against fascism.58  The indexicality of language, which was 
earlier expressed through Baroque allegory and the brand-name of the 
commodity, becomes in its guise as ‘dialectical image’ explicitly historical.  As 
Benjamin writes in what is perhaps Convolute N’s most important entry [N3, 
1]:  
 
What distinguishes images from the “essences” of phenomenology is their 
historical index. […] The historical index of images says [sagt] namely, not only 
that they belong to a particular time; it says above all that they come to 
legibility [zur Lesbarkeit kommen] only at a particular time. And indeed this 
                                                             
see Josh Cohen, ‘Unfolding: Reading after Romanticism’, in Walter Benjamin and 
Romanticism, ed. by Andrew Benjamin and Beatrice Hanssen (London: Continuum, 
2002), pp. 98-108.  See also Peter Osborne, ‘On Comparability: Kant and the 
Possibility of Comparative Studies’, boundary 2, Special Issue: Problems of 
Comparability/Possibilities for Comparative Studies, 32.2 (2005), 3-22 (pp. 21-22).   
57 Rainer Nägele, Theater, Theory, Speculation: Walter Benjamin and the Scenes of 
Modernity (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 66.  Another 
instance in this movement could be provided by Benjamin’s figure of the ‘lining’ with 
reference to the time of boredom as well as fashion: AP [D2a, 1], pp.105-106; GS V, 
pp. 161-162; AP [D9a, 4], p. 118; GS V, p. 176. 
58 See Thesis VIII, ‘On the Concept of History’, in SW4, p. 392; GS I.3, p. 697.  
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coming ‘to legibility’ is a particular critical point of the movement in their 
interior [der Bewegung in ihrem Innern].59 
 
Leaving the comparison with the phenomenological ‘essences’ aside, what is 
pertinent in Benjamin’s description of the image is the manner in which the 
image is conditioned by the historical index. The expository simplicity of 
‘telling’ [sagen], whether used intentionally by Benjamin or not, points 
nonetheless to the index’s own non-representational or non-semantic 
relationship to the image. The dialectical image’s historicity – a true, 
‘figurative’ [bildlich] historicity that is not simply ‘temporal’ or ‘archaic’, as 
Benjamin insists60 – is to be found partly within a particular time (belonging 
to that time) and partly outside it (in a movement towards that time). As both 
movement and the arrest of movement, the dialectical image is yet another 
articulation of a vessel that breaks at the seams, like the line that experiences 
its own partition outside itself: ‘And thus the historical phenomenon 
[Tatbestand] polarises into fore- and after-history, always anew, never in the 
same way.  And it does so outside itself, in its actual present instant 
[Aktualität]; like a line which, divided according to the apollonian cut, 
experiences its partition outside itself.’61 Once again, the force-field described 
by Benjamin as being at once within and beside itself expresses a 
                                                             
59 AP [N3, 1], pp. 462-463; GS V, pp. 577-578; translation modified. For more 
examples of this historical indexicality at work, see AP [N9a, 8], p. 474; GS V, p. 593. 
See also: ‘The past [Vergangenheit] carries with it a furtive index’ in Thesis II, ‘On the 
Concept of History’, in SW4, p. 390; GS I.3, p. 693 (translation modified).   
60 AP [N3, 1], pp. 462-463; GS V, pp. 577-578.  See also the shorter alternative version 
of this entry, where historical time is proposed as ‘not progression but image, 
suddenly emergent [sprunghaft]’: AP [N2a, 3], p. 462; GS V, p. 577.   
61 AP [N7a, 1], p. 470; GS V, pp. 587-588; translation modified.  Instructive here is the 
translator’s note clarifying the possible meaning of Benjamin’s reference to an 
‘Apollonian section’ – namely, the division of a narrow line by a narrower one of a 
different colour, an image that clearly accords with the notion of a self-differentiating 
interiority. See AP, n. 21, pp. 989-990.  
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monadological movement whose completion is yet-to-come. Let us now take 
this movement at a standstill outside the immediate context of Benjamin’s 
texts, and place it in dialogue with other thinkers of singularity.  In this way, 
we will also non-linearly arrive at the idea of the avant-garde after 
modernism, and its chronopolitics of an afterness ‘and/in’ singularity. 
    
 
5.3  Afterness and/in Singularity  
 
It has become commonplace in Anglophone cultural studies to present 
Benjamin as a thinker of the marginal and the microscopic.62  There is plenty 
of textual evidence to support this reading, and one cannot think of Benjamin’s 
cultural history ‘from below’ without the ethico-political imperative to bring 
the ‘rags’ and ‘refuse’ to the surface and restore their place in history.63  If we 
attend to the fundamental distinction between the object of examination (the 
marginal) and the medium of examination (the microscopic), however, a 
different picture of Benjaminian epistemology emerges.  Taking into account 
our earlier discussion of Benjamin’s mediation of the quotidian and messianic, 
especially with respect to the technological imaginary that marks his later 
work, it might be more exact to describe Benjamin as a thinker, not of the 
microscopic, but of the ‘telescopic’.64  Readers will recall the famous aphorism 
                                                             
62 See, for instance, the much-anthologised essay by Janet Wolff originally published 
as: Janet Wolff, ‘Memoirs and Micrologies: Walter Benjamin, Feminism and Cultural 
Analysis’, New Formations, 20 (1993), 113-22. 
63 As one instance among many, see Benjamin’s methodological reflections in the 
‘Epistemo-critical Prologue’: ‘The relationship between the minute precision 
[mikrologischen Verarbeitung] of the work and the proportions of the sculptural or 
intellectual whole demonstrates that truth-content is only to be grasped through 
immersion in the most minute [genauster Versenkung] details of subject-matter.’  
Origin, p. 29; GS I.1, p. 208.  
64 Alongside Miriam Hansen’s already-mentioned monograph on cinema and 
temporal experience, for another notable study that brings Benjamin’s technological 
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from Convolute N, which sets the parameters for a historical-materialist 
practice of history: ‘Telescoping [Telescopage] of the past through the 
present.’65 The telescope functions here as a technological apparatus (indeed 
as another vessel), which does not simply zoom into the smallest, discarded, 
or what cannot be perceived by the naked eye, but rather as a historical-time-
machine that optically re-configures the relationship between what is nearest 
and what is furthest, temporally as well as spatially.66  Like the aura, which 
gives ‘the unique appearance of distance [Ferne], however near it may be’,67 
the telescope alters one’s perception of distance.  Historical cognition is thus 
articulated through the practice of telescoping, which enables perception in a 
multi-focal, multi-scale, shifting perspective. Yet this ‘multi’ perspective 
should not be mistaken for a ‘plural’ perspective (in the additive sense of the 
plural avant-gardes that we discussed earlier), but as a multiplicity in self-
differentiation or, in other words, as a singularity.  Before we take our final 
steps towards our concluding proposition about the avant-garde’s 
chronopolitics of singularity, let us first conceptually delimit the notion of 
singularity more broadly and in its Benjaminian articulation as I identify it 
more specifically.  
In its most common definition, singularity is that which resists the 
structural relationship between universality and particularity. There are two 
parallel definitions, proposed by thinkers Peter Hallward and Kojin Karatani 
                                                             
imagination in relation to historicity see Eduardo Cadava, Words of Light: Theses on 
the Photography of History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).       
65 AP [N7a, 3], p. 471; GS V, p. 588.  
66 For a comparable technological apparatus that has important implications for 
historical perception, see the ‘historical time-lapse camera’ [historischer Zeitraffer] 
that Benjamin refers to in Thesis XV, ‘On the Concept of History’, in SW4, p. 395; GS 
I.2, p. 701.  
67 ‘The Work of Art in the Age of its Reproducibility (Second Version)’, in SW3, pp. 
104-105; GS VII, p. 355.   
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respectively, which are pertinent for our analysis.68 Although neither 
Hallward nor Karatani engage with Benjamin, drawing instead on other 
monadological thinkers such as Gilles Deleuze, their definition of singularity 
can help us articulate precisely what kind of singularity a Benjaminian 
singularity would be.  In Absolutely Postcolonial, his landmark critique of the 
category of difference in postcolonial writing, Hallward draws on a broad 
philosophical lineage that includes Buddhist and mystical Islamic thought 
alongside Badiou, Deleuze and the latter’s engagement with Spinoza and 
Leibniz, and defines the singular as an entity which generates its own origin 
and its own relations with other entities; unlike the universal, which imposes 
its validity through a position that is external to itself, the singular is ‘self-
constituent, an ongoing differentiation’.69 Hallward clarifies that singularity 
‘can be indifferently described as infinitely compressed (singular because 
punctual, without extension) or as infinitely extended (singular because all 
                                                             
68 See Peter Hallward, Absolutely Postcolonial: Writing between the Singular and the 
Specific (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001); Peter Hallward, ‘The 
Limits of Individuation, or how to Distinguish Deleuze and Foucault’, Angelaki 5.2 
(2000), 93-111.  For Karatani’s interpretation of the notion of singularity, see Kojin 
Karatani, Transcritique: On Kant and Marx, trans. by Sabu Kohso (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2003), pp. 100-12. On Karatani’s broader intellectual project, which can itself 
be read as a philosophy of singularity, see Kojin Karatani, Architecture as Metaphor: 
Language, Number, Money, trans. by Sabu Kohso (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995); 
Kojin Karatani, History and Repetition, ed. and trans. by Seiji M. Lippit (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004); The Structure of World History: From Modes of 
Production to Modes of Exchange, trans. by Michael K. Bourdaghs (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2014). See also Carl Cassegarde, ‘Exteriority and Transcritique: 
Karatani Kōjin and the Impact of the 1990s’, Japanese Studies, 27.1 (2007), 1-18; 
Harry Harootunian, ‘Philosophy of History’s Return’, History and Theory, 54. February 
(2015), 96-105.  
69 Hallward, Absolutely Postcolonial, p. 4.   
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inclusive, without horizon)’.70 The question of measuring scale and distance is 
here crucial and bears strong affinities with Benjamin’s telescopic thought: 
the singular renders the distinction between the nearest and furthest, the 
tiniest and the largest, redundant.  We can also here recall our earlier analysis 
from Chapter 1 with reference to Jetztzeit.  As a ‘model’ of the messianic, and 
as the ‘enormous abbreviation’ of history, isn’t Jetztzeit precisely such a 
singularity?  It is a moment in/of time, which is infinite while point-like, and 
expansive while (and because) compressed.71       
Kojin Karatani’s conception of singularity also brings us to issues that 
we have already encountered in Benjamin, especially his theory of language. 
Singularity, for Karatani, problematises the distinction between interiority 
and exteriority, and is ‘tied to the function of the proper name’.72  Benjaminian 
singularity is also tied to language’s function as proper name: ‘Language […] 
only expresses itself purely when it speaks in name’, writes Benjamin in ‘On 
Language as Such and on the Language of Man’.73  No longer mediated through 
signification or representation, as we have seen, Benjamin’s language as 
Adamic naming, or translation in its translatability, points to an interior 
expansion that contains within it the relationality of (particular) languages. In 
describing Karatani’s philosophical project, one commentator has cogently 
expressed how we might also think of Benjaminian singularity: as ‘the relation 
between the one and the other, in which the latter must be first traversed in 
order to arrive at the former, and because of which attention on this one can 
                                                             
70 Hallward, Absolutely Postcolonial, p. 18 (emphases added). See also Hallward, ‘The 
Limits of Individuation’, 95.   
71 Benjamin himself highlights this relationship between the ‘in’ and the ‘of’ of time 
when he writes with reference to epistemology: ‘Historical knowledge is only 
possible within the historical moment.  But knowledge within the historical moment 
is always knowledge of a moment’.  New Theses B, in ‘Paralipomena to “On the 
Concept of History”’, SW4, p. 404 (emphases original).      
72 See Karatani, History and Repetition, p. xix. 
73 ‘Language’, SW1, p. 65. Cf. Origin, pp. 36-37; GS I.1, pp. 216-17.   
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at any time be disrupted by those elements of which, in a double sense, it is a-
part (that is, both belonging to and different from itself).’74  Once again, in 
accord with our earlier analysis, it is possible to conceptualise Jetztzeit in just 
those terms: as both belonging to and being different from itself; as being ‘a-
part’ of/from the entire course of history.  
Precisely because Jetztzeit is not fully exterior to historical time, 
Benjaminian singularity differs from Hallward’s conception.  Whereas for 
Hallward singularity is not constituted by its relations to other entities 
(something which would render it ‘specific’ in Hallward’s definition), 
Benjaminian singularity is constitutively relational.  Unlike the big bang (one 
of Hallward’s figures for the singular), Jetztzeit cannot be said to be entirely 
generative of its own conditions of space and time: it remains bound to the 
time of historicism, and its explosion remains partly within pre-existing 
conditions of spatiotemporal experience.  Karatani’s conception, on the other 
hand, demands that singularity is not constituted by repetition.75  Yet 
Benjaminian singularity is constitutively repetitive (even if the character of 
that repetition remains in tension with the temporality of the ever-same).  It 
is a repetition necessitated by a survival (Überleben) and by what Benjamin 
describes as ‘an afterlife (Nachleben) of that which has been understood and 
whose pulse can be felt in the present’.76  As Miriam Hansen has aptly 
observed, repetition in Benjamin oscillates between a Marxian appropriation 
of the Nietzschean ‘eternal return’ through the temporality of the commodity-
form (as we also discussed with reference to John Roberts in Chapter 3), and 
a Proustian recollection that is made messianic as a repetition ‘in the mode of 
                                                             
74 Richard F. Calichman, ‘Introduction’, in Contemporary Japanese Thought, ed. by 
Richard F. Calichman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 1-42 (p. 25; 
emphasis added). 
75 It is worth noting that Karatani discusses singularity and the proper name also in 
relation to allegory.  See Karatani, History and Repetition, p. 94. 
76 ‘Eduard Fuchs, Collector and Historian’, in SW3, p. 263; GS II.2, p. 468.  Cf. Origin, 
pp. 45-46; GS I.1, p. 226.  
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the ‘yet-once-again’ (it might work this time).’77  Benjaminian singularity thus 
requires historical difference; rather than being unprecedented, the singular is 
here relational.  
It is therefore not surprising that in a contrasting definition of 
singularity, made this time with reference to Benjamin, Samuel Weber has 
articulated the singular as the ‘spectral after-effect of a repetition’.78  In 
Weber’s influential deconstructive reading of Benjaminian afterness, ‘the 
singular emerges through iteration as that which precisely is not the same, 
which does not fit in’.79  Weber foregrounds the category of citability and thus 
reads Benjaminian singularity as an afterness of iteration that brings Jetztzeit 
closer to a category of the Derridian untimely, where time is out of joint.80  
Considering the Nietzschean strains of Benjamin’s critique of historicism, 
reading Benjamin as a thinker of anachrony or contretemps is certainly 
defensible.  Yet, as I have already highlighted in Chapter 1, if we read 
Benjaminian chronopolitics as a politics of interruption or suspension, as 
Weber does, we run the risk of ignoring the role that decisionism plays in 
Benjamin’s thought.81  Not only is kairós not reducible to an always-already 
                                                             
77 See Miriam Bratu Hansen, Cinema and Experience: Siegfried Kracauer, Walter 
Benjamin, and Theodor W. Adorno (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), p. 
195. On Benjamin’s appropriation of the Nietzschean concept of the eternal return, 
see also Matthew Rampley, Nietzsche, Aesthetics and Modernity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 146-52.   
78 Weber, Benjamin’s –abilities, p. 203. On singularity and repetition, see also his most 
recent contribution in: Sam Weber, ‘Benjamin’s Aura: Fort/Da’, The Germanic Review, 
91.2 (2016), 105-11 (p. 106).  
79 Weber, Benjamin’s –abilities, p. 170.    
80 See Weber, Benjamin’s –abilities, p. 171.  Cf. Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The 
State of the Debt, The Work of Mourning, and the New International, trans. by Peggy 
Kamuf (London and New York: Routledge, [1994] 2006), pp. 19-22.   
81 For a comparable reading that problematically turns the urgency of the fire alarm 
into a formal interruption and reads decision as ‘de-cision’, see Alexander García 
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iterated moment, but also the manner in which Jetztzeit mediates the 
theological and historical-materialist dimensions of historicity means that it 
cannot be equated with the temporal figure of ‘the unfinished’.  Jetztzeit may 
announce the possibility of a historical opening but, while doing so, it also 
announces the possibility of an ultimate and irreversible danger.  (Or, to put it 
in the terms we deployed above, Jetztzeit is infinite because it is point-like).  
The monad is not always-already a monad but emerges as a monad at the 
moment of kairós, revealing itself and making itself recognisable to the 
historical materialist so that a specific era is ‘blasted’ out of the course of 
history.82  Let us also recall alongside tikkun and the fire alarm another mode 
of temporal irreversibility: the vessel of the kaleidoscope and Benjamin’s 
famous exhortation that ‘the kaleidoscope must be smashed’.83  Such images 
of detonation and material destruction might have offered some intellectual 
ammunition to the likes of the Red Army Faction, as Irving Wohlfahrt’s 
documentary evidence has shown, yet in its philological dimension that 
interests us here, it is imperative to stress that Benjamin’s philosophical an-
archy seeks to establish an order of things exterior to the prism offered by 
merely rearranging the kaleidoscope, and exterior to the sovereign’s exception 
to the rule.84  As such, it would be both philologically and ideologically 
questionable to simply integrate Benjamin’s afterness into a temporality that 
                                                             
Düttmann, The Memory of Thought: An Essay on Heidegger and Adorno, trans. by 
Nicholas Walker (London: Continuum, [1991] 2002), pp. 210-17.   
82 See Thesis XVI, ‘On the Concept of History’, SW4, p. 396; GS I.2, p. 703.  
83 ‘Central Park’, in SW4, p. 164; GS I.2, p. 660.      
84 On the Red Army Faction’s deployment of Benjaminian notions of insurrectionary 
violence, see Irving Wohlfahrt, ‘Entsetzen: Walter Benjamin and the Red Army 
Faction, Part One’, trans. by Nick Walker and Irving Wohlfahrt, Radical Philosophy, 
152. November/December (2008), 7-19 (pp. 12-15); ‘Spectres of Anarchy: Walter 
Benjamin and the Red Army Faction, Part Three’, trans. by Nick Walker and Irving 
Wohlfahrt, Radical Philosophy, 154. March/April (2009), 9-24 (pp. 10-13). 
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misrecognises the moment of finitude, and in doing so refashions Jetztzeit’s 
moment of crisis-as-danger into capital-time’s crisis-as-opportunity. 
If – despite being relational and despite being constituted by repetition 
– Benjaminian singularity cannot be sufficiently articulated through the prism 
of a Derridian iteration, how are we then to understand the character of this 
afterness?  In order to answer this question, I will attempt to bring my reading 
of Benjaminian singularity into dialogue with my earlier analyses of historical 
time in Peter Bürger, John Roberts, and the Neoavanguardia. In doing so, I am 
taking my cue from Karatani’s ‘transcritical practice’ which seeks to establish 
a parallax structure – a move which he himself describes through the analogy 
of a ‘displacement or derangement one experiences when one first hears one’s 
own recorded voice’.85  Karatani’s parallax does not refer to the kind of 
perspectival shift that, for instance, Hal Foster has in mind when he uses the 
term alongside deferred action with respect to the neo-avant-garde.86  The 
shift does not simply denote the subject’s changed perspective on an object 
and thus a changed object, but also involves the subject’s own displaced 
relation to itself.  Therefore, the relationship between singularity and 
afterness as it pertains to the idea of the avant-garde emerges from reading 
Benjamin with and against the modalities of afterness articulated through 
these theories ‘of’ the avant-garde (and thus also problematising the 
relationship of object/attribute that the common expression of a ‘theory of the 
avant-garde’ suggests).  Reading these theories in a Benjaminian constellation 
means, therefore, that they are themselves re-configured from theories of the 
avant-garde (with the avant-garde as object) into theories indicating the 
avant-garde (with the avant-garde as idea).  
The mode of afterness that can be proposed through reading these 
theories indicating the avant-garde requires a (partly) constitutive 
relationship to historicism.  Although the very name ‘historicism’ was 
                                                             
85 Karatani, Transcritique, p. 48.  
86 See Foster, Return, pp. xii-xiii.   
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anathema to Benjamin’s intellectual project, in my own adaptation of 
Benjaminian singularity, historicism is to be understood neither as a linear 
temporal orientation nor as progressivism. Rather, as I have suggested in my 
introduction, historicism is articulated as a chronopolitical site of contestation 
where different levels of historicity come into contact. In the case of Bürger, a 
temporality of afterness was revealed through a narratological treatment of 
Theory of the Avant-Garde.  Re-reading this earlier analysis in light of the terms 
that we have now gleaned from Benjamin, we can read narrative time in 
Theory of the Avant-Garde as a threshold or a border-crossing between two 
kinds of historicity.  The text’s proleptic mode of afterness indicated the avant-
garde in a manner that both presupposed and anticipated the avant-garde qua 
avant-garde, as the parallax in/of time was produced by the dislocation 
between a logical a priori necessary for Bürger’s historicism and a historical a 
priori necessary for Bürger’s epistemology.  The avant-garde’s double 
relationship to Institution Kunst, as both determining and determined by this 
historical-yet-hermeneutical notion of ‘institution’, pointed to a double 
determinacy where precondition swapped temporal places with 
consequence.  In the case of the Neoavanguardia, the double character of the 
‘modern’ (encompassing the convergences between ‘modernism’, ‘modernity’ 
and ‘modernisation’) also indicated the avant-garde as that which both 
measures and is measured, as a vessel and content in/of time.  In Theory of the 
Avant-garde, the two levels of historicity remained primarily within the 
confines of the textual object, as the temporal indexes of ‘Adorno’s death’ and 
‘May 68’ were utilised by Bürger in an attempt to historicise his own narrative. 
In the case of the Neoavanguardia and John Roberts’ indebtedness to Adorno, 
by contrast, historicism went beyond the interiority of a single text.  In the 
critical reception of Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory and the intellectual battles 
fought over Adorno’s Marxism, as well as the Neoavanguardia’s relationship 
to realism and political commitment, a broader Cold War ‘context’ permeated 
the discursive articulation of the avant-garde.  (Such historical ‘context’ is 
arguably also present in Roberts’ post-‘89 legacy of enlisting the avant-garde 
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for an anti-capitalist critique in the twenty-first century.)  My analysis has 
suggested that Roberts’ own historicism is rather problematic: even in the 
most recent publications, the terms ‘postmodern’ and ‘contemporary’ are 
used interchangeably, while the historical moment of the neo-avant-gardes is 
conflated with the moment of its theorisation thirty years later. Yet if, 
empirically speaking, Roberts’ historical dislocations are best described as 
anachronisms, from the perspective of a Benjaminian comparativism, such 
infidelity or miscognition – does Roberts’ text ‘mistake the moon for a ball’ or 
is it play-acting as if it were a ball?87 – can generate a parallactic mediation 
between historical epistemology and historical time.     
It is in these iterations of miscognition or temporal dislocation that the 
shift from a mimetic representation to an indexical exposition in/of the avant-
garde occurs.  Recalling my earlier, brief reference to Jean-François Lyotard’s 
theorisation of the avant-garde as the ‘unpresentable’ and juxtaposing it with 
Benjamin’s theory of mimesis can prove here instructive.  Lyotard’s working 
notion of singularity also points to an epistemology of miscognition. However, 
this miscognition is distinctly different from Benjamin’s playful, analogic kind: 
Lyotard’s ethico-political task rests with the ontologically exceptional, the 
epistemologically non-graspable – that which is ‘beyond compare’. The 
evental figure of ‘Auschwitz’ provides an example beyond exemplarity, its 
liminality, as other commentators have also observed, conferring upon it ‘a 
sense of quasi-religious awe in relation to non-divine subjects’.88 The 
historical and representational exteriority that is enabled by the quasi-
religious or quasi-theological status of the unpresentable will bring to mind 
the discussions on Jetztzeit’s messianism and the extent to which such 
messianism is theological.  However, what is of pertinence for us and with 
                                                             
87 See my earlier analysis in Chapter 1 with reference to Miriam Hansen’s reading of 
Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of its Reproducibility (Second Version)’, SW3, 
p. 124, n. 10.   
88 Catherine Brown, ‘What is “Comparative” Literature?’, Comparative Critical Studies, 
10.1 (2013), 67-88 (p. 75). 
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reference to the avant-garde is not the question of divine agency, or whether 
Jetztzeit might be theological only ‘strategically’, but the status of exteriority 
to historicism enabled by the time occupied by the theological.    
 Such theological exteriority necessarily entails the question of ‘naming’ 
whether as or instead of ‘representation’.  As I have intimated throughout the 
thesis, writing in the name of the avant-garde has been an important 
component of writing a theory of the avant-garde.  In all the theorisations 
examined, the name ‘avant-garde’ has exerted its own semantic force: in 
Bürger’s insistence that Adorno’s aesthetic theory is ‘historical’ because it 
doesn’t recognise the distinction between the avant-garde and modernism; in 
Roberts’ defence of a contemporary anti-capitalist research project in the 
name of the avant-garde; in Neoavanguardia’s debates over the avant-gardism 
of its own poetics as well as the historiographical disputes that replace the 
name of the avant-garde in the name of another (again, ‘modernism’).  Were 
we to see such instances of writing in the name of the avant-garde through 
Lyotard’s unpresentable, we would reach the conclusion that the avant-garde 
has the ontological and epistemological status of the proper name.  In 
Benjaminian terms, this would be the ‘pure language’ of translatability, a 
‘script’ accessible only through theology.  Yet the modes of afterness 
articulated in and through these theorisations reveal the avant-garde not as 
proper name but as exchange-script (Wandelschrift). Through the non-linear 
returns of prolepsis, infidelity and belatedness, the status of the exceptional – 
whether as kairós, as Badiouian event, or ‘Italian-ness’ – has been questioned 
through the chronopolitics of ‘timing’, a determination that does not exclude 
contingency, and which produces the avant-garde as a parallax in/of time.  
Accordingly, Jetztzeit’s relationship to the messianic – the messianic itself 
already being at one remove from the theological – is indexically mediated: ‘as 
a model of the messianic, [Jetztzeit] comprises the history of all humankind in 
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a tremendous abbreviation’.89  Therefore, the relational singularity of a 
historicity guided by comparativism alluded to in my introduction is enabled 
not by the figure of the ‘incomparable’, but by the figure of the ‘model’.  
The model of Jetztzeit is, of course, a peculiar kind of model in that it 
resists the very qualities of a ‘model’. This is far from the ahistorical model at 
work in modernisation theory, where a neutral, static exteriority submits 
particularities to its scaled-down, ideal image.  Benjamin’s model is 
spatiotemporally ‘located’ only insofar as it is ‘dislocated’ and, like the chess-
piece’s relationship to its own radically-changing function, the model’s own 
task is not modelled on an exterior, static set of rules; instead, its 
chronopolitical task is given anew from within each historical moment.90  In 
this sense, therefore, Benjaminian comparativism would be a practically 
unworkable model (unworkable, that is, from an epistemological perspective 
that views comparativism purely in terms of applicability.)  As a non-model of 
a model or as a non-method of a method, however, Benjaminian 
comparativism is perfectly ‘non-applicable’ to the idea of the avant-garde, 
precisely because it addresses the twofold issue of the avant-garde’s 
paradoxical historicity and semantic deixis.  I have previously mentioned 
deixis as one of the avenues through which scholars have responded to the 
avant-garde as a ‘problem-category’. Susan Rubin Suleiman’s proposition of 
the avant-garde as deixis certainly resonates with our present discussion on 
naming and the status of the proper name.  Yet the contested and contingent 
character expressed through deixis relies on the absence of any exteriority to 
its referent and, philosophically speaking, it would render the avant-garde a 
                                                             
89 Thesis XVIII, ‘On the Concept of History’, SW4, p. 396; translation modified. Cf. GSI.2, 
p. 703. 
90 In another instance of singular self-determination, Benjamin programmatically 
states that ‘the chance for a completely new resolution of a completely new task […] 
is upheld by the political situation’.  Thesis XVIIa, ‘Paralipomena to “On the Concept 
of History”’, SW4, p. 402 (translation modified). Cf. ‘Anmerkungen zu Seite 691-704’, 
GSI.3, p. 1231.    
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radical particularity. In the case of a Benjaminian indexicality, by contrast, the 
interiority is disrupted by the parallax structure of Jetztzeit since, as we have 
seen, the radical particularity hidden in the temporal kernel of now-time is 
never entirely disassociated from universality. With regard to both linguistic 
representation and historical temporality, therefore, my proposition of the 
avant-garde not as a deictic ‘here-and-now’ but as a parallactic ‘now-time’ 
establishes also the epistemological shift that enables the contested and 
contingent notion of the avant-garde (still remaining fixed to predetermined 
empirical coordinates) to become itself the very medium and condition of 
contestation and contingency.         
 In the introduction to this thesis, I responded to Peter Osborne’s adoption 
of the Adornian dictum that ‘modernity is a qualitative, not a chronological, 
category’ by positing the avant-garde as a qualitative and a chronological 
category, as a category that is qualitative and chronological at the same time.  
This ‘at the same time’, connecting yet differentiating the avant-garde’s 
twofold temporality, is precisely the locus of the time of parallax, a time which 
itself remains ein Drittes, not a dialectical sublation of experience and 
measurement but its excessive exteriority, like Benjamin’s sock.  It is through 
the prism of a Benjaminian singularity, therefore, that the idea of the avant-
garde emerges as an afterness ‘and/in’ singularity.  The structure of ‘and/in’ 
expresses this parallax: while the ‘and’ denotes a separation (and thus 
exteriority) between the two, the ‘in’ points to the monadological interiority 
at work.  The kind of constitutive split that characterises the avant-garde in 
this new re-configuration is not between qualitative and quantitative time, 
therefore, but between (full) interiority and (full) exteriority.  In other words, 
since Benjaminian singularity does not represent the fragmentation of the 
whole but rather monadologically mediates the fragment as a whole, the split 
is one between self-determination and contingency. Thus, the idea of the 
avant-garde, whereby the avant-garde emerges as an idea in a truly 
Benjaminian non-representational sense, produces this structural 
relationship not only with respect to interiority and exteriority, but also 
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inescapably between anteriority and posteriority, and between completion 
and incompletion (in/of historical time). Placed in a Benjaminian 
constellation, the avant-garde no longer functions as a general concept that 
represents the particular phenomenon, but emerges as a singular idea that 
indexically mediates differentiation (with that differentiation partly including 
its self-differentiation).  Historical difference, as a result, is not posited as a 
variety in diversity, but a self-differentiation in univocity.  Constituted by 
afterness, the avant-garde as idea emerges as ahead of time (as such) and 
ahead of its (own) time.  It is itself a historical index, a compass that navigates 
towards its own ‘North Pole’, and against a course of time that others would 
consider a ‘deviation’.91          
 So what course of history does this conceptualisation of the avant-garde 
indicate? What ‘next’, and ‘where’ next, for the avant-garde as a Benjaminian 
singularity? The temporal endpoint to my own present narrative is intended 
here as an ‘enormous abbreviation’, whose expository mode ‘tells’, rather than 
‘shows’, what this new avant-garde would be: no longer historically specific, 
the avant-garde as a parallax in/of time emerges as historically singular.  Being 
ahead of its own time (and not simply ahead of others that occupy the same 
time, as the Saint-Simonian and etymological definitions suggest), this avant-
garde is positioned diametrically against an undialectical notion of progress.  
In this positioning, its disruption of linear periodisation also entails the 
disruption of pluralisation: with the avant-garde as an afterness and/in 
singularity, there are no more particular avant-gardes.  The relationship 
between the concept of the avant-garde and the phenomenon of the avant-
garde in its national or regional configuration (Russian avant-garde, Japanese 
avant-garde, Nordic avant-garde, etc.) is thus radically rearranged beyond the 
kaleidoscope’s mere re-ordering. The relationship between avant-garde 
phenomenon and avant-garde attribute is also radically disrupted: there are 
no more avant-garde attributes in disciplinary or representational terms 
                                                             
91 See AP [N1, 2], p. 456; GS V, p. 570.  Cf. AP [N9, 8], p 473; GS V, p. 592. 
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(architectural avant-garde, cinematic avant-garde, musical avant-garde, etc.). 
There can be no medium-specificity of the avant-garde, nor is there a plurality 
of media responding to the concept of the avant-garde, because in this 
configuration the avant-garde becomes a medial category itself. As 
Benjaminian idea, the avant-garde does not communicate, represent, or 
exemplify a certain ‘avant-garde-ness’. There is no elusive ‘common quality’ 
binding together particulars that have already been nominated ‘avant-garde’.  
The avant-garde as idea has no plural, not because it is homogeneous, but 
because it has no object.  Like the dialectical image, it is not an image of 
anything.  Like a tiger’s leap into the past, it is a leap whose time produces the 
very time in which a leap can occur.  Like Brecht’s dynamic chess-piece, its 
temporal function changes during the course of history – and the ‘course’ of 
history is changed with it.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Coda: 
 
Chronopolitics Out of Joint 
 
 
Arriving at this work’s conclusion while reflecting on the temporality that 
marks any conclusion, I am reminded of intellectual historian Martin Jay’s 
unscholarly intervention in the footnote that closes his introduction to the 
monograph Songs of Experience.1  Jay attaches his footnote to an utterance that 
directly addresses the reader, and by way of referring to his own experience 
of writing a book about experience, he foregrounds the temporal and 
experiential gap between himself and his audience: ‘[…] the experience of 
writing Songs of Experience may lead me where I do not expect to go.  You, the 
reader, will soon know how it will end; I, the author, am at the moment of 
writing these words, still eager to find out’.2  Rather than provide any evidence 
to this statement, the lengthy footnote that lies just beneath reveals to the 
reader the time it was written: 1997, six years before the writing of the 
footnote itself.  As the footnote tells us, upon re-reading the sentence after the 
manuscript had been completed, the author felt the sentence ‘disingenuous’, 
yet decided to keep it and attach this footnote so as to undermine, even if 
subtly, the academic façade of ‘retrospective coherence and closure’.3  Jay 
insightfully comments that scholarly convention demands that texts appear as 
if they came into being ‘all at once’, covering up the specificity of their time 
and place, concealing their ‘deictic particulars’.4      
 Writing a conclusion may seem by comparison a far less heterochronic 
affair.  After all, the conclusion cannot but be written last, after everything has 
                                                             
1 See Martin Jay, Songs of Experience: Modern American and European Variations on a 
Universal Theme (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), p. 8, n. 21.   
2 Jay, p. 8. 
3 Jay, p. 8, n. 21. 
4 Ibid. 
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been reasoned, revised, written and re-written. Yet in a work that has 
concerned itself, not with experience per se, but with the conflicting 
tendencies of experience and measurement as they manifest themselves 
through the category of historical time, a similar unscholarly strategy seems 
to be called for.  In this way perhaps I can make visible my own feeling of 
‘disingenuousness’ at the incongruity between the chronopolitics presented 
in this work and the chronopolitics of this work’s ‘deictic particulars’ – a 
doctoral thesis written in a UK university during the years of 2011-2016, and 
therefore bound to the chronometrisation of the state-regulated, border-
controlled, privately-funded neoliberal institution that demands that the work 
be ‘completed’. Even if the thesis had aspired to perform a kind of 
chronopolitical intervention, however, it would still pale in comparison to the 
calendrical intervention of the French social movement Nuit Debout, which 
have re-set the calendar to the movement’s beginning on March 31, and which 
at the time of writing is the 79th of March.5  No revolutionary calendars or 
clocks have been devised in this study, of course. Yet if there is a 
chronopolitical lesson to be learnt from this thesis’ praxis it is precisely in 
exposing this gap – understood perhaps as the Benjaminian singularity of ein 
Drittes – that lies hidden in the deictic particularity of ‘the time of writing’.  Not 
a disingenuous incongruity, in this case, but a necessary gap between the time 
of writing and the time in writing, whereby ‘writing’ itself occupies a double 
temporality: a finitude as well as an opening, a point-like activity and that 
activity’s afterlife, of what remains as writing.  The more particular task of 
writing critical theory (and of critical theory as writing), therefore, is 
necessarily embroiled in what Benjamin himself had identified with respect 
to the question of distance. ‘Kritik ist eine Sache des rechten Abstands’ 
[criticism is a matter of correct distance], wrote Benjamin in One-way Street, 
and in this space of assessment of what is ‘correct’ or ‘appropriate’ distance, 
                                                             
5 For an online version of the Nuit Debout calendar, see 
<http://jcfrog.com/NuitDebout> [last accessed 1 December 2016].  It was the 79th of 
March when this sentence was written for the first time.     
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we can perhaps identify a model for critical theory’s relationship to historical 
time.6 In this way, critical theory’s deictic particularity – its ‘thisness’, 
‘nowness’ or ‘hereness’ –  would not be subsumed by what might seem most 
‘timely’ or ‘topical’ (a false urgency that often amounts to nothing more than 
what Adorno describes in his inimitably germanised American-English as the 
state of ‘Uptodatesein’),7 but would itself function as the medium for assessing 
what constitutes appropriate distance.     
 Being able to assess one’s own timeliness in history may be easier in some 
cases than in others.  The term chronopolitics, which has recently become 
topical in academic discourse, has been mapped as current precisely because 
discussions have focussed on historical developments that are 
unprecedented: the environmental transformations that are commonly 
referred to as ‘the Anthropocene’, and the prevalence of digital and network 
technologies where velocity (whether articulated as a defence or attack of 
acceleration) becomes the site of a broader contestation over the experience 
and production of time, and over human agency’s role in effecting historical 
change.8  It is less easy to assess timeliness when it comes to the competing 
claims made in the name of tradition or progress.  Equally, when it comes to 
                                                             
6 SW1, p. 476; GS IV.1, p. 131; translation modified.  See also Gerhard Richter’s 
biographically-oriented discussion of the notion of ‘correct distance’ in Benjamin. 
Gerhard Richter, ‘A Matter of Distance: Benjamin’s One-Way Street through the 
Arcades’, in Thought-Images: Frankfurt School Writers’ Reflections from Damaged Life 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 43-71.     
7 See Adorno, ‘On the Fetish-Character in Music and the Regression of Listening’, in 
Essays on Music: Theodor W. Adorno, pp. 288-317 (p. 311); AGS 14, pp. 14-50 (p. 45). 
8 As an indication, see Hartmut Rosa, Alienation and Acceleration: Towards a Critical 
Theory of Late-Modern Temporality (Malmö: Aarhus University Press, 2010); Robin 
Mackay and Armen Avanessian, eds., #Accelerate: The Accelerationist Reader 
(Falmouth and Berlin: Urbanomic/Merve Verlag, 2014); Judy Wajcman, Pressed for 
Time: The Acceleration of Life in Digital Capitalism (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2015). 
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the avant-garde, answering the question of whether a study on the avant-
garde is ‘timely’ becomes slippery (especially as it may entail a question on 
the status of the avant-garde’s own temporality).  There is certainly nothing 
topical about examining the question of the avant-garde’s chronopolitics and, 
although the term ‘avant-garde’ is still current, an engagement with the avant-
garde’s relationship to the temporality of modernity is no timelier today than 
it was 30 years ago, when this question was raised with reference to the 
condition of postmodernity.  The timeliness of a study on chronopolitics and 
the avant-garde in the first decades of the twenty-first century is perhaps best 
defended, however, not in terms of unprecedented change but in view of 
historical and political continuities.  And the importance of such continuities, 
though overshadowed by the more attention-grabbing temporality of 
unprecedented change, is made all the more evident when the name ‘avant-
garde’ is still invoked in claims of progress, as when deployed for instance by 
the Italian neo-fascist group Comunità Politica di Avanguardia [Vanguard 
Political Community], whose monthly magazine is simply entitled 
Avanguardia.9           
It is this tension between historical continuity and historical rupture (and 
between ‘novelty’ and ‘the new’) that has been at the heart of my investigation.  
As a study that proposes a new conceptualisation of the avant-garde’s 
relationship to historical time, Ahead of its Time has sought to challenge not 
only prevailing accounts of the avant-garde’s progressivism but also its 
mythologised status as historical rupture.  In dialogue with scholars who have 
                                                             
9 Comunità Politica di Avanguardia (Vanguard Political Community) forms a 
continuation of the extra-parliamentary organisation Avanguardia Nazionale 
(National Vanguard) that was active in the 1960s.  On the group Avanguardia 
Nazionale, see Andrea Mammone, Transnational Neofascism in France and Italy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 113-14. For the official website 
of Comunità Politica di Avanguardia, see <http://blog.avanguardia.tv> [accessed 23 
November 2016]. 
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approached the avant-garde philosophically, in this study I have been 
concerned with the notion of the avant-garde insofar as it poses the question 
of what it takes to be absolutely new.  By focussing on the idea of the avant-
garde after modernism more specifically, I have sought to explore the problem 
of the new from the perspective of afterness: what does it take to be absolutely 
new while also being ‘historically new’? Rather than rejecting altogether the 
‘homogeneous, empty time’ of historicism and treating its temporality as 
irrelevant or extraneous to the avant-garde’s chronopolitics, I have posited 
the avant-garde as a notion that both inhabits and resists the temporality of 
historical periodisation. In this endeavour, I took my cue from scholars who 
have discussed the temporality of the avant-garde with reference to the 
Benjaminian notion of Jetztzeit, before extending these analyses by examining 
Jetztzeit’s exteriority to historical time in Chapter 1.  Against accounts that 
privilege the exceptional temporality of kairós, I argued for a notion of Jetztzeit 
that indexically mediates the exceptional with the quotidian. Considering the 
relationship between Benjamin’s writings on history and his reflections on 
language and mimesis, moreover, I suggested that a new form of 
comparativism founded on a telescopic perspective of the shifting scale can 
provide a starting point for undoing the relationship between universality and 
particularity, especially as it persists in current tendencies that seem to 
‘specify’ the avant-garde.   
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 (Part II) were devoted to close textual interpretations 
of theorisations of the avant-garde after modernism, selected as iterations of 
the problematic of a chronopolitics of ‘the new after the new’. Chapter 2 
revisited Peter Bürger’s canonical theory through a narratological prism so as 
to analyse the different layers and intersections of historicism that were 
present beneath the text’s progressivist surface.  While analysing the proleptic 
syntactical structures at work in Theory of the Avant-Garde, I also exposed the 
parallax in/of time that characterised the relationship between Bürger’s 
under-determined notion of the avant-garde and his main theoretical category 
of the institution of art/literature – a category which, as I demonstrated, is at 
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once historically specific in its relationship to aestheticism and trans-
historical in its heuristic function as the epistemological foundation of a new 
sociological analysis of art and literature. Discussing Bürger’s attempts to self-
historicise his own theory, I suggested that the question of afterness as an 
avant-garde ‘inheritance’ could be best articulated as a proleptic, anticipatory 
modality that is itself reminiscent of Benjamin’s messianic prolepsis in 
Angelus Novus. The question of historical indebtedness was again taken up in 
the following chapter through the figures of fidelity and ‘the new’.  In Chapter 
3, I turned to Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory and to art theorist John Roberts, 
whose polemical publications have defended the continuing relevance of the 
notion of the avant-garde for an anti-capitalist politics.  I revisited Adorno’s 
relationship to the avant-garde – as opposed to ‘modernism’ – and challenged 
the reception of Adorno’s aesthetic theory as a theory of the avant-garde, 
while also sketching a brief intellectual history of such reception. Turning to 
the question of ‘the new’ in Adorno and elaborating on its dialectical 
relationship to the ‘ever-same’, I prepared the ground for a critical 
engagement with Roberts’ use of the Adornian new and its application to his 
theory of the ‘suspensive avant-garde’. My analysis revealed the centrality of 
repetition in considering the chronopolitics of the avant-garde after 
modernism, and rather than romantically embracing the avant-garde as a 
figure of anti-capitalist temporality, I exposed the avant-garde’s implication in 
modernity’s hellish repetition of the ever-same. Chapter 4 examined afterness 
through the contentious issue of ‘belated modernisation’ in the context of the 
literary circle Neoavanguardia. I began by situating the work of the 
Neoavanguardia in the context of the Italian New Left, discussing the 
centrality of the question of impegno [commitment] in perpetuating a 
realism/avant-garde dichotomy, and introduced the different positions that 
two of the most prominent voices of the Neoavanguardia (Edoardo Sanguineti 
and Angelo Guglielmi) took with respect to ‘history’.  My analysis then shifted 
focus onto the historiographies of the Neoavanguardia and re-visited the 
realism/avant-garde dichotomy from the perspective of literary history. 
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Foregrounding the auto-allochronic discourse underpinning these historical 
narratives, I analysed the issue of ‘translating’ the (Italian) avant-garde into 
(Anglo-American) modernism, showing how Neoavanguardia has been 
historicised as a transition between realism and postmodernism, and as a 
stage in Italian literary history that anticipates the alleged openness and 
diversity of postmodernism. As a unique iteration of the chronopolitics of the 
new after the new, therefore, the case of the Neoavanguardia revealed another 
mode of afterness, in which inheriting the avant-garde is fraught with the 
temporal tensions between the writing of national literary historiography and 
its cultural translation into the cosmopolitan aspirations of trans-national 
modernism.         
 Having examined these iterations of afterness in Part II, in the final chapter 
I sought to crystallise my overall argument by returning to issues that had 
been broached over the thesis’ narrative course. Chapter 5 began by returning 
to the problem of specificity as it had been outlined in the thesis’ introduction, 
and by way of a critical summary of scholarly tendencies within avant-garde 
studies, I argued against an avant-garde ‘in the plural’.  While I sided with a 
number of critics of the multiple-modernities paradigm, I also argued that a 
singular avant-garde was necessary as a means of uncoupling the notion of the 
avant-garde (as generality) from the phenomenon of the avant-garde (as 
specificity). Returning to Benjamin’s writing on language and historical time, 
and using the figure of the vessel as means through which to foreground the 
relationship between historical time and mimesis, I proposed Benjaminian 
singularity as a model for thinking the avant-garde, not as a concept related to 
a phenomenon, but as an idea in constellation or – in the parallactic terms I 
suggested – as an idea of afterness and/in singularity. Theorising the avant-
garde after modernism was thus itself reconfigured in a Benjaminian 
constellation, whereby the theories were no longer of the avant-garde, but 
became temporal indexes of a chronopolitics out of joint.    
Situated at the intersection of critical theory and philology, this study has 
been written in dialogue with scholars primarily in the fields of Benjamin 
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studies and avant-garde studies.  In both cases, however, I have approached 
the fields obliquely, and with a certain distance.  In the former case, my 
engagement with Benjamin’s corpus and the vast secondary scholarship that 
has accrued since the 1970s has been guided by a search for a comparativist 
methodology, even if such search has meant foregoing a clear distinction 
between ‘object’ and ‘method’. My focus on historical time in Benjamin’s 
oeuvre has sought to foreground the importance of other kinds of temporality 
that co-exist alongside the still-potent, ruptural time of Jetztzeit, while it is 
hoped that my proposition of Benjamin as a thinker of singularity will open 
further avenues of comparison between other non-Hegelian thinkers such as 
Deleuze, Edouard Glissant or Georges Bataille.10  With respect to avant-garde 
studies, although this study has positioned itself somewhat antagonistically 
towards this field, its relevance for current scholarly debates within avant-
garde studies is arguably greater. For the most part, avant-garde studies 
scholarship has tended to rely on the main categories that this thesis has 
refuted: the periodising categories of ‘historical avant-garde’ and ‘neo-avant-
garde’; the replacement of the avant-garde with the plural avant-gardes; and 
the all-too-easy leap between the concept ‘avant-garde’ and the socio-cultural 
formations ‘of the avant-garde’. Nevertheless, in its questioning of the 
geochronopolitical coordinates of the notion of the avant-garde, and in its 
suspension of identity between ‘avant-garde-ness’ and the category of ‘avant-
garde art’, this thesis can provide a starting point for other scholars who are 
invested in ‘de-linearising’ avant-garde histories and historiographies, 
especially as such histories are themselves deployed in certain national 
contexts in the name of modernisation (most prominently in post-socialist 
                                                             
10 Although comparisons between Benjamin and Bataille are frequently hinted at, 
there are few scholarly studies that have devoted themselves to such a task.  As an 
exception, see the article drawn from a doctoral dissertation by Michael Weingrad, 
‘The College of Sociology and the Institute of Social Research’, New German Critique, 
84. Autumn (2001), 129-61. 
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countries), or when ‘national avant-garde heritage’ studies from the periphery 
interact with ‘area studies’ in ways that disturbingly perpetuate the 
allochronic institutional structures of global academe.   
My proposition of the avant-garde as historically singular leaves itself open 
to certain ethico-political charges.  I would like to briefly address these by way 
of conclusion.  Proposing the avant-garde as a temporal self-determination 
that brings about a radical reconstitution of historical time as such could be 
misconstrued as a call to boundless sovereignty or unlimited ‘will-to-time’, 
with the avant-garde being pronounced as a law unto itself.  Accordingly, 
proposing the avant-garde as a Benjaminian idea without an object could be 
misread as advocating a politics of immediacy or spontaneous voluntarism, 
which leaves no room for political representation.  These dangers are indeed 
present in Benjamin’s own work, and insofar as my proposed notion of the 
avant-garde is Benjaminian, they ought not to be circumvented.  That said, the 
question of time’s ‘fullness’ is here pivotal, and it is precisely in the testing and 
contesting of that fullness through a parallactic prism that the above dangers 
can be confronted.  For, the avant-garde is proposed here neither as a full 
determination nor as a (full) self-determination.  Rather, in that filling-in that 
is also an emptying-out (exemplified by the figures of tikkun or the sock) and 
in language’s translatability, where an ‘other’ language does not become ‘our 
own’ through translation, but rather language is itself an ‘other-to-come’, the 
idea of the avant-garde as a singularity is never fully inside ‘its’ time. The 
proposed conceptualisation of the idea of the avant-garde after modernism, 
therefore, points neither to a politics of a presence in/of historical time, nor to 
an ideological aspiration of full belonging, but rather to a site of contestation 
where contingency is always ‘a-part’.  As we take these ideas beyond the 
study’s deictic particularity and out into our historical time, therefore, it is 
hoped that the avant-garde’s chronopolitics out of joint can act as a modest 
reminder that the historical time we believe to be ours may well carry in its 
interiority a time radically other, a time that radically reconfigures the 
historical time that we, up to this time, had called our own.  
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